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ASPECTS OF RURAL PLANNING IN THAILAND



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Editor's Note

This issue is mainly concerned with the concept of planning in the agricultural and rural sector.

The first article on "Coordination and Implementation of Agricultural Development Administration" is a joint paper by Dr. Warin Wonghanchao and Ms. Orapan Nabangchang. The article discusses the concept of agricultural development planning and its fundamental components. It also looks into the administrative aspect and the existing mechanisms of planning and the ways that these inhibit the successful planning and implementation of agricultural development. The article was first published as a follow up paper for the study of "Agricultural Employment Creation and the Improvement of the Quality of Agricultural Commodity for Increasing Income and Export Earnings", which served as a consultant report to the NESDB. It was prepared with the assistance and insights of several people in the planning agencies of the agricultural sector, i.e., the Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Land Development Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Livestock and the Department of Agricultural Extension. The representatives from these agencies have been open in opinions of the problems and obstacles in agricultural development planning and in the suggestions as to what might be solutions for effective planning as viewed from a practitioners point of view. This has been of great contribution in bringing some realism into the presentation of the paper as to what is practical within the existing constraints of planning.


The Second article on "Issues of Rural Development" is written by Dr. Jacques Amyot. This article highlights some of the issues in the changes of the traditional agricultural structure through the transitional phase into a "progressive type of agriculture." Among the issues discussed are the factors that determine the changes such as the agricultural services and extension programmes, farmers perceptions of change and attitudes to change, the context of change, i.e., social traditions, economic structures and legal framework. In the last paragraphs of the article, agricultural development is discussed in connection with the concept of rural well-being, i.e., in terms of the improvement of the quality of life, physical level of living and the spiritual aspects of rural well-being relating to family, community and the individual.

The following three articles are related to a particular aspect of agricultural development, i.e., land issues. The first of these is the article, "Issues of Land Reform and Planning for Land Distribution" written by Ms. Orapan Nabangchang. In this article, problems of land reform are discussed in terms of the conceptual issues of land reform implementation and procedures. The article discusses the various aspects

of the land reform execution in its three fundamental phases, i.e., the pre-land distribution period, the land distribution and the post-land distribution phase. In the final sections focus on recommendations on how land reform implementation procedures can be improved from an organizational point of view and how the constituents of the Top-down and the Bottom-up can effectively contribute to successful land reform implementation. Following this article is a case study of land-labour relationships in an article "Landowner-Labour Relationships in a District of Rural Central Thailand" which provides an interesting overview of the complexities of relationships that are determined by external changes both from the market economy and from the state intervention measures. This article is written by Dr. Naruemon Bunjongjit based on a study conducted in the Ban Na District of Nakhon Nayok. The author has used social anthropological methods in investigating the changes in land-labour relationships. The last paper on land issues is written by Mr. Guatam Yamada titled "Patron Client Relationships : Landless and Landowners in South Asia." This is a paper which deals with more theoretical aspects of landlessness and patron-client relationships.

The final paper of this issue is prepared by Mr. Prisca Piamphongsant on "Alternative planning Vision and Structural Changes in rural Thailand." The article gives an interesting analysis of the present approach to planning and offers a new perspective that starts the planning process with the goals and targets to be reached and the organization of the means to reach the goals according to the desired outcome.

Orapan Nabangchang



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Coordination and Implementation of Agricultural Development Administration

*Dr. Warin Wonghanchao
Ms. Orapan Nabangchang*

1. Framework and Plan From The Project on "Agricultural Employment Creation and The Improvement of The Quality of Agricultural Commodities for Increasing Income and Export Earnings".

1.1 Planning Framework, Components and Policy Types.

Planning Framework.

With the planning framework for increasing employment, income and export earnings, we consider the three main sectors of the agricultural economy to be the private, government and the cooperative and the farmer's organization hereafter to be called "cooperatives" for short.

In the fact of the main constraints, namely the lack of government resources, our philosophy is that the cooperative sector, however small, offers an additional route of saving resources. Privatisation is not the only way. The cooperative sector has to be strengthened. We feel that this can offer a way of reducing the government's financial burdens if properly organized. Moreover, it fits a Bottom-up approach and the development strategy that emphasizes participation.

Framework Components.

The planning framework may be envisaged as falling into several parts forming the following pattern :

(1) At the core will be the agricultural resource development and the agricultural production plans ;

(2) The marketing plan for domestic and export markets must be carefully coordinated with the production plan ;

(3) The two types of organizations which will operate within the planning framework will be those in the private sector and the cooperatives ;

(4) **Agricultural Research and Development** will be applied in the agricultural production through in-house research within the MOAC and research institutes inside and outside the country ;

(5) **The Agricultural Multi-Commodity Insurance Plan** will operate in the sector of production through the cooperatives and the insurance companies in the private sector.

(6) **The Agricultural Credit Plan** will operate in production and marketing and the credit will be offered through cooperatives and the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives.

(7) **The Agricultural Aid Funds Plan** will allocate funds in a coordinated manner to cover needs in production and marketing by using the cooperatives who will also act as a channel of communication for making farmer's needs known.

(8) **Farm Level Supplementary Income Plan** will operate also through production and marketing when possible, by using the cooperatives. The activities of the private sector will be directed largely by market forces and hence not specifically targeted in the plans. The activities of the cooperative sector are emphasized in the framework because they form an additional way of relieving the government financial burden in development and of mobilizing and coordinating otherwise dormant productive forces by utilizing the Bottom Up approach.

Forms of Development Policy.

The framework identifies four specific forms of development policy :

- (1) Area specific ;
- (2) Function specific ;
- (3) Market specific ;
- (4) Commodity specific.

Area Specific. Problem specific to different areas must be clearly identified. This is due to the diversity of agro climates, topology, the availability of land and water resources varies as well as the accessibility of resources. The deterioration in production resources also varies considerably from one area to another. Hence, the plans have to take into account the diversity of the problems.

Function specific. Financial resources for development are limited. Different areas, producers and commodities are competing for these resources. Hence the plans should set up criteria for allocating these resources most effectively. Each function in a commodity production chain is different and will require different treatment but there is a need to have a coherent overall framework for all the commodities together. For example, plantations of oil palm would have a higher priority than coconuts

owing to their different and more extensive marketing needs. In agricultural resource development, fruit trees would have priority over oil palm. In the sphere of cooperative development, coffee would have priority over fruit trees.

Market Specific. Different markets have different requirements and must be developed taking these differences into account. For example, aquaculture products at present are sold on the local market but are not suitable for export. For export markets, the market of the U.S. is different from the markets in Europe and Japan.

Commodity Specific. Each commodity follows a different chain from farm to market. Hence the idea is to regard each commodity as a complete system so as to guide production in accordance with marketing needs. Regarding the commodity as a system permits us easily to identify weaknesses and to remedy these. For example, in the rice commodity system in the South, problems are more likely to arise in production and in post-harvest loss than in marketing. On the other hand, in the coffee production system, production problems are relatively unimportant. Here, marketing is the difficulty particularly in relation to price fluctuations which arise from uncertainty over demand when the annual quota is being negotiated.

1.2 Linkages of Framework Components.

Linkages of Plans.

The plans within the framework are linked and integrated as shown in the charts 1 and 2

Operational Linkages.

The planning framework as shown above is composed of nine plans. Each plan already has operating government agencies. The effective coordination of the various plans and the components of the plans is essential but constitutes a problem.

At the outset, the plans would be operated by the existing authorities working in cooperation but a sole authority to direct the cooperation and to monitor the plans should be envisaged.

2. Coordination, Implementation and Monitoring of the Agricultural Development Administration.

2.1 The Needs for Improving the Present Agricultural Development Administration.

Problems of Agricultural Development Administration :

The pursuit of agricultural development activities are confronted with an array of problems ranging from the technical problems of production to the social and economic problems of the status of the majority of the agricultural producers,

Chart 1 The integrated agricultural development planning network.





Chart 2 Plan linkages in the integrated agricultural development planning framework.



to the ideological problems of the structural changes in the economic base of the country a process in which the agricultural sector play a significant role. One of the most important facets in agricultural development, however, is the role of the State, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. The problems confronted by MOAC in the role that it plays in the management of agricultural development activities can be divided into two major categories: (1) the management problems and (2) the financial problems.

The management problems :

(1) At present, the role of the various MOAC Departments are not clear. There is much duplication of jobs and inter-Departmental conflicts arising from competition for budget allocation which is very much a hindrance to the effective coordination of efforts. In this situation, the Departments are all going their one way trying to assume full responsibility from the start to the end and none of them has really looked into the possibility of how to effectively link, not only among themselves but also with the private sector. The MOAC is ineffective in controlling the Departments and the activities should be in a programme approach.

(2) The organization such as the present Committee for Policy Formulation does not in practice, set out the strategy for agricultural development approaches. It is rather overwhelmed by the task of solving day to day work :

The financial problems :

(1) The Budget Bureau assesses the proposals on a line item basis rather than on a project basis.

(2) The staff of the Budget Bureau who are responsible are normally those who do not have the background nor the specialised knowledge to assess the appropriateness of the proposal and act accordingly. In the future, there should be some authority within each of the Ministries responsible for the screening project proposals in stead of the present situation where the Budget Bureau assumes the total responsibility. It is proposed thus, as the Ministerial staff will be more aware of the background in which the project proposals are made and the technicalities involved.

(3) In the process of approving the budget proposals of the Departments and the Divisions, there is no attempt on the part of the Budget Bureau to evaluate these proposals in the light of the National Plan and the Ministerial Plan to ensure the validity of these requests on the basis of their compatibility with the broader strategy of the Ministry itself. Instead, each Department approaches the Budget Bureau independently and approvals are made on the effectiveness of the personal links.

Approaches for Tackling the Problems of Agricultural Development :

In view of the nature of the problem outlined, it becomes essential to identify the means with which to overcome these problems. Two approaches for tackling the problems of agricultural development administration are here identified: (1) Market led and production led approaches, (2) Top-down and Bottom-up approaches.

Market led and production led approaches. The emphasis here is to foster effective linkages between the production or the supply side and the marketing or the demand side. Such effective linkages between state agencies related to the demand side, i.e. the MOAC and the supply side, the MOC has been hitherto noticeably lacking to the extent that there is no compatibility and consistency between the production promotion and marketing prospects. Some of the subdivisions within the MOAC have resumed full responsibility from the promotion of production following on through to the marketing aspects of a particular agricultural product with little assistance from external agencies. However, it is not technically possible nor feasible that the MOAC should assume total responsibility for some of the commodities. Thus some practical guidelines needs to be established to clearly define the scope of responsibility of the MOAC on the production side and its linkage with other agencies on the marketing side to foster the required linkage. For this reason, the proposed approach is that the commodities should be divided into two types :

(1) The Commodities which we already have the comparative advantage given the natural conditions of production. For these commodities, emphasis should be given to the improvement of the breeds and genetic qualities. In this case, the Departments may be able to take total responsibility in conducting research and development (R&D) from the production to the marketing ;

(2) Commodities wanted by the market, particularly, the export market. Emphasis here should be on the improvement of the product quality so that it is consistent with the market requirements. In this case, there is an apparent need for effective linkage between the production side and the marketing side, i.e., MOC. The strategy to be used should be the market led strategy.

Bottom-up and Top-down approach. In addition to the clarity of approach to the two types of commodities discussed above, there is also an apparent need to incorporate the concept of Bottom-up and Top-down process. The following consideration should be in order :

(1) Bottom-up elements ensures that there is people's participation in the local agricultural development process. Bottom-up is undertaken in the following levels :

(1.1) Village level. At the village level, people's participation is conducted in the form of village meetings arranged by the Committee for Village Development (CVD). The objective of these meeting are to find solutions to the problems of agricultural development and to propose these recommendations in the form of projects to the tambon level ;

(1.2) Tambon level. The Tambon council is the mechanism for local development planning as well as administering the local development activities ;

(1.3) District and Provincial Level. The organizations responsible for implementing development activities in accordance with the policies and the objectives laid down by the Annual Implementation Plan and the Five Year Ministeral Master Plan are the MOAC representatives, the Provincial Sub-committee for Rural Development Committee.

(2) The Top-down Planning elements on the other hand, lay down the guidelines, the scope and the constraints pertaining to the situational context of planning. The implementing agency is the Office of the Permanent Secretary acting in accordance with the planning framework already described. The Top-down level planning consists of three components :

(2.1) Projects and programmes according to the element within the planning framework such as resource development, production, marketing, agricultural credit, aids funds, commodity insurance, research and development, the strengthening of farmers' institutions.

(2.2) The special crash projects and programmes that arise due to unforeseen circumstances ;

(2.3) Projects and programmes which are designed to support projects and programmes of other Ministries and government agencies, private sector and farmer's organizations.

2.2 Coordination and Implementation Target for Improving Agricultural Development Administration.

The Targets for Coordination and Implementation

For effective implementation, effective coordination must first be envisaged between :

- (1) The various government agencies ;
- (2) The private sector ;
- (3) The farmers and the public at large.

For effective implementation, agricultural development administration should be specific in terms of the following :

(1) **Area.** This involves specifying the area to be used for particular agricultural production purposes, eg. land rice production areas, maize production areas, areas reserved for the promotion of fishery production, area reserved for the promotion of livestock production. This would make possible the regulation of supplies as well as allow for the effective organization of extension services ;

(2) **Target Group.** Agricultural development strategy should clearly distinguish the farmers of different social and economic status and policies should be geared towards their specific needs. The farmers can be divided into three groups : the advanced farmers, the less advanced farmers, the least advanced farmers. Distinctions of the three groups are made on the basis of their income and investment patterns. The strategy for the least advanced farmers should be primarily that of upgrading their production to a level where it could meet their subsistence needs and for the less advanced farmers to provide them with adequate production and marketing information. In the case of the advanced farmers, the objectives would be to improve their production techniques, reduce cost of production and increase market competition.

(3) **Commodity.** On crop specification, as already discussed, clear distinction will be made between the type of commodities : the production led type and the market led type commodities.

(4) **Agency.** For coordinating agricultural development administration activities, one will have to clearly indicate the agencies responsible for implementation. For example, activities in agricultural resource development Plan will include measures in land resource development, water resource development, human resource development and infrastructural resource development. This will require the efforts of a number of agencies both within the MOAC itself and outside agencies such as the Land Development Department (LDD), the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), Department of Forestry (DOF), Department of Agriculture (DOA) and Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE).

Target Linkages for Coordinating Agricultural Development Administration

The target linkages between the various constituents to agricultural development administration should be clearly identified for ensuring directions of coordination and implementation. The following are several types of linkages essential to bring about coordination of efforts for agricultural development administration, these are :

(1) **Producer-consumer linkage.** This is related to the concept of production to market approach and the market led strategy discussed above. An effective linkage system must be established to ensure the consistency between the supply and the demand of agricultural commodities.

(2) MOAC and other agencies. Effective agricultural development administration require not only the restructuring of the organizational structure and approach within the MOAC itself but also the cooperation with other Ministries. For example, the cooperation of the MOC is required to establish effective linkage between production and marketing, the cooperation of the Budget Bureau for adaptation of budgetary procedures, the cooperation of the CSC for modification of positions, mobility, etc.

(3) Inter-MOAC Linkages. Coordination among the sub-organizations within the MOAC itself is one of the most important prerequisites for effective agricultural development administration. Coordination must be created both horizontally among the sub-organizations of equal status as well as vertically between organizations of different status. There are five types of linkages as follows :

- Inter-departmental linkages ;
- Inter-ministerial linkages ;
- Inter-division linkages ,
- Department-division linkages ;
- Ministry-department linkages

(4) Area linkages. The emphasis on area linkages stems from the need to conceptualize the totality of the context of agricultural production. Among the factors which needs to be taken into account are the spatial linkages, the difference in physical environment and the difference in development potentials relating to those natural conditions and made conditions in terms of allocation of resources. All these factors will make it possible to coordinate agricultural development with a view on the linkages of one particular area to the other fostering effective linkages between development activities of one area to another. For example, the idea of combining the production system of beef cattle in the Northeastern region and the central region, where the former would be the breeding location up to a stage where the cattle could be transferred to the central region for fattening, slaughtering and marketing.

(5) Inter-Project linkages. This linkage can also be called intra-programme linkage. Similar to the concept in area linkages, the projects designs for one particular area mybe linked to, and complimentary with another projects simultaneously undertaken.

(6) Time Frame Linkages. Agricultural Development administration should be conceptualised in a given time frame, i.e., 1 year, 5 years, 10 years and 15 years periods, with clear specifications on the linkages and between activities and results during a period within that time frame. This would ensure that there is an in built mechanism for evaluating performance and incorporating experiences and lessons acquired for the benefit of future agricultural development administration.

All the target linkages described are related. There is also a hierarchy among the linkages themselves which is determined by an array of factors such as the commodity in question, the timing, the prevailing market and production condition. At different times, in different contexts, therefore, the emphasis on which type of linkage should be emphasized will vary.

2.3 Documentation for Coordinating and Implementation of Agricultural Development Administration

The Set up of a Data Bank

To support the coordination plan, it is essential to build up an adequate data bank which stores data from all the departments and divisions in order to lay out the perspective of agricultural development taking into consideration a configuration of factors pertaining to the different areas and accordingly set out the appropriate strategy.

This Data bank is to be constructed and maintained by the OAE with effective retrieval systems at the following coordination and implementation organizations most of which already equipped with computerised systems :

- (2.1) Office of the Permanent Secretary ;
- (2.2) Regional Agricultural Office and
- (2.3) Planning Division of Departments and Divisions

Data Categories of Entities

The data bank should at least be classified in the following data entities :

- (1) Area, such as the National level, Regional level, provincial level and district level ;
- (2) Projects ;
- (3) Commodities ;
- (4) Target groups.
- (5) Implementation agencies such as the Ministerial subdivisions, Departments and Divisions, etc.

The data will be used for the formulation of the Annual Operation Plan, 5 year Ministerial Master Plan, 10 Year Ministerial Perspective Plan and the 15 Ministerial Indicative Plan. The OAE is the central body responsible for compiling the data and analysing and projecting the potential for development of specific areas with the technical assistance forthcoming from the various Departments. The latter will not only be feeding in the raw data but also provide the information on constraints and the limits to agricultural development in their specific area of responsibility.

2.4 Coordinating and Implementing Agencies.

Responsibilities of the Agencies for Coordination and Implementation of Agricultural Development Activities.

The two broad categories of responsibilities of the agencies responsible for coordination and implementation of agricultural development activities are :

(1) Formulation of agricultural development administration plan. This contains two important interrelated functions : the identification of the policy and the formulation of programmes and projects.

(2) Operation or implement the programmes and projects. This involves coordinating activities of the various agencies as well as monitoring the work performance. The monitoring function should be emphasized since it is the most important mechanism that will ensure the feed back from implementation experiences. Such feed back will be utilised for the purpose of addressing the drawbacks modifying the plan and future plan formulation ;

The Level of coordination. The two levels of coordination are the National level and the local level :

(1) At the National level. The office for coordinating and implementation should be within the Office of the Permanent Secretary.

(2) At the Local level. Since the coordinating agencies are responsible for integrating the Top-down Policies and the Bottom-up needs of the people at the village, tambon, and district level, the office the office of the coordinating agencies should be located at the Regional Agricultural Office. At each province, the office of the Provincial Representatives of the MOAC should be the coordinating and implementation centers.

It should be emphasised that while the National level coordination is essential for the establishment of the broad guideline to unify the approaches of the various suborganizations at the local level, the local level itself should have sufficient autonomy and a degree of independence of action. This will allow for flexibility of action on their part and reduce delays in decisions which are common in the case where the authority and decision making power are centralised. The situation at the local level at present is that there is very little horizontal coordination of activities among the various suborganizations of the MOAC. The whole approach to agricultural development is predominantly a sectoral approach in which each Department and division undertaking its particular area of responsibility without paying very much attention to the interrelatedness among the activities being concurrently undertaken in the same area. The concept of an area development approach wherein each facet of agricultural development is visualised in terms of its relationship with other constituent factors has not been sufficiently developed. This is however, precisely what the local level coordination seeks to establish.

The Organizations for Coordination and Implementation

Several organizations responsible for coordination and implementation are here identified: the Budget Bureau (BB), Central Committee for Self-Defense Village (CCSD), Committee for District Development (CDD), Council of Economic Ministers (CEM), Committee for Agricultural and Cooperative Development Policy and Planning (CPP), Civil Servants Commission (CSC), Committee for Village Development (CVD), Subdivisions of MOAC: Department and Offices, House of the Representatives (H), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), Ministry of Commerce (MOC), National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), Office of the Permanent Secretary (OPS), Provincial Agricultural Representative (PAR), Provincial Agricultural Representatives Office (PARO), Provincial Development Committee (PDC), Provincial Governor's Office, (PGO), Regional Agricultural Office (RAO), Provincial Sub-committee for Rural Development (SPRD), Tambon Council (TC), Tambon Working Group for Rural Development (TWGRD), Working Group for Formulation of Agricultural Implementation Plan (WGFI). The most important organizations for coordinating and implementation are: the CPP, the OPS, the RAO and the WGFI.

The Committee for Agricultural and Cooperative Development Policy and Planning (CPP). The Committee for Agricultural and Cooperative Development Policy and Planning should have a strong secretariat to be recruited from the Office of the Permanent Secretary. This will ensure that the OPS will be endowed with adequate power to resume the tasks now required.

The Office of the Permanent Secretary. The function of this office are as follows:

- (1) Policy integration and coordination:
- (2) Budget integration and coordination. This involves:
 - (2.1) Requesting the budget and negotiation with the Budget Bureau;
 - (2.2) Allocating the budget to Departments
- (3) Coordination and implementation. This involves:
 - (3.1) Approving work assignments of each Department;
 - (3.2) Setting the work priority;
 - (3.3) Integrating the work plan; personnel plan and budget plan.

The Regional Agricultural Office. The function of the RAO are as follows:

- (1) Coordination and implementation;
- (2) Training of the Assistant Permanent Secretaries and the Provincial Agricultural Representatives;
- (3) Coordination and organization of workshops;

(4) *One-stop-shop providing extension services in a package.* Extension services are at present provided on an issue by issue basis by the various Department on a very separate basis. Spatially, there is an apparent mal distribution of extension centers thus reducing the accessibility of the potential beneficiaries and their utilities. To save time, effort, as well as to spare the confusion on the part of the farmers who seek assistance and advice, extension centers manned by officers of the various Departments will be established here at the RAO where services and assistance of various types are made available. Extension services will be provided as a package not on a piecemeal basis by the specialised technical staffs ;

The Working Group for Agricultural Plan Formulation and Implementation. This working group is responsible for coordinating sectoral and Departmental plans.

Organizational Network for Coordination and Implementation of Agricultural Development Administration.

Policy Directives. At the top of the hierarchy are the House of Representatives and the Council of Economic Ministers which determine, at the national level, the broad policy framework. These directives are then transferred into CPP, the NESDB on the one hand and the NCRD, the BB, and the CSC on the other. From the NCRD, the BB and the CSC, the MOAC will derive at the factors which determine the broader framework of MOAC operations, that is the budget from the BB, the manpower from the CSC and the rural development strategy within the framework of the NCRD. These directives are transmitted to the MOAC through the Office of the Permanent Secretary (OPS) which is the linkage factor between the National and the Ministerial level. The directions will pass on from the OPS to the Regional Agricultural Office (RAO), the WGFI and the OAE. As mentioned earlier, the OAR will provide the academic support function, while the implementor will be the RAO. From the OPS, the RAO will give direction to them PARO at the local level. Feedback systems exist at all levels to ensure the practicality of the directives given the prevalent conditions at the operational level which may not have been taken into account at the time of implementation or that which may have emerged as a consequence of implementation. At the operational level, the RAO will be the linkage point through which feedbacks from the PARO flows to the WGFI and the OAE. At the Ministerial level, the feedbacks will pass through the OPS and to the higher organizations of decision making (Chart 3)

Programmes and Projects Implementation. The broader framework of operation in terms of budget and manpower allocation is given by the BB and the CSC respectively. These are transferred to the OPS. The function of the OPS is very crucial to the operation of the system since it is here that the given opera-

tional framework in terms of manpower and the budget allocation are integrated with the policy directives of agricultural development and are translated into operational activities in the forms of programmes and projects. The directives from the OPS pass on to the RAO and from there to the PARO, the Departments and Divisions. As with the policy directives, there are built in feedback systems. There are two feedback channels. One is from the PARO through the RAD and to the OPS. The other is feedback from divisions to their departments and ultimately to the OPS (Chart 4).

Levels of Policy, Programme and Project Implementation. Policy, programme and project implementation are undertaken at two levels. As shown in Chart 5, at the national level, the major role is undertaken by the OPS which is responsible for receiving policy directives and transforming them into programmes and projects. It is also the organization that is allocated the responsibilities of dealing with outside agencies such as the BB, and CSC as representative of the MOAC as a whole. At the local level, the major role is assumed by the RAO. The RAO is responsible for coordinating the implementation of programmes and projects undertaken by the various Departments, divisions at the operational level.

Formulation of Programmes and Projects.

In conclusion, formulation of programmes and projects, coordination and implementation are undertaken at two broad levels: the national and the local level. Agencies responsible agencies for plan formulation, coordinating at each level and sublevels are indicated in Chart 6.

2.5 Personnel of The Coordination and Implementation Agencies of Agricultural Development Administration

Qualification of the Personnel

It should be stressed that a reconceptualisation of the coordination activities itself must be envisaged. Under the new conceptual approach, coordinating is to be a main activity and not as it is at present perceived, as a sideline activity lacking in the support of the various Departments and having no effective authority;


The personnel recruited to assume the role of the coordinator must have three essential qualifications:

(1) He must have sufficient seniority to allow him to assume this position with authority and is capable of controlling the respect and acknowledgement of personnel from different departments and divisions.

(2) He must have sufficient experience;


(3) He must have the coordinating ability, that is flexibility and the ability to make compromises when situations demands it while at the same time being able to control the pace of the work and the spirit of the co-workers.

Chart 3 Flow of Policy Directives



———— Policy Directive Flow

- - - - - Feed-back Flow

Chart 4 Programmes and Project Implementation.

————— Implementation Flow

- - - - - Feedback Flow

Chart 5 The Coordination Structure for Agriculture Development Administration.




Chart 6 Formulation, Coordination and Monitoring of Plan Programmes and Projects

	Formulation	Coordination and monitoring
National Level		
- Inter-Ministerial	H, CEM, NESDB, CPP, BB, CSC, NCRD,	OPS
- Inter-Departmental	OPS, WGFI OAE	OPS
- Inter-Division	WGFI	OPS
Local Level		
- Regional	-	RAO
- Provincial	PDC, SCPRD, PGO	PARO
- District	CDD	PARO
- Tambon	TWGRD, TC	PARO
- Village	CVD CCSV	PARO

Key Personnel for Coordinating and Implementation of Agricultural Development Administration.

The key personnel are :

- (1) The programme director ;
- (2) The project director ;
- (3) The Secretariat and the project team members.

The four Assistant Permanent Secretaries are to operate at the local level representing each region. The position of the APS is similar to that of a Regional Programme Director. He should have authority over the administration of the budget at the local level and work under the Permanent Secretary. The Assistant Permanent

Secretary should set the policy and financial plan for the various development activities. He should also have the authority to make decisions in incidences where there are changes in such plans so long as these changes do not involve expenditure in excess to the sum allocated from the onset. This will also ensure against the delay in the work procedures. Recruitment of the Assistant Permanent Secretaries should be from C 9 to C 10 personnel of various Departments within the MOAC. Upon selection, they should undergo special training for coordination, implementation and evaluation of programmes and projects.

Provincial Agricultural representatives of the MOAC as deputies to the Assistant Permanent Secretaries functionally equivalent to that of a provincial programme directors. These personnel are to be recruited from the various Departments and the Divisions through appropriate screening process. The proposed position is markedly different from the present the Provincial Agricultural Officer since the latter is only attached to the Department of Agricultural Extension. The appointed must be endowed with adequate authority to carry out his task effectively. Recruitments of the Provincial representatives of the MOAC should be from C 8 to C 9 personnel of various Departments within the MOAC. Similar to the Assistant Permanent Secretary, the PAR should undergo special training for coordination, implementation and evaluation of programmes and projects.

The APS and the PAR should have terms, i.e., a 4 year term with possible extension of another 4 years to ensure the flow of new ideas and level of work enthusiasm.

The Consideration for New Appointments

On the issue of personnel, emphasis is rather placed on the changes in the function to existing personnel for the purpose of assuming their responsibilities under the new approach with only minimum recommended changes. These changes are:

- (1) The appointment of 4 Assistant Permanent Secretaries;
- (2) The appointment of 73 Provincial Agricultural Representatives;
- (3) The strengthening of the Regional Agricultural Office to ensure that these offices have the capability to undertake coordination work as secretariat to the OPS and the PAR.

The restructuring of organization within the MOAC to make possible effective coordination among the different Departments and Divisions does not only involve addressing internal factors but also external organizations such as the NESDB, the Budget Bureau and the CSC. Measures should therefore be undertaken to ensure that the personnel transfer does not hinder the upward mobility of career of the individual. The modification of the structure of the MOAC does not necessarily

mean that additional staff will be required but rather that the positions and functions of the existing staff should be modified. This is subjected to the changes which the CSC must be willing to accommodate. Some of the CSC regulations pertaining to the upward mobility of an individual's position may have to be modified. As present, such regulations create a general disincentive to creative work since creativity and deviation from the rigid job description does not accelerate the chances of career mobility.

2.6 Financial Resources for Implementing and Coordinating Agricultural Development Administration

The Needs of Programme Budgeting

Sources of funds include loans, government budget and revolving funds.

As pointed out earlier, the new conceptual approach to ensure effective coordination between the various agencies within the MOAC itself require that all activities be undertaken on a programme and project approach. Accordingly, the administration of agricultural development activities should be perceived of as a part of Programme administration. Budgeting is an essential element of this planning and request should be forwarded to the Budget Bureau in the form of programme budgeting with authority centralised under the Permanent Secretary.

Programme budgeting is another mechanism which can be used to foster coordination and control of the use of budget among the various Department. At present, the Ministry gives the ceiling to the Department as a guideline, but no time is really given to work out a Ministerial budgeting plan as such. Defending the budget has in practice become defending the projects each of the Departments responsible for defending the projects submitted for approval. At the higher level however, there is no clear line of defense, no clear target as such.

Main Consideration in Requesting Budget

A high ranking competent member of the Budget Bureau should participate in the process of plan formulation starting from policy formulation to programme and project formulation. In the process of approving the budget proposals of the Departments and the Divisions, the Budget Bureau must evaluate these proposals in the light of the National Plan and the Ministerial Plan to ensure the validity of these requests on the basis of their compatibility with the broader strategy of the Ministry itself:

The budget requirement at the regional level consists of;

- (1) For general administration budget and general extension work;
- (2) For coordination budget;
- (3) For programmes and projects preparation;
- (4) For research and development;

The APS should be given the authority of using the budget allocated and has the power to reallocate the budget items within limitations.

2.7 Monitoring and Evaluation

Scope of Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation will be discussed here only within the time frame of the annual operation plan and the Five Year Ministerial Plan. Since the 10 Year Ministerial Perspective Plan and the 15 Year Indicative Plan are not usually programme specific, it is not practical in this context to design a monitoring and evaluation system as such.

A monitoring committee should be set up consisting of two groups:

(1) The staff of the Coordinating and implementation agencies and the staff of the agencies assuming direct responsibility over that particular programme.

(2) The monitoring committee should also be participated by members of external agencies such as the Budget Bureau.

Monitoring and Evaluation is to be conducted by using the logic framework. This is a technique of managing and organizing the use of natural resources to achieve a set objective within a framework of causative linkages.

The logic framework is divided into three steps:

(1) The first step is the identification of the inputs of a project, determining set of assumptions concerning the output, the operation costs and the work phases. The equation is $\text{inputs} \cdot \text{the first set of assumptions} = \text{output}$. If the assumptions concerning the causative linkages between these factors are valid, the first linkage will have been established. At this stage, the costs and the work schedule are the work control indicators. Should the costs be too high, or should one find that the work schedule cannot be followed effectively, then it is essential to retract to the starting point. The linkages are as follows:

(1.1) The logical linkage between the cause and the effect that is the linkage between the project inputs and outputs.

(1.2) The linkage between the targets and the verifiable indicators. The targets are the project inputs and the verifiable indicators are the various costs and the project work schedule.

(1.3) The linkage between the necessary assumptions and the logic frame which is related to the cause and the effect. The necessary assumptions here refer to the first set of assumptions concerning the logical relationship between the inputs and the outputs of the project.

In evaluating the linkages between the first set of assumptions relating to production and the logical relationship between the inputs and the outputs. If the correlation is positive, this will lead to the materialisation of the target that is the outputs of the project. But if the correlation is negative, then it is essential to retract to modify or introduce new assumptions concerning the relationship between the inputs and the outputs. If the equation is valid, then the target output will be obtained.

(2) Once the first set of assumptions have been tested, the next step is to evaluate the second set of assumptions which is the linkage between the project purposes and the project output. The equation is $\text{output} + \text{the second set of assumptions} = \text{project purposes}$. The verifiable indicators are the output from the project. Should all assumptions hold, the next step is the evaluation the third set of assumptions.

(3) The third step concerns the goals of the project and the logical relationship between the purposes of the project and the goals of the project. The equation is that the project purposes - the third set of assumptions - the project goals. The evaluation is based on the set of purposes of the project, if all assumptions hold, then the goals of the project will be reached. The next step is to evaluate the goals against the goal assessment indicators. If all assumptions hold, then it is the end of the evaluation process. If they do not, the procedure is to go back to the stage of testing the third set of assumptions and modifying the assumptions that then move on to the above sequence until it is no longer essential to go back to test the third set of assumptions.

The logic frame and monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation is the logical sequence of activities and are therefore directly related to the logic frame. Monitoring and evaluation within the logic frame requires that linkages or relationships are clearly determined at the project preparation stage. Certain assumptions needs to be established, for example, the anticipated output from a set of inputs and the relationship between the output and the project purpose and the relationship between the project purposes and the goals. The target beneficiaries groups will also have to be clearly indicated.

The objective of the monitoring and evaluation within the logic frame :

(1) To modify the existing projects of increase the chances of reaching the set objective and goals within the framework of project implementation. This may involve modification of goals and targets which may have been too optimistic to a more realistic level given the present context of project implementation ;

(2) To establish a system for effective control of implementation so that it will be easier to reach the set goals and;

(3) To monitor the problems that emerge in the course of project implementation.

Monitoring and evaluation can be undertaken in three stages :

- (1) The determination of the key indicators:
- (2) Evaluation of the key indicators by using in-depth analysis as well as sample surveys. This will make possible the evaluation of the targets and the assumptions within the logic frame ;
- (3) Collection of information and data from the first set of evaluation and the second in the form that will be useful for decision makings on policy issues and implementation measures at all management levels of the project.

Once the monitoring system has detected the factors which account for the delay or the problems in project implementation, it becomes essential to address those problems even if this means delay and additional costs rather than pursuing on with the project actions which might never lead to the materialisation of the objectives and goals of the project at all.

Annual Operation Plan

Annual monitoring should be conducted by using the logic framework as described above so that results can be used as the basis for plan formulation of the annual operation plan for the following year.

The Five Year Ministerial Master Plan

The general concept and the procedures in monitoring the Five Year Ministerial Master Plan are the same as those of the annual operation plan. There are however, some additional factors which needs to be taken into consideration :

(1) Evaluating the Five Year Ministerial Master Plan should be conducted by external organizations to economize on the expenditure ;

(2) Evaluating the Five Year Ministerial Master Plan should be conducted three times under the following emphasis :

(2.1) The first evaluation session is to be conducted at the end of the first year to evaluate the results for the purpose of reviewing and modifying the plan ;

(2.2) The second evaluation session is to be conducted at the end of the third year with the aim of using the result for the formulation of the next Five Year Ministerial Master Plan ;

(2.3) The final evaluation session is to be conducted at the end of the fifth year with the aim of using the findings for the benefit of implementation of other similar programmes and projects.

The important issues which should be taken into account are :

- (1) How valid are the objectives of the programmes in this present context ?
- (2) How valid are the objectives of the plans in the context where the objectives of the programmes have already been changed ?

(3) How consistent are the details within each programme and project and are they likely to produce the anticipated results?

(4) Are the indicators used to evaluate the performance of the projects still valid and can they really be used to assess the performance of the projects?

(5) Are the evaluation procedures appropriate and effective in practice?

(6) Do the assumptions cover all the external factors that are relevant to the projects?

(7) Are the constituent factors of the projects available in fact and are they adequate for the purpose?

(8) Are the anticipated results essential and adequate to fulfill the set objectives?

(9) Are the results in accordance with the set target at the time of evaluation and do they fulfill part of the objectives initially set?

(10) Are the methods used for evaluation applicable to the work requirement?

(11) Are there any correlations between the factors assumed to have effects on the outcome of the projects and unforeseen events during the course of the projects?

(12) Assessment of general acceptance on the opinions emerging from the work experience.

(13) Comparison of the level of people's participation between the new approach and the Top-down development projects.

(14) Assessment of the level of acceptance of the new structure of work organization.

(15) Assessment of the requirement for technical experts.

(16) Assessment of the linkage between the project and the other activities and projects being undertaken.

3. Immediate Action to be Undertaken

The course of action that could be undertaken in the immediate future will be to approach several authoritative people at the decision making level in order to obtain their feedback and support for the formulation of these ideas into concrete action plans. The proposed personnel to lobby include: the Prime Minister, the Minister of MOAC, the Permanent Secretary of the MOAC, the Agricultural Committee of the House of Representatives, the Committee for Agricultural and Cooperative Development Policy and Planning, the Budget Bureau, the CSC, the Committee for Government Administration Reform.

List of Abbreviations

- | | | |
|-----|-------|--|
| 1. | APS | Assistant Permanent Secretary of MOAC. |
| 2. | BB | The Budget Bureau |
| 3. | C | Classification of Civil Servants' Rank |
| 4. | CCSD | Central Committee for Self-Defense Village |
| 5. | CDD | Committee for District Development |
| 6. | CEM | Council of Economic Ministers |
| 7. | CPP | Committee for Agricultural and Cooperative Development Policy and Planning |
| 8. | CSC | Civil Servants Commission |
| 9. | CVD | Committee for Village Development |
| 10. | Dept. | Subdivisions of MOAC: Departments and Offices |
| 11. | DG | Director General of Department |
| 12. | Div. | Subdivision of Department |
| 13. | H | House of the Representatives |
| 14. | MOAC | Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives |
| 15. | MOC | Ministry of Commerce |
| 16. | NESDB | National Economic and Social Development Board |
| 17. | OAE | Office of Agricultural Economics |
| 18. | OPS | Office of the Permanent Secretary |
| 19. | PAR | Provincial Agricultural Representative |
| 20. | PARO | Provincial Agricultural Representatives Office |
| 21. | PDC | Provincial Development Committee |
| 22. | PGO | Provincial Governor's Office |
| 23. | PS | Permanent Secretary of the MOAC |
| 24. | RAO | Regional Agricultural Office |
| 25. | SCPRD | Provincial Sub-Committee for Rural Development |
| 26. | TC | Tambon Council |
| 27. | TWGRD | Tambon Working Group for Rural Development |
| 28. | WGFI | Working Group for Formulation of Agricultural Implementation Plan |

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Issues of Rural Development

Dr. Jacques Anyot

Introduction : the overall context of rural development

Rural development implementation is usually perceived in terms of effecting a number of physical improvements in various sectors of rural areas that have bearing on the livelihood of the rural people. Thus, a land reform project can be planned with many components. Land redistribution is the core of the project but it also includes a development package. This makes provisions for road communication improvement, irrigation and drinking water supply, land development, schools, health care stations, agricultural credit and agricultural extension.

Two initial observations suggest themselves. The first is that none of this activity is an end in itself. The whole project is a *means* to achieve the *end* of rural development which is primarily the well-being of the rural people. Secondly, individual activities cannot achieve this end unless they are related to needed complementary activities in an integrated perspective. Thus, there are many examples in Thailand that demonstrate that making land available to landless farmers without also providing supportive services and infrastructure such as agricultural extension, agricultural credit, access roads, etc. leads to failure.

The thrust of this paper is an effort to see the overall picture, identifying all of the elements of rural development. Its purpose is to make explicit the objectives of development as applied to a project such as land reform and to provide a framework for the preparation of meaningful development packages. The subject matter is treated under two broad heading: (1) agricultural development, and (2) rural well-being. The first deals mainly, but not exclusively, with techno-economic aspects. The stress of the second is more on socio-cultural aspects.

A. Agricultural Development

Traditional agriculture

The practice of cultivation destroys the natural ecological balance between soils, climate, vegetation, animals and people. If nutrients are not restored to the soil, the soil under cultivation becomes more impoverished with each successive crop. Yields diminish to the point that cropping on the plot cultivated has to be abandoned.

Early farmers on the territory of Thailand have adapted to this constraint of nature in two ways. The first is shifting cultivation which is still practiced by hill people in northern Thailand. When a plot under cultivation loses its fertility after three or four seasons, it is abandoned. A new plot is cleared and cultivated on a new site for as long as the soil retains sufficient productivity, and then the farmers move on again. The technology is very inefficient and wasteful. The second adaptation, flood plain wet rice cultivation, proved to be much more important. It came from the discovery of a crop that is well suited to cultivation under the flooded conditions of the river valleys and that it can be grown repeatedly in the same plots season after season because soil nutrients are restored by annual flood silting.

Successful adaptation to the environment involved not only technology but the development of a style of life suited to its demands. Cooperation, mutual assistance, reliance on the community became central both for the pursuit of livelihood activities as well as for security. Social institutions and attitudes developed to reinforce and maintain necessary social relationships. Religious beliefs and ritual provided the means to placate and manipulate the forces of nature the agricultural society found itself at the mercy of.

At this level of subsistence, once successful adaptation is achieved, the premium is on tradition rather than on change because only tradition guarantees survival. There is very little scope for economic choice-making.

The main characteristics of traditional agricultural economy may be summarized as follows:

(1) *Crops and technology.* They are traditional, habitual. Learning to farm means learning to cultivate the usual crops in the usual places in the usual way, i.e. learning how to plow using the water buffalo, how to plant and transplant paddy, how to irrigate the fields, how to harvest, thresh, etc.

(2) *Production.* It is for home and village consumption only.

(3) *Agricultural decisions.* They are interwoven with social, religious and other non-economic considerations such as meeting social obligations among kin and neighbors, merit-making, celebrations at the occasion of life cycle events, religious festivals, etc.

(4) *The economy.* There is little or no use of money in this self-sufficient, localized, subsistence economy. Bartering is the basis of exchange for goods and services that need to be "paid" for.

The transition to progressive agriculture

Because traditional society is based on conservatism, the transition from traditional to modern agricultural economy is very gradual and slow indeed. Many rural communities in Thailand today continue to conform rather closely to the tradi-

tion described above. Paddy cultivation continues to be seen as the farmer's basic enterprise. Bartering continues to be common in remoter communities. Even in more modernizing rural communities, social and ritual considerations continue to play an important part in agricultural decisions. Such manifestations of persistence of traditionalism notwithstanding, pressures for modernization are such that, for better or for worse, change is inevitable and necessary. Contributing factors, to name a few, are improved communications providing outward access to hitherto isolated communities, the market economy with its national and international dimensions, increased population pressure on limited agricultural land, new agricultural technology, and so on.

In the modern context, pressures for survival are now forcing traditional farmers to adopt more progressive practices. The premium now is on change rather than tradition.

In contrast with traditional agricultural economy, the characteristics of a progressive agricultural economy are as follows :

(1) *Crops and technology.* They are changing constantly in response to price changes, new techniques, new knowledge.

(2) *Production.* It is mainly for sale on the market and not for home consumption. Household consumer items are purchased in stores rather than produced on the farm.

(3) *Agricultural decisions.* They are more individualistic and based on economic rationality ; there is a degree of separation from social and religious considerations.

(4) *The Economy.* It is monetized with extensive use of money and other financial instruments.

In contrast with traditional agricultural economy in which there are few alternatives to choose from, economic choicemaking is of the essence of a progressive agricultural economy.

Types of choices in a progressive agriculture

A progressive agriculture requires frequent *technical decisions*. Every change in land use changes the balance between soils, climate, livestock and people. For successful manipulation of biological growth, every change calls for additional measures to maintain soil fertility, to control insect pests, to maintain water resources and so on. In other words, every change calls for additional changes. Progressive agriculture cannot be both permanent and static.

Successful manipulation of biological growth resulting in a higher quality agricultural product and higher yields does not necessarily mean higher profits for the farmer. The farmer must exercise skill in managing *cost and income*. Frequent

adjustments are needed in the proportion to which land, labor and capital are applied to farming depending on how much each costs in relation to returns.

Progressive agriculture requires continuous adjustments between the agricultural sector and *other sectors of the economy*. For example, the products and costs of agricultural inputs emanating from the industrial sector such as chemical fertilizers, insecticides, tractors, threshers, pumps, etc. have important bearing on agricultural production. Perhaps the most dramatic example is the effect of rising fuel costs on the farmers' livelihood.

Finally, progressive agriculture requires continuous *adjustment to political decisions* resulting in agricultural commodity price controls, pricing policies, premiums, taxation, quotas, etc. which change price relationships within agriculture. Farmers have little or no voice in this. Important aspects of progressive agriculture depend on decisions of politically influential people.

The implications of the situation described can be summarized by the following three propositions :

(1) Increasing the productivity of agriculture is a continuous unending process which becomes more complex as it proceeds. There is no definitive "modern" agriculture that can be pointed to as the end product of the development of traditional agriculture. It can be referred to meaningfully only as progressive agriculture.

(2) Increasing the productivity of agriculture does not depend on farmers alone but also on others in many aspects of national life : politicians, government administrators, merchants, bankers, industrialists, educators, voters, etc.

(3) Increasing the productivity of agriculture depends on a high degree of choice-making widely dispersed.

Factors bearing on agricultural development

Among the many factors bearing on agricultural development, three areas are singled out for discussion here because of their special significance : (1) agricultural services, facilities, programs ; (2) attitudes of farmers and of the political elite ; and (3), social traditions, economic structure and legal frameworks within which agriculture is carried on.

(1) *Agricultural services, facilities, programs.* In order to make choices leading to higher agricultural productivity, farmers need information on alternatives available and their implication e.g. crops best suited for their land, improved crop varieties, optimum cropping pattern, choice and application of fertilizer. Such information communication requires agricultural *extension services* which in turn are dependent upon research institutions staffed by graduates of government supported agricultural faculties. As agricultural inputs need to be purchased, the farmers need working

capital which calls for *credit institutions* and a credit policy. Recommended practices normally require agricultural requisits such as fertilizer, insecticide, implements, which are produced outside of the village. *Market availability* of such items at an accessible price becomes important and for this, *roads* to bring supplies in and agricultural commodities out economically are a necessary component.

As agriculture becomes more complex, it calls for more sophistication on the part of the farmer. Elementary and even secondary *education* becomes a necessity to read and understand the instructions in the use of purchased modern agricultural requisit and to keep accounts. A farmer needs to stay healthy if he is to produce effectively so improved *health services* are needed to contend with malaria and other health problems of rural populations.

Other requisites may appear as the process of agricultural development proceeds. There may be a need for new *irrigation* facilities or for more effective *control of pests and diseases* of crops and livestock. With increased commercialization of agriculture, *improved marketing channels* become a necessity.

(2) *Attitudes*. Agricultural development is determined to a large extent by the *attitudes of the farmers* towards development itself as an end that is attainable and as a means for achieving a better life. If they and their families are sufficiently motivated to improve their level of living and if the farmers feel that increase in agricultural production using the new methods proposed by the extension workers is possible, they will be willing to try them. This however depends on their confidence in the extension workers and on the dependability of the research results. If the extension workers inspire confidence by their professionalism, dedication and genuine concern for the rural people, the farmers will utilize their services and follow their advice. If, on the other hand, the attitudes of the extension workers towards the farmers and the biases of the farmers themselves lead them to perceive the extension workers as the agents of an exploitative and uncaring government, their services will be shunned.

Agricultural development is also influenced by the *attitudes of the political elite* affecting decisions of government bearing on the agricultural sector. Such decisions include, for example, what agricultural development programs are undertaken and with which budgetary provisions, laws regarding land tenure, agricultural commodity pricing policy, etc. What is decided in fact depends on the value placed by the decision-makers on agricultural development in relation to other development objectives such as industrialization, energy development, etc. which benefit urban populations more. The content of the agricultural development promoted depends on realization of the importance of agricultural production prerequisites, and its style will reflect the attitudes of the political elite towards rural people—the extent to which they have confidence in farmers as farm managers and believe that the people have a capacity to manage community development projects with government facilitation.

A most important conclusion of this section is that the attitudes of both rural populations and political elites (including government administrators), and their attitudes towards each other, are important determinants of rates of agricultural development.

(3) **Social Traditions, economic structure, Legal framework.** All three provide the context which determines the basic rules of the game within which agriculture is carried on.

To the extent that agricultural development in the modern context implies change, rates of development depends a great deal on the extent to which traditional conservatism persists. Not all social traditions conflict with progress. On the contrary, they can contribute powerfully to giving the process of modernization an orientation that is best suited to the society in which it takes place. Some traditional views of the rural population however do indeed conflict with modernization and need to be taken into consideration in any development program. For example, rural populations traditionally rely on rice culture as the primary source of family security and they are reluctant to experiment with other forms of agricultural enterprise, e.g., scientific poultry raising, growing non traditional crops, at the expense of rice production. Few farmers would not want to increase their income but because of their own priorities in time allocation and the perceived high social cost, not all are willing to submit to the requirement of substantially modifying their style of life in order to do so. Agricultural extension workers might stress the need to optimize cropping patterns and practice dry season cultivation. Many farmers however prefer familiar customary cropping practices and find it more rewarding and pleasurable to engage in ritual activities and in off farm employment away from the boredom of their villages during the dry season.

Situations of land scarcity due to population growth present serious challenges to the promotion of progressive agriculture as holdings become too small to be exploited profitably. This situation in congested areas can be alleviated if new land is made available through land reform schemes through development of less productive agricultural land, or if alternative employment in other sectors is available. Such solutions can be acted upon however only if there is a degree of place mobility in the rural population affected, that is, if there is a willingness to take new land, to assume non-agricultural jobs and not be held back by family ties, real or imagined fears, etc. Such adjustments are beneficial for progressive agriculture.

Another important parameter of agricultural development is the legal framework within which agriculture is operated, for example, laws with respect to land tenure, the pattern of tenancy within these laws, and laws with respect to debt and alienation of property. To illustrate, a farmer cannot be expected to work wholeheartedly to

develop land over which he has no security of tenure. Likewise, a tenant share-cropper has little motivation to achieve progressive agriculture if he must yield half of his crop to his landlord at harvest time. Again, a farmer who has made a "green contract" with his creditor, that is, who has agreed in advance to yield his whole crop at harvest time at a preset low price in repayment of his debt, is not interested in improving the quality of his product. Such legal framework, its interpretation or lack of enforcement, are often used by unscrupulous wealthier persons to gain influence over poorer farmers and take advantage of them. Of relevance here also is the status of rural people in the formal and informal political process and the extent to which they can influence political decisions bearing on them. How relevant is their voting behavior in this respect and to what extent do elected National Assemblymen represent their interests? How effective are farmers' organizations as pressure groups? How politically conscious are the individual farmers themselves?

B. Rural Well-Being

Quality of life. Agricultural development is important but not as an end in itself. More and higher quality rice, higher incomes from agricultural production are sought not for their own sake but as a means of enhancing the quality of life of the agricultural producers. The converse is often true: people enjoying more well-being are usually more productive farmers. Statistical measures of well-being are usually based on physical criteria, perhaps because they are more easily quantified. Although physical well-being is certainly important, the ultimate criterium of quality of life is spiritual and non-economic, that is, the extent to which the people are happy, satisfied, serene. This may or may not follow from physical well-being. Both aspects of rural well-being are treated separately in the paragraphs that follow.

The Physical level of Living

There is a fairly common understanding among practitioners of development about what constitutes physical well-being. Conventional indicators at the individual and family level usually include:

- levels of nutrition
- quality of housing
- birth and death rates
- adequacy and healthfulness of drinking water,
 - sewage disposal, protection from disease
 - bearing insects: flies, mosquitoes, etc.

At the community and regional level one can add:

- quality of communications: roads and public transportation

public utilities such as electricity
 internal security, police protection
 postal services
 schools, health centers and hospitals
 marketing facilities
 community centers, cultural and recreational
 facilities

It is often assumed that physical standards of living will rise automatically from agricultural development. This does not necessarily follow. First of all, farm income does not automatically rise in proportion to the value of increased production. In many situations, a considerable share of the cost of these products to the consumer never reaches the farmer. It is common practice in the marketing system of Thailand for the farmers to sell their crop to traders at harvest time when prices are lowest because they need the cash. The traders for their parts, because they can afford to wait, sell this crop to onward market outlets only when prices rise again. They, not the farmers benefit from the higher prices. Another example is that of tenant share-croppers who must share their profits with their land owners. Farmers are further cheated of profits by crop pricing policies, e.g., to maintain the internal price of rice to consumers low. This only benefits urban populations at the expense of the farmers.

A second reason why the physical standards of living do not rise automatically from agricultural development is because these do not automatically rise in proportion to increased farm income. Rather than being converted to higher material level of living, the increased income is more likely to go to farm improvements such as the purchase of more land, or to be used on social expenditures such as weddings, festivals, entertainment, etc. It is not unusual for pious Thai farmers to devote much of their profits to religious merit-making such as the building of a new annex to the village temple.

One concludes then that agricultural development alone is not sufficient to induce rural development. A well rounded development program must also include social components such as adult education, health and sanitation programs, nutrition programs, etc. Once the people get to know and appreciate the value of such items as better stoves, sanitary toilets, filters for drinking water, etc. there will be increased motivation to improve agricultural production in order to acquire the income needed to purchase them.

There is a clear connection between the physical level of living of a farmer and his capacity to respond to an extension program. It is not the farmers who are undernourished, ridden with malaria or unable to read who are responsive to such

programs but those who are healthy, alert and literate. As the latter tend also to be the relatively wealthier farmers, an awkward situation arises. It is not those who "need" extension education most who get it but those who make the best of it. Pursuing the same line of thought, it is not the poorer farmers who apply the new technologies for improved agriculture communicated by the extension worker but the richer farmers who can afford the risk of failure, and they increase their wealth in the process. One of the vagaries and unintended results of development programs is that those who benefit from them most are often those least in need of them.

Spiritual aspects of rural well-being relating to family, community and the individual

There is no obvious correlation between the *Quality of family relationships* and physical levels of living except perhaps indirectly as when higher living standards facilitate the introduction of modern urban and industrial society values which erode traditional family values. The quality of family relationships is more closely related to the personal qualities of individual family members the extent to which, for example, they have shared values and interest, show mutual respect, understand and accept the role of each, show courtesy and consideration and accept responsibility for their share of work.

Physical levels of living have bearing on the *quality of community relationships* but as the latter are conditioned by other more basic factors discussed below, the relationship is not always compelling. Situations of abject poverty clearly do not favor good community relationships and are rather occasions for in-fighting over scarce resources for survival. In communities enjoying relatively high physical levels of living and in which community relationships are of high quality, more likely than not, the latter are the cause rather than the effect of the good physical standards. Consistently, rural villages which are clean, well ordered, attractive and with good and well maintained community facilities such as roads, public wells, village level irrigation systems, village meeting halls and temples, are also villages in which there is harmony, cooperation and good leadership. Higher physical levels can contribute to good community relations by generating a feeling of self reliance because of more abundant resources and a sense of belonging because the community is a more attractive place to live in. One can observe empirically that if more individuals in the community own land and dwelling units, if more economic opportunities are available in the community and less economic hardship encountered, all things being equal, feeling as part of the community will become stronger among members and they will be more motivated to work for the improvement of the community as a whole.

But all things are not always equal. It could also be that rising physical levels in the community simply changes issues about which people quarrel. Increasingly as the village economy become monetized, personal wealth replaces reliance on the community as a source of security. In contrast with traditional rural communities, members tend to be more individualistic and less other-centered and caring. Likewise, village society becomes less egalitarian with more resources being monopolized by a smaller number of people. Conflicts arise between individual and groups interests. Those with the requisite economic and political power find in this the best way to enrich themselves further at the expense of the others. Competing factions form around persons with power and influence from wealth who further contribute to disrupting village harmony by competing among themselves for prestige and influence.

As in the case of family relationships, the quality of community relationships depends more on the personal characteristics of the members of the community who demonstrate a high rate of participation inactivity serving group objectives and a high degree of social conscience and sense of responsibility for the interests of the community and well-being of all members. Clearly, this ideal can at best be only approximated in real life situations and cannot be promoted directly except in an inspirational or religious context, which should not of course be discounted.

Beyond the personal characteristics of community members, the quality of relations depends chiefly on organization, that is, on mechanisms for dealing with community problems such as community development, village security, settlement of, disputes elimination of social and economic discrimination, etc. In traditional rural Thai society, such mechanisms were and are provided by natural or traditional alliance groups within the community: extended family groups, traditional institutions such as village committees, labor exchange groups, water users associations, etc., each with their specific and well established pattern of leadership and association. One might argue that such institutions are geared to serve a static community and that new forms of social organization are needed to cope with and engineer rapid change in the development context of modern Thailand. For example, there is a need for better institutionalized mechanisms to handle village external political and economic relations. Some more modern village level projects such as a credit cooperative or a community electricity generation and distribution scheme require special administrative or technical skills. Be this as it may, rather than seek to substitute new forms of organization for the old to serve new needs, it would seem more appropriate and less disruptive to think in terms of evolution, reorientation or reinterpretation of existing organizational types because these are part and parcel of rural village culture and consequently more in conformity with the social understandings and expectations of the village population.

With regard to *individual psychological well-being*, the relationship between physical level of living and the personal satisfaction and happiness of individual members of rural communities depends more on the attitudes of these individuals towards their own level of living and their expectations in regard to material development rather than on the level itself. Material progress and development do not automatically bring happiness and it could well be that the populations of simpler, less developed traditional communities were happier and more content than those subject to the pressures of a more modern, more affluent society. Even if this is so, one needs to be reminded that the conditions under which village life was conducted in earlier times no longer prevail in contemporary Thailand. Villagers' social status and roles are no longer perceived in relation to a closed, isolated, subsistence-level rural community only. Now, statuses are evaluated and roles played in the context of the wider national society and its overall political, social and economic structure.

Happiness means different things to different people according to the interests of their age, sex, and social condition. Most would consider the quality of interpersonal relations in the family and community to be an important ingredient but it is not sufficient. At a deeper level of consciousness, a person needs to have a feeling of worth and of self-esteem, a sense that *his/her life as an individual* and as a member of society is meaningful. In this respect, the modern wider society of Thailand has not given the rural people much to be happy about. In their self-view, farmers see themselves as being at the bottom of the social scale. Their ambition for their children is to provide them with an education so that they can leave the village and get into some other more rewarding and prestigious occupation. Political elites frequently express concern for rural people in their speeches and pronouncements but in fact show them little practical esteem. Farmers seem to be taken advantage of by practically everybody outside of their villages: middlemen and traders, money lenders, agribusiness firms, politicians and other influential persons. By and large, villagers continue to look upon themselves as the wards of the state, the legacy of a long tradition of highly centralized and paternalistic government. The government, not themselves, is seen as having primary responsibility for their welfare. In spite of recent tentative steps towards administrative decentralization, popular participation still remains mostly development rhetoric and the villagers still have little voice in or control over development activity in their villages.

What the proposition that a person needs to have a sense that *his/her life as an individual* and as a member of society is meaningful implies for village farmers in practice is, firstly, *a sense of vocation as a farmer*, that is, a sense of dignity and self-esteem as a member of a respectable and important profession which is in no way inferior to any other. He sees in farming an opportunity for creativity. Just as the best teachers are those who enjoy teaching and the best cooks are those

who enjoy cooking, the best farmers are those who like and take pleasure in their work. Farming is seen as a source of independence and self-reliance. It gives the farmer the ability to cope with problems with a minimum of insecurity and to provide for his family. What makes life meaningful for a villager is secondly *a sense of having a significant role in society*. He is not simply a passive recipient of decisions made by outsiders on community matters but has an active voice in the decision-making process itself. His opinions are sought and respected in and out of the village. He contributes to the planning, implementation and evaluation of government sponsored development activity in his community. In a word, he is a responsible, useful citizen of his society.

The achievement by the rural people of both sense of vocation and sense of having a significant role in society in the context of modern Thailand has relationship to agricultural/economic development. Today, a subsistence farmer practicing traditional agriculture can no longer have the social position he would have enjoyed in a traditional community of the past. Although the culture provides means by which even a poor and destitute villager can acquire serenity by detachment, it is not reasonable or realistic for development planners to include asceticism as one of their parameters. However important, economic development is not enough and in a sense, is less crucial to the achievement of the ultimate end of development, the happiness of the people, than socio-cultural development.

Thailand has had a record of economic development in the last few decades that has made her the envy of her neighbors but it has not been without social cost. Much of the dislocation of rural populations described above can be attributed to the fact that the pace of economic and technological change has been too rapid for the society to adjust to effectively. Just as the early populations of Thailand had to develop social institutions and adopt social values to meet the requirements of life and work in sedentary communities of flood plain cultivators of paddy, so must modern Thai society adjust its institutions and values to meet the requirements of life and work under radically modified circumstances. We are no longer speaking merely of rural development however but of national social development. Adjustments need to be made in all segments of the population—urban as well as rural, public sector and private sector, agricultural as well as non-agricultural.

A fundamental fault of the modern society lies in the imbalance between the urban and rural segments of the population in terms of participation in national, political social and economic processes resulting in unequal access to the benefits derived from such participation. The problem is usually considered in a civil rights perspective and the case for the need to correct the inequalities is based on considerations of social and economic justice with the ultimate objective of achieving a just society.

While this is perfectly valid and legitimate, one can also take the approach that if there is a more balanced distribution of capacities to contribute to political, social and economic processes within a national structure that facilitates this involvement, there will be better utilization of human resources in all sectors for the benefit of all and a more efficient, more functional society will be achieved.

While rural popular participation is seen as an essential feature of the organization of this more efficient, more functional society, it would be unrealistic to expect it to happen before the conditions making it possible are realized. For the rural people themselves, these include the acquisition of the level of sophistication and confidence needed to deal effectively with representatives of all national sectors intruding on their village lives. For government officialdom, they imply a change in attitude towards rural people from that of wards of the government to that of fully mature and responsible citizens, an acceptance of the need for popular participation, and the political will to facilitate its implementation through policy formulation, legislation, administrative reform and social development measures. Finally, in the absence of institutional mechanisms to implement it, a style of popular participation needs to be developed and institutionalized in consultation with the people, taking into consideration existing values, customs and institutions and the needs of the people in the broader modern context. The imposition of an alien model that is not derived from local experience and that has no basis in Thai culture has little chance of success. There must be continuity between the old and the new, the one growing out of the other.

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Issues of Land Reform and Planning for Land Distribution

Orapan Nobangchang

1. The context of land reform in Thailand :

1.1 General Background.

Land reform is a way of equalizing access to the factors of production, namely the land assets, by seeking to contain and slow down the process of land concentration and provide security of tenure.

Land reform in the context of Thailand can be divided in to two major categories of activities, land distribution and development activities. Although the two components of land reform are essential for the full benefits fundamentally to be derived, the emphasis on the two components of land reform, i.e., land distribution and development activities are essentially different at different stages of land reform implementation. At the initial stage of land reform the priority is given to the activities of land distribution while such emphasis is gradually reduced with the progressing periods during which the development activities will gain higher importance in order to ensure the ability of the beneficiaries of land reform to capitalize from the ownership of the land.

Land distribution is the action of providing land to the small and the landless farmers. The landless refer to those who have no land of their own for the use of agricultural production and having to resolve to renting the entire land for payment either in cash or in kind. The small farmers on the other hand, refer to those who have a minimal land of their own but have to rent additional land so as to sustain a minimum livelihood. The land available for distribution can either be that which has been appropriated by larger land holders whose size of holdings exceeds the State specified limit or it can be the fallow land belonging to the State which formerly has not be put to agricultural production use. For this particular study, the focus is specifically on State or public land.

Concerning development activities, it is also held that the provision of land by itself is insufficient and that in the absence of other development activities, the rural producers cannot capitalize on the land they have acquired. Thus, development activities became the necessary component to land reform.

The Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) is responsible for land reform implementation in accordance with the Agricultural Land Reform Act of 1975. Its function is related to land rights and holdings in agricultural land. Its responsibility also extends to the provision of housing arrangements for small, landless farmers and farmers' institutions by means of rent, hire purchase or provision of rights to cultivate. It is also the government's policy that ALRO should assist in the development of agricultural occupation by improving resource conditions, facilitating and providing the flow of inputs for supporting production and marketing of agricultural produce. ALRO's activities are determined by the policy measures, rules and regulations set by the National Agricultural Land Reform Executive Committee the latter being also responsible for following up on ALRO's operation. As stated in the Land Reform Administration Act, 1975, ALRO's function is to complete land reform work within a period of three years following the enactment of the Act.

A considerable period of time has now passed beyond that time frame, and ALRO faces considerable administrative problems that inhibits effective implementation of land reform. Among the significant drawbacks are :

(1) The lack of a clearly defined scope of work as well as the specifications of the activities to be carried out at each stage of land reform implementation. In this circumstance, the implementing staff at the operational level has to adapt themselves to the situation context of the different land reform areas at their own discretion.

(2) Related to (1) due to the lack of clear policy guidelines and scope of work, it has been operationally difficult for the agencies and the personnel responsible for land reform implementation to function efficiently.

(3) The non-materialization of radical changes in the status of land ownership. Legally, a large number of holdings may have been broken down into smaller holdings with different specified legal owners. In practice, however, the land may still be operated by the former holders due to the social and economic control which large landowners are known to exercise.

2. Problems Encountered in Land Reform Implementation

2.1 Problems Related to The Organizational Structure

2.1.1 The Top-Down Aspects in Land Distribution.

Policy issues :

(1) The work emphasis. The emphasis is more on quantitative rather than qualitative achievement. One aspect of quantitative achievement is the acceleration of land registration and expansion of land reform areas. Not much attention is given to the selection of farmers to whom land is allocated to the extent that the majority of the beneficiaries of land reform may not be the intended target groups, i.e., the small and the landless farmers.

(2) The political awareness of policy makers. On the whole, the approach is more paternalistic and welfare oriented than one that opens up channels for effective participation of the people. There is an over-emphasis on the "supply" side of planning a notion that the planners and administrators know best. There is a lack of continuity and clear approach on the part of the ALRO, whose policies tend to vary according to the changes in the top personnel of ALRO itself.

(3) The lack of clear policy guidelines. The work system seems to rely heavily on personal techniques and concept of development of each provincial land reform officer. While a degree of independence is needed for effective work, some broad procedural guidelines are also essential to prevent people from going different directions to ensure a degree of continuity and to reduce the personal element of the work system. Personification of the system may cause sudden collapse should the charismatic person be moved to some other higher position.

The Administrative Structures.

(1) Horizontal relationships among the different agencies are not smoothly carried out. There is an overlapping of functions and a general tendency of the ALRO to assume total responsibility within the land reform areas. The prevalence of such attitude may unintentionally discourage the active involvement of other local government representatives such as the Agricultural Extension Officers and the Cooperatives Officers due to the implicit respect for not oversteering the threshold of responsibilities. Given better work allocation, however, the local representatives of the various government branches could be meaningfully involved in the process of land reform implementation. Within the internal organization of ALRO itself, there is interdepartmental and interdivision problem. At present information system flow and data collection are carried out on an ad hoc basis within each department. The bureaucratic paper work and the process whereby information flows within divisions to the decision maker and passed on to the other related divisions is both time budget consuming not to mention the overlapping of responsibilities.

(2) Vertical relationships exist predominantly in the form of a reporting system where the officials fulfill the quantitative work targets rather than stressing on qualitative achievement. It is not uncommon that the initiatives and the efficiency of the local officials is often suppressed by the routine work requirements and by factors which he has little control over, such as time constraints and budget constraints as well as contending local power elites. Moreover, the poor work performance can be traced back to the reward system which operate in such a ways as to discourage those who want to do quality work because of the priority it gives to the quantity of work accomplished.

Manpower.

(1) There is a general lack of qualified staff for specific tasks particularly for activities such as community studies and publicity campaigns during the pre-land distribution period. Since land reform is a sensitive issue which will effect the different social and economic groups by different scales, the attribution to the human aspects of land reform needs to be given its due consideration. The sensitivity of land reform activities require that ALRO's staff spend more time with the people, to gain their acceptance, to convey the right messages and to identify villagers who will participate in land reform implementation activities. However, the type of personnel appropriate for the community development aspects of land reform is noticeably lacking. To overcome this problem, ALRO has initiated a training programme. Currently, however, apart from the budgetary and procedural problems, the success of the training programme is hindered by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the officials and the farmers in training programmes. Moreover, there is an apparent need for explicit statement of willingness of the State, an acceptance that meaningful participation requires an on-going dialogue between the people and the officials and also that it is a learning process for both the officials and the farmer.

(2) There is an unbalanced distribution of staff between the ALRO central office and in the provinces. Moreover, communication and information flow between ALRO's local staff and the people is restricted by the physical distance. Visits and dialogue are mostly restricted to that between officials and community leaders, the latter being the most common source of bottom up source of information.

(3) Apart from undertaking routine work, the local staff are involved in solving immediate problems. They are thus too preoccupied to rationalize on the causal effects which their current actions might have on the structural changes within the rural society and the contribution to the overall process of land reform.

(4) Local officials are not trained to ask the farmers of their opinions over issues and are generally of the impression that farmers lack the knowledge to give useful suggestions. As a consequence of the limited contact between the two parties, there emerges an element of mistrust on both parts. Such an attitude is not one that will foster any useful dialogue and exchange of ideas between the two parties. Moreover, the accounting system works one way, that is upwards, the officials are not accountable to the people for their actions, be they a success or a failure.

(5) A phenomena has emerged where the local officials are becoming the 'heros' in the eyes of the farmers. This is through the delivery system, i.e., of goods and services. This breeds a new kind of dependency that hinders the growth of autonomous development of the farmers as individual and as collectives.

2.1.2 The Bottom-up Aspects.

The Bottom-up planning approach is an acknowledgement of the need to find mechanisms that can convey the realities of the mass concerning their problems, needs and wants. It is a response to the outcome of the development pursuits that have been heavily biased towards growth achievement. With the Bottom-up planning approach emerged the concepts of decentralization of political and decision making power and spatial development policies which consciously seek to spread growth into the outlying regions through appropriate resource allocation and investment programmes.

Thailand is one of the countries in pursuit of a more balanced and equitable growth. The move towards a more decentralized planning involving a degree of grassroots participation can be seen in the approaches such as the concept of basic needs, self-reliance. In general, people's participation is through their community leaders and key informants, and this is participation in terms of information transfer between the two parties, i.e., the officials and the community leaders, the latter supposedly to act in the interest of his people. Other types of participatory activities include special activity groups generally initiated from the outside together with technical assistance and organizational efforts. These activities are often related to material and physical infrastructure development. Within the rural communities, there are also loosely structured social and cultural groups. They are naturally formed groups based on ethnicity and place of origin. No conscious efforts have however been undertaken to make use of the cohesion that already exist within these groups for the promotion of an active organization.

Over the years there have been modifications as well as a reconceptualization of the approach of the ALRO. These are reflected in the attempt to broaden the base of decision making. The move resulted in the enlargement of the bureaucratic machine as seen in the emergence of a series of newly set up working groups, special task working groups to solve urgent issues and the emergence of Provincial Land Reform Committees. Although these organizations do allow for interagencies interaction as well as the involvement of the farmers through their representatives in the process of decision making, in most cases, the function of these lower echelons are merely to approve of predetermined top down policies. Democratic participation may exist only in principle. In practice the presence of farmers' representatives maybe merely to justify in name that there is people's participation.

The Bottom-up aspects in terms of land reform will be discussed in two aspects, the organizational structure fostering people's participation and the drawbacks relating to the people themselves.

(1) **The Organizational Structure for Bottom-up Participation.** Within a land reform area, three types of participation initiated and supported ALRO can be identified :

(1.1) *Formal Participation.* The farmers' representative act as committee member of the Provincial Land Reform Committee and the District Land Reform Committee. In these set ups, farmers are often underrepresented. Moreover, the representatives often feel intimidated by the dominance of the presence of government officials to the extent that no fruitful dialogue can take place. They end up as passive participant of those meetings. Much needs to be modified in terms of which group of people are represented and in what proportion.

(1.2) *Land Reform Agricultural Cooperatives.* The most widespread form of people's organization is in the form of land reform agricultural cooperatives. In each land reform area, the farmers are persuaded to become members of the Land Reform Agricultural Cooperatives soon after they are allocated their land. Agricultural cooperatives do not function as a forum where the people can voice their needs and can only be nominal organizations with no real function. Members do not identify with the cooperative as their own organization and generally perceive agricultural cooperatives as institutional means to obtain cheap credit. In fact, debt burdens of the farmers are said to be increasing due to the fact that farmers now have more sources of loans.

(1.3) *Small Farmers Development Programme.* Such a programme is aimed at the development of small farmers and the creation of a strong self-reliant grassroot organization. It involves activities which aim to increase production and income of the small farmers as well as their ability to identify problems, causes and solutions. Despite the fact that the programme is initiated from above, the development approach is quite different. The Small Farmers Development Programme is target group specific. The beneficiaries are restricted to the smaller farmers in the acknowledgement that the distributional bias of the benefits that tends to be channelled towards the better-off farmers. It is also selective in the choice of change agents. The idea of grouping together small farmers is not just for the benefit of credit obtainment but also to encourage group activities related to their main occupation as well as in the secondary occupations. There is also a fundamental acknowledgement of the need for fruitful dialogues between the officials (change agents) and the people.

(2) *The rural people and participation in the land reform areas.* Several factors indicate that the low level of people's participation has not been solely due to the Top-down organizational structure that appears to be inconducive to its growth but also due to the non-readiness of the Bottom-up elements themselves. These are:

(2.1) *The attitudes of the farmers in the land reform areas.*

(2.1.1) *Attitudes towards the land.* Since most of the land is self cleared or has been bought by the present occupier, the villagers preciding in the

land reform area tend to perceive of the land as being rightfully theirs. In such a situation, it becomes a difficult task to convey the idea that the land occupied is, by legal status, state property. Thus from the onset, there is an unavoidable conflict of interest between ALRO and the present land occupiers. More often than not, the landed are the influential group of people within a rural community. This rather negative attitudes towards land reform has led to the general feeling of resentment to ALRO and the subject of land reform becomes generally the forbidden topic of discussion.

(2.1.2) Attitudes towards the document. The conditions laid down by the land title issued by ALRO, i.e., ALRO 4-01 is that land ownership cannot be transferred by sales. This is a way of ensuring the land ownership does not change hands and that land will stay with those who till it. In practice, illegal sales are quite common. In some cases, even N.S. 3 can be issued backdated for land that has already been allocated. The document also has some other practical draw backs as it does not entitle the holder to request individual loans from the bank, nor can it be used to bail people out of jail, which is most interestingly one of the merits of N.S. 3.

(2.1.3) The attitudes of the farmers towards ALRO. While farmers' perceptions of ALRO's land distribution functions is determined by their attachment to the land, their assessment of the ALRO's role in development activities is primarily based on the actual work done and the ways in which they have been accomplished. Generally, some of the farmers' perception, particularly those whose land has been reduced, is that ALRO's development activities are essential to the compensate for the development activities are essential to the compensate for the reduction of size of holding. The majority however feel that ALRO's work responded little to their immediate needs. Moreover, since they took no active part in the selection and implementation of these development activities, they generally do not identify with these activities a factor which account for the apathy in relation to government's development projects. Attitudes towards ALRO however vary by localities, due to the different physical resources as well as the individual performance of the officials.

(2.1.4) The divisions among the farmers. There are a great number of groups at the local level both those initiated from the government and those groups formed out of breaks and conflicts among members of the community. Farmers in land reform areas can therefore be quite fragmented hence the difficulty of forming collectives and group cohesion.

(2.1.5) The lack of tradition of 'democratic participation' in the rural areas. Farmers are often bound by the security of the 'patron-client relationship'. Thus, it is usual that the farmers often play the role of a passive participant partly due to the years of being treated in such a manner and partly because there is no legal framework for participation except in the form of agricultural cooperatives and working committees as described earlier. On the other hand, there is a growing discontent among the farmers on the ways which they are being handled by the

officials. Such discontent is not however conceptualized in such a way as to lead to the formation of grassroot organizations to make demands. Moreover, the primary concern over the procurement of subsistence needs creates general apathy to the extent that farmers attach less importance to the idea of organization. These attitudes are reinforced by low opinion of people's organization, the immediate example being the agricultural cooperatives whose performance is far from satisfactory.

(2.1.6) The peasants are usually dominated by merchant capitals and are ridden with problems of indebtedness which perpetuates their dependency on traditional sources of capital.

2.2 The Organization of Routine Work.

2.2.1 Manpower Allocation.

Spatial distribution of ALRO staff is rather centralized. That is, of the approximate 3,800 ALRO staff, 3,000 are in the central office in Bangkok while 800 are resident staff in the land reform areas. About 80% of the contact between the local resident staff and the people are in the forms of meetings in the land reform areas during the day time. Informal contacts between ALRO staff and the farmers in the land reform areas are limited. Only a small percentage of ALRO field staff can be said to be those who really understand the problems of rural development and the plight of the people.

There are, however, structural organization of ALRO that spreads out from the center to the provincial level, to the district level, and through kamnans and village headmen to the subdistrict and the village level. The various departments at the center and at the local level and their functions are discussed in the following paragraphs.

2.2.2 Organizational Structure

Central Organization.

(1) *Division of Academic Studies and Planning.* The function of this division is to collect the socio-economic data of the people in the target area as well as secondary data from other locally presented government branches.

(2) *Land Reform Implementation Division.* The division is responsible for mapping and staking of the land reform areas. The division should work closely with the Department of Forestry, the Department of Local Administration and the Land Department. It is also responsible for collecting agricultural statistics and make initial evaluation of the possibilities of setting up an agricultural Land Reform Cooperatives.

(3) *Land Reform Funds Division.* The function of this division is to evaluate the economic and financial returns on investment in land distribution and development activities as well as collect the compensation money lent for various purposes ranging from land compensation and various development activities.

(4) *The Legal Division.* The function of this division is to collect the data on the ways in which the occupant the time of land reform have acquired the occupancy of the land. They are also to look into the legal problems such as overlapping of claimance over a particular price of land, possession of N.S. 3 and land title deeds and other types of ownership documents issued by other land related government agencies. The division staff are, in theory, also given the responsibility of studying the AIT handbook on land distribution in public land and identify possibilities of setting up representative of house clusters to jointly classify the land use, the size of holding, value of land compensation and the selection of beneficiaries.

(5) *The Engineering Division.* The function of the division is to collect data that will be required for infrastructural development planning, problems and budgeting requirement ;

Local Organization.

(1) *The Provincial Land Reform Committee.* An institutional body chaired by the governor and precided over by the Provincial Agricultural Officer, the Provincial Commercial Officer, the Industrial Provincial Officer, Provincial Land Officer, Chairman of the BAAC, the District Officer of Land Reform Areas within that particular province and three representatives of the villagers in land reform areas. The function of the Provincial Land Reform Committee are as follows :

(1.1) To approve of the programmes and projects and the expenditures of the Provincial Land Reform Office (PLRO) ;

(1.2) To monitor the work of the PLRO so as to ensure that it is in accordance with the approved of programmes and projects. The Committee is also to find ways of solving problems that might occur in the process of land reform implementation ;

(1.3) To evaluate the work and to make appropriate recommendations on modifications of programmes and projects as well as budgeting and work procedures ;

(1.4) To formulate an expenditure plan and submit such plans to the Land Reform Committee ;

(1.5) To manage financial aspects and other activities that are related to land reform in accordance with the role set by the Land Reform Committee ;

(1.6) To lay down the rules and regulations concerning the operations of PLRO on issues which are in conflict with the rules and regulations laid down by the Land Reform Committee.

(2) *The District Land Reform Committee.* An institutional body chaired by the district officer, precided over by Land Department representative at the district level, the representatives of the Forestry Department, the Department of

Agricultural Extension, the Department of Community Development, the police force, Agricultural Cooperatives Department, kamnans and village headmen in land reform areas, three elected representatives of the villagers, the provincial land reform officer, one local ALRO staff, one resident legal ALRO staff. The function of such a committee is to review the requests for right of land ownership, select the beneficiaries according to the selection criteria set by the Provincial Land Reform Development Committee, review the complaints related to land distribution as well as settle dispute related to land distribution, approve of the size of holding, give opinions on the value of land compensation, settle agreements between the former occupier and the beneficiaries, review and solve problems related to selection of beneficiaries and land distribution and give support to development projects within the land reform area.

(3) *The Provincial Land Reform Office.* ALRO's local branch is divided into five major sections: the land reform implementation section, accounting and record keeping section, Secretarial work section, legal work section, and mapping and staking section. Only the responsibilities of two subsections are dwelled upon in detail here as their work involves coming into direct contact with the people in the land reform areas. These are:

(3.1) The land reform implementation section. This section is responsible for conducting studies of the land reform area in the particular province; to lay down the plan and financial requirement for land distribution; to encourage the growth of people's organizations as well as coordinating between various government agencies locally represented in undertaking development activities. The staff from this section is also to sit in Provincial Land Reform Committee meetings.

(3.2) Legal work section. This section is responsible for land distribution negotiation, making checking contracts related to land ownership. Review complaints of both the former holders and beneficiaries. Review request for rights of occupancy and possibilities of making allowance for land holding slightly exceeding the ceiling of ALRO. Give legal advice where required and help to settle disputes related to land holdings.

2.2.3 The Conceptual Problem of Work Organization.

Operational context within which these personnel and structures operate indicate significant drawbacks emanating from the absence of clear policy guidelines and a clear scope of work. This has rendered it difficult to specify the definite activities to be undertaken in each phase of land reform. Thus the land reform process lacks a unity of approach and a clear position as to what it seeks fundamentally to establish. Conceptual clarity is required in two significant aspects:

(1) Should ALRO be responsible for carrying out development activities during and after land distribution; and

(2) Is it possible for ALRO to clearly specify the length of time required for the whole process of land reform, i.e., from the activities of cadastral surveys, land rights cross examination, land allocation and negotiation and the issuance of ALRO 4-01 or legal documents guaranteeing the holders rights to the land allocated.

Within this context of operation, the organizational structure that exists cannot effectively function as a means to implement land reform. This is also partly due to the following reasons:

(1) The non-commitment of the various representatives of the various branches of government forming these institutions;

(2) The lack of clear role definitions and specifications for the constituents.

(3) The routine work and other obligations and different sets of reporting systems which each constituent operate under.

(4) The representativeness of the committee. This is of vital importance particularly for a body which is responsible not only for the approval of the beneficiaries, but also in their selection such as the District Land Reform Committee.

Having discussed the details of the mechanisms of land reform and their functions, the following section will deal with the procedural problems of land reform in its various stages.

2.3 Problems Related to the Procedure of Land Reform Implementation.

2.3.1 Pre-land distribution

Orientation. It has been reported that the duration of orientation in any particular land reform area is rather short, maybe a half hour or so. In such a short time, it is impossible to get across the information of what ALRO is doing and how it will effect the community. More often than not, those who come are those whose interests are inflicted upon. The smaller the audience, particularly when such an audience are members of groups who feel that their interests are at stake, the less accurate are going to be their interpretation of ALRO's work. Naturally to the landed group, the small owners and the landless, the picture of ALRO may appear very different, but the present system doesn't give ALRO the opportunity to reach a wider audience. It is also very easy to dismiss questions with promises and unfulfilled promises which may have grave consequences on perceptions of the people towards ALRO.

The socio-economic surveys. There is a lack of in-depth community studies. The baseline community surveys are usually conducted in the form of meetings in very formal atmosphere. Questions are geared towards getting quantitative answers which are usually under normal circumstances difficult to recall. Information therefore is prone to a high degree of error.

2.3.2 Land-Distribution Phase

Land rights cross examination. The purpose of land rights cross examinations is to register the size of holding of the farmers in the land reform area, to investigate whether the land is presently being cultivated by its present claimer and to determine the size of the land exceeding the ALRO specified holding size that would be subjected to appropriation. Observations from the two field trips of the study team indicates a variety of ways in which evasion of land appropriation can be avoided. These range from falsifying the household registration, identifying relatives and other claimers as beneficiaries who have no legal claim over the land since were not utilising the land for agricultural production at the time the area was declared as a land reform area. Some of the couples who do not have children over 20 years of age may even resolve to divorce. Land rights cross examination is a critical stage of land distribution. The fact that most of the land may still be operated by the same holders point out to the need to review the mechanisms employed to cross examine the claimance of former holdings as well as the process of selection. Legal cross examination is usually conducted by a team of legal staff from the center who go into the land reform areas during the distribution phase. They will work together with the resident legal staff in a land reform area. Given the sensitivity of land reform, the task may require more than just verbal questioning. It requires follow up studies and the dispersal of sources of informants to prove and counterprove. Evasions can be detected given the time and the familiarity with the people. The system should, however, have in built mechanisms with which to avert the human mistakes to avoid having anyone group of specialized staff take full control of selection of beneficiaries and negotiations without having a built in checking device.

Selection and negotiations for land distribution and the selection of beneficiaries. In the process of land rights cross examination, the legal staff will require the farmers to identify the beneficiaries. The rightful priorities are given to his children. The surplus land after that will be appropriated by ALRO to be distributed. This particular aspect of land reform will be discussed in three aspects, the legal aspects, the organizational structure and the target groups.

(i) The legal tools. Whether or not ALRO can use the legal tools as a means of implementing land reform in State land rests on the clarifications of the types of legal documents to be issued in the final stage of land reform. The document ALRO 4-01 has many legal drawbacks which cannot lead to the structural changes in the structure of land ownership. It is not uncommon that the tenants will request rights of occupancy in the interest of the large landowners. ALRO 4-01 does not entitle the holder to full ownership since the legal characteristics pertaining to the document prohibits the sales or transference of the land. On the other hand, if full

ownership status is granted either in the form of N.S. 3 or other standardized land ownership documents, the structure of land ownership will change fundamentally. It will no longer be possible for the larger and more influential land owners to use their tenants name to claim the land on their behalf since, ultimately the claimer will become the legal owner to that land. It will be a means with which to ensure against the concentration of land ownership. Equalization of ownership of land assets will be possible since the legal structure dictates that no one should possess more than 50 rai of land. Thus the process of land concentration will, by legal means, have been contained.

(2) The target groups. Relating to the target groups of land reform, three major points can be made :

(2.1) In practice, the social groups that turn out to be more effected by land reform are the middle size and the small farmers.

(2.2) Between these two groups, new types of conflict may have been caused. Such conflict has structural repercussions since it is the type of conflict that would ultimately lead to the weakening of the homogeneity of the weaker section of rural communities. The middle size farms often belong to the social groupings with little influential power, thus they have very little means to evade land appropriation. It is very natural that the middle size farms part of whose land has been appropriated will feel resentment not only towards ALRO, but also to the new owners particularly when the latter is not a landless farmer but someone who already has some land of his own. The small and landless farmers on the other hand are not automatically guaranteed of the holdings allocated. Failure to reach an agreement on compensation money, the lack of source of other possible sources of funds together with the outright obstruction of the former holders are the factors which hinder his effective claimance.

(2.3) The most critical target group for land appropriation, i.e., the large land holders are the social and economic group less effected. This is not to deny the right to hand over the part of the land that could be legally transferred to the his children but to demand the right of others to access of the surplus land. It can generally be said that neither the legal means nor the existing organizational mechanisms can be successfully employed to subject the large land owners to the normal process of land reform. The power structure within the land reform area is similar to those in other rural societies in that power is associated with the size of land owned, i.e., the more land, the more power, and vice versa. Thus power to resist land reform for the smaller land holders are comparatively smaller than the larger land owners. Taking this point in consideration together with two other significant factors that is the lack of adequate political back up of the State as well as clarity of legal aspects of land reform, it is predictable that the staff at the operational level will have limited success in dealing with the powerful land owners to carry out land reform.

(3) The organizational backup. Several groups and individuals are involved in selection process and negotiations for land distribution as well as the settlement of disputes. The personnel directly involved are the legal section and the land reform implementation section. The rewarding system which these staff are subjected to, contribute in indirect ways to their under performance in terms of quality. Work assessment is in quantitative terms, how many beneficiaries have been allocated land and how many are in the process of acquiring the ALRO 4-01. There is also a degree of human error on the part of the implementing staff as reflected in the differences of treatment to the different social groups in land reform areas. As has been stated, the smaller the size of holding the less power, the easier it is to appropriate and distribute and the larger the number of the beneficiaries. The more powerful ones, on the other hand must be contacted directly, they are asked to come up with list of 'who' they think should receive their land. The benefits are both ways, from the numbers of holdings appropriated and distributed and the reward for good cooperation with the large land holders.

2.3.3 Post Land Distribution.

In discussing post-land distribution activities, it is essential to refer to the conceptual problems relating to the scope of work of ALRO. One is the scope of work of ALRO's involvement on development activities in the land reform area. Under the present circumstances, the scale of ALRO's involvement in the land reform area is comparatively greater than other agencies. The second is the time frame of involvement, there appears to be no indication of when the intensiveness of ALRO's involvement in a particular land reform area will end and when a given land reform area will normalize its status and its people becoming part of the rural sector of the country as a whole.

As is presented in the subsequent paragraphs, post-distribution activities are by no means activities which is exclusively carried out by ALRO. They are activities which form part of the national development policies which addresses the structural underdevelopment of the rural societies in eliminating the basic problems of the rural poor, that is the problem of indebtedness, organization and participation. The following paragraphs will discuss these three aspects in detail.

Overcoming the economic barriers of the farmers with specific reference to the problem of indebtedness. The problems of debts is one of the serious problems of the farmers in land reform areas. Debts creates dependency on the money lenders, it distorts the factor markets and reduces the bargaining power of the producer vis a vis the merchant cum money lenders. The dependency of the smaller producers for other production inputs and financial assistance means that acquisition of land ownership does not equalize social and economic status nor change relations of production in such a way as would improve the position of the smaller farmers. The debts of the people in land reform areas can be divided into two broad types, the old debts (both production and consumption loans) and the new debts through the acquisition of land compensation. Financial shortages of many of the smaller

farmers mean that they cannot produce the money required to supplement the ALRO loans to pay off the former land occupants. Going to money lenders to obtain additional loan for this purpose can only increase the debt problem and the odds that the farmers will never free himself off his debts and consequently the harder conditions of production and marketing he will be subjected to. Some voice their opinion that ALRO should provide the loans to cover all the costs of the compensation money and in so doing become the only lender, that with the lower interest rates, they have a chance to repay. This is a rather dubious proposition however, as most of farmers themselves tend to give priority to the repayment of non-government loans. Efforts have been made however to look into ways of reducing the debts of the farmers through the attempts to reach agreements between the money lenders and the farmers. Such efforts maybe successful in one situation in which particular case, it benefited from the enthusiasm of ALRO's staff and on the willingness of the lender in question to cooperate. Thus the provision of access to land must be considered in relation to the constraints under which the farmers also operate.

Formation of the people's organizations. The land reform cooperatives is not an organization that simultaneously emerge from the perceived needs and the meaningful participation of the people. The concept of cooperatives and that of self-reliance, given the present perceptions of the people as to what the cooperatives are, appear to be contradictory. The money lending functions expands the ties with the market economy. Moreover, the economic ties with the money lenders act as the natural barrier to entry to cooperatives, even in the case where they effectively function. To be effective, the land reform cooperatives would have to be involved in the full cycle of production and marketing problem and addressing the crucial problem of indebtedness of the members. Such a cooperative demand high management skills and greater understanding of the members as to how the cooperative should be used as a collective to tackle the cause of the problems not, as it is, how to borrow money.

The allocation of the other development projects. Due to the lack of effective horizontal coordinating system, there seem to be a general unawareness among the various public and private agencies involved in development activities in the land reform area of the activities being carried out at the same time. This not only causes confusion among the farmers but also unnecessary waste of manpower and resources in cases where there is an overlapping of functions.

3. Conclusions of the Problems Related to Land Reform and Recommendations.

3.1 Main Problems in Land Reform Implementation.

3.1.1 Problems Related to the Legal Mechanisms.

The legal clarity is one of the most important tools enabling ALRO to distribute land to the landless and the small farmers. The present ALRO 4-01 document however cannot be used for this purpose due to the legal drawbacks as mentioned earlier.

3.1.2 Problems Related to the Scope of Work and the Phases in Land Reform Implementation.

The process of land reform implementation in general lacks a unity of approach and a clear target for achievement. There is an apparent need to define the scope of ALRO's work both in terms of areas of responsibility and the time frame of involvement within a given land reform area;

3.1.3 Problems Related to the Organizational Structure.

Both types of organizations related to land reform implementation, i.e., the Top-down and the Bottom-up lack the efficiency of operation. This greatly hinders their capacity to fulfill the assigned functions.

3.2 The Recommendations for the Improvement of the Organization of Land Reform and of Related Development Activities.

3.2.1 General Conceptual Approach to Land Reform

Land Reform activities should be considered as a part of the broader movement of rural development. It should be undertaken on a project basis with a starting point and a clearly point of completion.

The land reform project is divided into three phases: the pre-land distribution phase, land distribution phase and post-land distribution phase. Recommendations relating to the structural problems identified above are addressed as they occur in the various stages of land reform implementation. A more detailed description of the various activities during each implementation stage together with the identification of the various responsible agencies are provided in Chart.

3.2.2 Pre-Land Distribution Phase.

Community Studies

(1) Forms of community studies. During the pre-land distribution phase, community studies will involve adopting both quantitative as well as qualitative study methods. The emphasis is however on the qualitative aspects of community studies. The importance of community studies cannot be overstressed particularly in a sensitive issue as land reform since the effects of land distribution will generate different types of responses from different groups of people. It is therefore crucial that ALRO be in a position to predict the various response types so that pre-planned approaches can be visualized and appropriate actions be taken when required. Among the crucial information to be obtained is the break down of the social and economic class structure, the power and the social and economic relationships between the different groups. Such information will widen the basis with which ALRO can make the decision on the potential beneficiaries. It will certainly give adequate information as to whom to involve to take joint responsibility in the identification of beneficiaries and well as in cross examinations and negotiation activities.

(2) Personnel for conducting community studies. Community studies will be jointly undertaken by ALRO field staff team and by the technical field staff workers. The former will be concentrating on the quantitative aspects of land reform while the latter on the qualitative aspects of community studies research. In view of the nature of the work to be undertaken which is predominantly community development work, members of the field work team will demand someone with a particular ideological thinking and frame of mind that is willing to work with and learn from the people. The recruitment of the personnel to fulfill these roles can be from three alternatives. These are (1) the new recruits and existing ALRO local staff who will be selected and called in for retraining; (2) volunteers from Non Government Organizations; (3) the existing people's organizations such as the Tambon Council, the Village Committee and the representative of the natural house clusters. They will work closely with ALRO technical field staff but have a degree of independence of action. For continuity, the field work team and the technical field staff would work as a team and stay in a particular land reform area from the beginning of land reform implementation to the very end of ALRO's involvement in that area.

Publicity Campaign. Another activity which is crucial in the pre-land distribution phase is the publicity campaigns. This should be carried out on a more intensive scale. The objectives of these publicity campaigns are to provide adequate information on the purpose of land reform, the role of ALRO and the benefits of land reform to the community. This information should be publicized in forms and language that can be easily understood by the people. Although publicity campaign is presently conducted, due to manpower, time and budgetary constraints, publicity campaigns cannot be carried out in adequate scale and coverage. Under the present system, ALRO publicity campaign staff are only able to spend a minimum amount of time in each land reform area prior to going in to a particular community. Land reform is however, a highly sensitive issue and limited understanding of the role of ALRO can lead to the misinterpretation that ALRO is coming to take away their land. The initial impression therefore is of crucial importance to ALRO eventual work of ALRO. Much more attention should therefore be allocated to the provision of appropriate and adequate publicity campaigns.

Organization Restructuring. The organizations related to land reform activities are divided into the organizations that are related to land distribution activities and the organizations that are related to development activities within a given land reform area. The functional contribution of the two types of organizations are as follows :

(1) **The Organizations and Personnel Related to Land Distribution.** These are considered to be the Top-down organizations. Such organizations should be sufficiently empowered to carry out its duties with a degree of independence and

recognized authority. The organizations that are related to land distribution are already existing in the form of the Provincial Land Reform Committee and the Land Reform Subcommittee at the District level. The functional attribute of these two organization should be clearly defined as follows :

(1.1) The District Land Reform Subcommittee. The activities of this organization should be concentrated in the land distribution aspects. The District Land Reform Committee could be a counterforce to the virtual monopoly of the legal staff in selection and negotiation for land distribution. The upgrading of the efficiency of this organization will involve restructuring the composition of the residing members. Such a committee should be represented by those who are closely related to the issue of land distribution. The ratio between official and 'people' members of the Committee should be equal, not, as it is under the present circumstances where the people are by sheer numbers, minority groups in the Committee. The farmer's representatives should not, by any means be appointed by the Provincial Land Reform Officer as is the normal procedure, they should have been identified at the stage where community studies were undertaken. By status, they should be drawn from different social and economic groups so as to disperse viewpoints.

(1.2) The Provincial Land Reform Committee. The activities of the Land Reform Committee's activities should be more focussed on development activities within the land reform area. Since such organization is represented by the various branches of government, it can assist the land reform activities of ALRO by creating an awareness on the undertakings of the ALRO within the land reform area in land distribution activities as well as in development activities. The Provincial Land Reform Committee could be used as a platform from which to pool in resources and efforts from the various government and non-government agencies to finance development activities. It could function as a coordinating body coordinating all development activities within the land reform area. For effectiveness, the responsibilities described above for the PLRC and DLRC require no less than a full time committed working group. Commitment is not however, purely generated at the operational level. To a certain extent, it must be cleared at the inter-Ministerial level, on how committed the various government departments are to land reform and accordingly, how much time, authority, independence of decision making power and budget allocation are to be allocated.

(1.3) ALRO's field staff. ALRO's staff operating at the field will comprise of two major groups of workers, i.e., the technical field staff and the field work team. The roles of the technical field staff and the field work team are functionally different. The former is responsible for conducting the technical routine work of ALRO, that is the cross examining land right, land survey, mapping staking engineering work. The field work team on the other hand is more involved with

the qualitative aspects of land reform implementation. Their function is to create a general understanding of the role of ALRO, create an acceptance for ALRO and involving people in the process of land reform. The two groups of workers will work together as a team in a given land reform area from the commencement of the land reform project through to its termination point, i.e. post land distribution upon the issuance of full ownership document. Through the field staff work team, ALRO will be able to have the much needed dialogue with the people in the land reform areas.

(2) The organizations responsible for the development activities. The role of such organizations is to transfer the problems and needs of the people. Such information will be used as the basis for the formulation of the development plans more suited and appropriate to the needs of the people.

Training. Training programmes should be considered as one of the most important component of land reform implementations and should be part of the land reform implementation policy. For effectiveness, they should be routine and recurrent with adequate follow up studies on the usefulness of the exercise at the operational level. They can be used as effective practical procedural guidelines to render some uniformity of approach to land reform implementation. The objective, the content of the training programmes and the trainees will differ during the various stages of land reform. The objective of pre-land distribution training is to lay the ground for the understanding on the part of all ranks of personnel about the nature of land reform, the role of ALRO as well as on promotional activities, and ways of effectively carrying out publicity campaigns. It is also the start of the training processes on specific skills for ALRO technical field staff.

(1) Trainees. The main target groups to undergo training during the pre-land distribution phase are the technical field staff and the field work team responsible for conducting community studies. Since the emphasis is placed in the conduct of in-depth community studies, the priority here is therefore placed in the training of the field work team.

(2) The content of training will be to provide basic understanding of the nature of work undertaken by ALRO. On three major aspects :

(2.1) Clarification of policies, objectives and target of land reform :

(2.2) Ways of creating the attitudes which are inductive to community development work ;

(2.3) Techniques of creating skills in working and living with people in the rural areas.

(3) Trainers. For the purpose of training, ALRO could set up a division for coordinating and managing training activities. Trainer should be drawn from a

number agencies such as the Community Development Department, the Department of Agricultural Extension, Non Government Organizations, Department of Cooperatives Promotion, ALRO's own staff and educational institutions in related fields.

(4) Duration of Training. The type of training offered will differ according to the roles each target group is expected to fill in land reform implementation. The initial formal training should take at least six months after which period the field staff would be training on the job in ALRO areas as well as in other areas to allow for comparisons between ALRO's approach and those of other development agencies. In addition to the formal approach, training could be conducted via a problems solving approach. This could be arranged in the form of annual conference. The objective of these annual conference would be to open a forum for discussion in exchange of experiences, problems and obstacles of work. The opportunity to exchange ideas would be of benefit to both the field staff and ALRO's central staff. Results of the conference could be compiled into a book of cases to be uses as practical guidelines for field workers in similar cases and circumstances.

Planning. Based on the proposal that land reform should be undertaken on a project basis with clear starting point and termination point, there is a need to formulate action plans for project implementation in each land reform area. The contents of the plan will include details on manpower and budget allocation which will be consistent with the overall land reform policy at the national level.

Classification of Land Reform Area. The classification of land reform areas into the two following types is essential for the identification of appropriate strategy in terms of manpower, time and budget allocation.

(1) The areas where land reform could be carried out with relative ease :

(1.1) Areas with 80% of the holdings are of the size specified by ALRO ;

(1.2) Area where the average size of holdings are under the ALRO specified size ;

(1.3) Area where the compensation money is relatively near and the large land owners want the compensation money ; (which maybe due to having faced crop failures and want to sell land to pay off debts.)

(1.4) Area where the soil suitability and water supply are poor or where are poor public utilities and the people are mostly average to poor income groups ;

(1.5) Areas where the kamnans and the village headmen are respected elders of the majority of the people in the community ;

(2) Areas where it is likely to be difficult to carry out land reform :

(2.1) Area where the large land owners are powerful people and have settled in an area for a relatively long period ;

(2.2) Area where the kamnans and the village headman cannot unite the people and where the people are divided into factions and cliques. This means that there is no real collective leadership as they tend to vary according to the different groups;

(2.3) Areas with adequately developed public utilities to the extent that investors are attracted and have sent in agents who are usually influential people within the community such as the kamnans and the village headmen;

(2.4) Areas where land sales are quite common and the market price higher than the value of land compensation per rai. Or areas where there are interfering external interests;

3.2.3 Land Distribution.

The conditions for land distribution. The following factors are considered to be the prerequisites for the implementation of land reform:

(1) The support of the state. The state must give full protection to ALRO staff in conducting their duties in a given land reform area particularly in support of their negotiations for land distribution with the large land owners thus ensuring security and guaranteeing safety in conducting their duties.

(2) The clarity over legal right and status. It is recommended that ultimately ALRO 4-7 will either be upgraded so that its quality is standardized and equal to other types of land ownership documents or that it be substituted by a land document that is issued by a single authority namely the Land Department. The legal aspects of land reform must be clearly conveyed to the people via the publicity campaigns and during the community studies. The people must be aware of the legal status they will have acquired at the final stage of land reform as well as the legal quality of the land ownership document issued by ALRO. Clarity of legal rights of however rests on the laid down land reform policy as well as on the successful outcome of negotiation among the different government branches related to the National Land Policy. Once this is obtained, ALRO can use the legal aspects of land reform to facilitate the negotiation process for land distribution and the value of land compensation.

(3) The organizational development. The state must be committed to the upgrading of the performance of the existing people's organizations. It should also lay down a basis for the involvement of non-government organizations in the land reform activities in the long run;

(4) The state commitment towards tackling the basic economic problems of the people in the land reform area. The main obstacle restricting the potential benefits to be derived from land acquisition is the problem on indebtedness. It is recommended that all the outstanding debts of the farmers in the land reform area

at the time of land distribution which are obtained from informal credit sources should be transferred into the formal credit system. Within the land reform area, ALRO will be the representative of the government in transferring these debts for which ALRO will charge the interest rate equivalent to the standing market interest rate.

The activities during the land distribution phase. Apart from the procedural activities described in chart 3.2.1-1, the following are considered to be the activities which need to be given special attention:

(1) The development of the basic infrastructures. The development of physical infrastructure is consistent with the concept that ALRO should provide means of production other than the ownership of land which will enable the farmers within the land reform area to earn their living. They also form perceived as compensation for the reduction of the size of holdings of some of the farmers of that particular land reform area. The approach towards basic infrastructural development is however markedly different from the previous undertakings since the new approach emphasises the need to involve the people in the decision making, project identification, involvement of resources both in terms of partial financing and in labour contribution. It should also be stressed that the level of development of these physical infrastructures should at least be equivalent to the minimum level as in other rural areas.

(2) The implementation of crash development programmes. These are short term development projects designed to create experiences of the people in the land reform areas in participating in community development work. In any development activities undertaken either during the land distribution and post-land distribution phases however, ALRO will act as the coordinator pooling in resources and coordinating between the various government agencies which are directly involved in particular fields.

(3) Community development work. Community development work during the land distribution phase is divided into two aspects:

(3.1) The selection of the community leaders. On the basis of the information acquired through secondary data survey and primary field work data, the field worker will enter a community getting acquainted with its inhabitants and creating trust among the people. At the same time, the field worker will try to identify, in his observation of the social and economic relationships of the people, the various community leaders. The community leaders to participate in land reform activities should be selected on the basis of the differences in role and functions within their community so as to broaden the range of ideas and information about that society. A wider selection will also prevent domination of idea from any one leader. The dialogues between ALRO staff and village headmen and kamnans are often wrongly misconceived as a form of people's participation. There is thus a

tendency for government officials to misinterpret the people's problems and needs according to the opinions of these village headmen who may not always represent the views of the majority of the people.

(3.2) The involvement of community leaders in ALRO's routine work formerly exclusively undertaken by ALRO local staff. Together with the community leader, the field work team would try to work out the appropriate size of holdings, land value and preliminary selection of beneficiaries (based on the community leaders' knowledge of who cultivates the land or not). This information will be used as the basis for ALRO's legal staff for procedural matters.

Supporting Activities During the Land Distribution Phase.

(1) Training. The objective of training during the land distribution phases is to provide specific skills for the field work team in their particular area of responsibility. The training is also geared towards laying the basis for the understanding on the part of the community leaders of the concept of 'participation' and its significance in relation to the land reform procedures.

(2) The continuation of publicity campaign. The field work team, the community leaders and to a certain extent the technical work team will be putting in efforts to publicize the ideas of land reform in order to reinforce the initial publicity campaigns.

(3) Formation of the people's organization.

(3.1) The objectives of forming the organization of the people. The formation of people's organization is one of the conditions that will lead to the completion of the land reform project in a given area. This task is carried out on the basis of understanding that the provision of land to the landless and the small farmers although essential is only one aspect of rural development. The acquisition of land ownership still leaves other crucial problems such as indebtedness and dependency still intact. Land reform efforts must occur simultaneously with the efforts to reduce the effects of externalities which constitute the context of production and marketing and the key mechanism will be the people's organization. Independent efforts to promote the growth of the people's organization and the implementation of externally introduced development projects cannot bring about any lasting structural changes or eliminate the externalities which inhibit on the potential benefit to be gained from land acquisition. If the people's organization is adequately strong, their operation in itself will reduce the effects of the externalities without the government assistance.

(3.2) The role of the public agencies in the formation of the people's organization. The development of the people's organization however is not solely the responsibility of ALRO and cannot be so for a number of reasons such as budgetary

constraints and the functional limitations of ALRO. It should therefore be considered as one of the activities within the approach to rural development of the country as a whole. The only difference will be that in the land reform area, the role of ALRO by comparison to other organizations, is more prominent. The conditions which are conducive to the growth of such organization will have to be manipulated. They will not emerge spontaneously and ALRO must be the stimulant factor in bringing about the conditions of change during this transitional phase. The rationality of ALRO's organization and the familiarity of within the communities place ALRO in a better position as a unified in bringing about social harmony in those societies to induce people's participation.

(3.3) The development of people's participation and organization. Initially, such participation can take be in crash programmes which can be used as a tactical tool in creating the basis for people's participation. ALRO should however, envisage its role as the helper not as the main actor. During the land distribution phase, the field work team and the community leaders should try to convey the ideas of working together as a collective to the people in order to create harmony and sense of belonging to the community. Sense of belonging is highly essential for the growth of the people's organization of the community particularly in land reform areas given that the people come from an array of backgrounds, by way of place of origin and ownership status prior to land distribution. The only factor they may have in common is that in coming together as community members of the land reform area, they will have acquired a similar status at least in the ownership of the land assets which are more or less evenly distributed. A newly shared sense of identity should be used to promote a sense of belonging to that community. At this point, there is no need to push for a well structured organization as such. Rural development is characterized by too many 'structured' organization that do not fulfill any practical functions but remain nominal organizations. The way in which people come together to discuss their problem should at this stage be visualized as a loosely structured from of collective. Eventually, the collective will develop its own structure in the ways that are compatible with the people's needs. ALRO staff workers will be participants only when requested. They will not give suggestions as to what to do but may propose possible ways of looking at problems to stimulate the people to think up solutions themselves. Such comprehensive involvement would generate a sense of belonging and identification with activities which would be of benefit to their community.

3.2.4 Post Land Distribution Phase.

The role of ALRO staff will have considerably reduced at this stage. Much of the development activities should be conceptualized, initiated and carried out by the people through their organization which will have emerged in the previous phase.

Post land distribution should mark the end of ALRO intensive involvement with the community. ALRO's presence will however still be felt at longer intervals. The objective of these visits would be to monitor and evaluate the performance of the people's organization. ALRO will have left the community with a strong organization, capable of protecting its members against the externalities and ensuring that the land stays with the tillers according to ALRO's fundamental goal.

The conditions for the completion of the land reform project in a given area. The following are indicators which will determine the level of development within the land reform areas to be used as the criteria for the completion of the land reform project in a given area. The assessment will be carried out by the Provincial Land Reform Development Committee which will submit the results to the Land Reform Committee at the national level for approval. These indicators are as follows :

(1) The level of development of the physical infrastructure is equivalent to the minimum standard applying to other rural areas. It should be noted that the level of development of the physical infrastructure should be at the minimum level required to enable ALRO to conduct its land distribution activities, e.g. the construction costs of feeder roads with spatial coverage of one square kilometre. Other require infrastructures include basic health care facilities, school facilities and adequate provision or access to reliable sources of consumption water. Basic needs criteria such as specified by the National Economic and Social Development Board could be applied as the measuring indicators for this purpose;

(2) The people's organization is adequately strong and is capable of confronting problems on an independent basis. At least such organizations should be in the position to coordinate with other public and private agencies in the area other than ALRO.

(3) The rate of repayment of debts is satisfactory. Debt repayment rate is an indicator of the ability of the farmers to make a basic living from the land which he has come to possess. As previously mentioned, it is recommended that to overcome the externalities in the context of production and marketing that ALRO should institutionalize existing debts. The target for debt institutionalization should be that at the time when ALRO withdraws from a LRA the proportion of debts within the formal and informal financial markets should be 90%:10% and that the rate of repayment of should be targeted at 80% of the total sum loaned within the next ten years.

(4) The issuance of a legal document providing the holder of full ownership status.

3.3 The Constituent Factors of Land Reform.

3.3.1 Institutional Requirement for Inter Departmental Cooperation.

The institutional requirements here refers to the modifications in the present organizational structure that would allow for greater effectiveness in the implementation of land reform. This refers to both Top-down organizations as well as Bottom-up organization. The two fundamental functions of the organizations are mainly for the purpose of land distribution and for the purpose of development activities.

(1) The Top-down Organizations. The strategy emphasises the need to coordinate efforts of the various departments and divisions of ALRO in the formulation of work programme and management of land reform and to take decisions pertaining to the following aspects of land reform :

(1.1) Whether or not to carry out land reform in a particular area;

(1.2) Which of the two categories of the land identified does a particular area fall into;

(1.3) Assess the interrelatedness between the various on-going work of the various government as well as non-government agencies and future development activities. The objective of the exercise is to come up with possible ways of coordinating efforts in order to minimize where possible, the time and the budget in pursuing development activities;

(1.4) The formulation of the plan and work procedure will be formulated in accordance with the policy guidelines. Naturally, the socio-economic conditions of land reform areas differ, and although flexibility and a degree of autonomy is desirable, there must still be a certain level of uniformity of concepts and approach to avoid staff from going in all directions to achieve the ends.

3.3.2 Strengthening the Bottom-up Aspects and Creating Meaningful Involvement of the People.

The emphasis is on the use of existing farmers and local organizations such as the Tambon Council (TC), the Village Committee (VC). Currently, neither the VCs or the TCs can be used in its present forms nor can be used as the only forms of people's organizations due to their narrow representation of the various social and economic groups within a rural community. The use of NGOs are also discussed in great detail in this paper due to the interest of the conceptual approach of their functions and the possibilities of coordinating efforts between ALRO and NGOs.

Three alternatives identified below are possible types of local institutions to carry out the task of ALRO at the field level. None of these recommended types can be presently used to perform the task required by ALRO. They all have opera-

tional drawbacks which are related to the existing rationale of the various types of organization, the lack of skill and experience in carrying out the tasks required. There are also drawbacks related to the social and economic power structure, the absence of clear policy commitment, recognition and support to their involvement in land reform implementation tasks. The three alternatives are:

- (1) ALRO retrained personnel
- (2) The existing rural organizations
 - the Tambon Council
 - the Village Committee
- (3) The Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)

ALRO retrained personnel. This first alternative would involve the least change in the institutional structure of ALRO. It involves the selection of existing ALRO staffs and in view of the expansion of the land reform areas, new recruits.

The existing rural organizations.

(1) The Tambon Council. At first impression the Tambon Council appears to be a very promising possibility due to its present involvement in community development activities. Among the many activities of the TCs are responsible for are rural development activities at the tambon level, the most time consuming is perhaps the rural employment project. The Tambon Council is to evaluate the problems of the villages and formulate ways of solving such problems into the form of development projects. It is also responsible for coordinating between various government agencies in implementing rural development projects at the tambon level. Expenditures and identified agencies, the formulation of the five year tambon development plan, the annual expenditure plan. Another function which may be useful to the work of ALRO is the laid down policy that the TCs should assist in the identification of public land in order to issue legal documents claiming the state ownership of that land and take appropriate measures on the encroachers. By the very function which it presently fulfills, the TCs are very appropriate for the purpose. Yet the involvement of the TCs are subjected to several constraints.

(1.1) The TCs are local institutional bodies set up by the Ministry of Interior. Should TCs be involved in land reform implementation, the nature of involvement and the scope of work will have to be clearly specified as a policy and approved by the Ministry of Interior which is the direct governing authority.

(1.2) TCs members consist of kamnans and village headmen who are the local people already involved in actuality in land reform. Thus one is not talking about different sets of people but the same people fulfilling different functions. TCs cannot be used as a matter of fact. Moreover, evaluations of TCs themselves on

development activities, which to a certain extent is less interest ridden than land reform issues can hardly be evaluated as satisfactory. Abundant time and resources also needs to be invested to make it a more effective functioning body.

(1.3) Another drawbacks is that the TC is known to be ridden with vested interests. Moreover, TCs are over represented by formal community leaders, namely the kamnans and the village headmen who more often not belong to the group of landed class. Consequentially, small holders and landless people's interests maybe clouded by a more narrow self interests of preceding members. On sensitive issues as land distribution therefore, it is very hopeful to expect that TCs could be objectively involved in land reform implementation.

(1.4) Spatial distribution wise, TC is the most viable unit of people's local organization. On the other hand, land reform areas do not often cover the whole of a particular *tambon*, this means that tambons with only one or more villages may confront difficulties in voicing the interests of their village's interest for lack of majority vote.

(2) The village committee. A smaller unit of local organization is the village committee. The committee, consists of 10 members with the village headman as the chairman of the committee. The nine other members are responsible for various aspects of community development such as education, agriculture, health, etc. In some cases village committees can be mere proxies set up with no real function. Indeed, some village headmen cannot automatically recall the names of the members of his respective village committees, But the effectiveness of the Village Committee very much depend on the personality of the village headmen. Should he be the person who is widely respected within the rural community and enthusiastic in development activities, the maybe able to choose able members to sit in as members of the VCs and together, form an effective people's work team. On the other hand, if communities consist of various social groupings bearing much difference in terms of social and economic status, the village headmen may not be effective in inducing efforts from VCs members for community work.

(3) A more viable possibility may be the representative of the *khumban* (the natural clusters of households within a village). Since members are elected by the villagers themselves, they appear to be the most useful unit of representation to develop.

The NGOs. The failure of existing delivery system has been paralleled with the growing faith in the role of Non Government Organizations. By way of training and ideological background, and work approach volunteers who work under the Non-Government Organizations are the very type of people needed to collect the more indepth information which are so essential to the work of ALRO.

(1) The advantages of NGOs

(1.1) NGOs "...introduces an element of pluralism that can at least provide countervailing forces against the risk of an exclusively government dominated strategy." (Rahnema comments in article: *NGOs: Sifting the Wheat from Chaff*). The element of pluralism is essential to land reform implementation because ALRO needs to have the information on the diversity of social and economic issues. There is a need for effective tools for information transfer. This is not to say that the 'elements of pluralism' is altogether lacking. Indeed, deliberate attempts have been made to involve local participants to disperse sources of information. Noticeably, however, it has been operationally difficult to 'go' for other sources of information other than the formal community leaders such as the kamnans and the village headmen. A number of other possible information source are present, the task is how to identify them, and who is to identify them. Certainly, the 'label' which is attached to ALRO reduces the effectiveness of ALRO in assuming this task. That is why such the independence of action, the lack of association with any established interests of volunteers makes them, at first glance a better choice.

(1.2) It offers a new approach towards community studies. This arises from the awareness of the inadequacies of the delivery system that breeds and consolidate the sense of dependency of the people and in relation to that, the rejection of the technocratic approach to the solution of the people's problems.

(1.3) The belief that the people themselves are in better solutions to state their problems and identify ways of solving those problems.

(1.4) Related to the points mentioned, their search for genuine participation with the people. NGOs see themselves as catalyste to help the people create their own alternative approach to their development problems.

(2) Drawbacks

(2.1) Not all of the numerous Non Government Organizations operate under that concept. Indeed, some foreign based NGOs operate on a social welfare approach. On the other hand, even in the case of small grassroots NGOs, not all of them can fulfill the ideals described above. Volunteers often go through periods of self-conflict, i.e., the discrepancies between, reality of what rural communities are and their perceptions prior to venturing in a rural community of rural societies.

(2.2) The Non Government Organizations are not really known among the people in general, a fact which tends to their lack of sense of stability and status. Moreover, neither are Non Government Organizations acknowledged by the government. There is as yet no clear policy statement concerning the status of NGOs at least not the non-profit oriented NGOs types. They are hardly aware of who NGOs

are, their reason for coming into a rural community and what they are going to do in the rural communities. Some government officials are of the opinion that development work is the monopoly of government agencies. If NGOs want to be involved, they must comply in the ways that the government wants them to. This is contradictory to the independent nature of work so important to NGOs.

(2.3) Most of the NGOs are also new to the rural community development work. They still lack the work experience and have not yet developed a work system and the technique. They are still themselves in the experimental stage, of experiencing, reviewing analyzing.

(2.4) The concept of NGOs is to work in poor isolated rural areas. Greater involvement of volunteers with government may stand in opposition with the fundamental concept of the freedom of action of NGOs. Institutionalizing their involvement is even harder to reconcile.

(3) The pre-conditions in involving NGOs with the work of ALRO.

(3.1) The involvement of NGOs must be recognized as a policy issue in which it should be stated clearly the nature of involvement, the scope of work and the conditions under which they work in relation to ALRO;

(3.2) Once recruited NGO volunteers must also under go a period of training in order to familiarize themselves with the work of ALRO, its objectives, procedures and problems;

(3.3) They are not direct employees of ALRO and they must be allowed certain freedom of action to pursue community development studies by their own techniques. Involvement with ALRO local staff should be minimal to avoid the association and the dissatisfaction that may arise as people come to think of volunteers as ALRO spies.

(4) The function of NGOs in land reform implementation.

(4.1) Pre-land distribution phase and land distribution participate in community studies. NGOs or volunteers will not take place of ALRO's local staff but they will be fulfilling a function which local ALRO staff may not be able to undertake. There is the supportive role. They may gather information, they can be the media between ALRO and the people, information flow will be both both ways, from the people and to the people. Contact between volunteers and ALRO must not take place prior to the acceptance of NGOs by the people and until NGOs have grasped the basic understanding of the structure of power within the community and is able to identify the various groups of people and detect their responses to land reform. The presence of someone who is well aware of the stance and the problems of each counterforces can help neutralize the tension through the availability of adequate information.

(4.2) Land distribution and post-land distribution. There is community development work as discussed in detail in the earlier section. They will want to create the strength of the people so that they can help themselves and become self-reliant. It is at the same time a conscientization process and the process of learning to solve the problem together by their own efforts and by their own means.

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS

PROBLEMS

The process of land reform implementation in general lacks a unity of approach and a clear target for achievement. There is an apparent need to define the scope of ALRO's work both in terms of areas of responsibility and the time frame of involvement within a given land reform area.

Both types of organizations related to land reform implementation, i.e., the Top-down and the Bottom-up lack the efficiency of operation. This greatly hinders their meaningful participation in the land reform activities.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

There is a need to clearly specify the scope of work of ALRO. Land reform should be conceived of as one of the means to the broader goal of rural development. Land reform activities in a given land reform area should therefore be conceived of as a project in which there is a definite starting and ending point. The key activities in each land reform implementation stage should be clearly defined. Practical guidelines should also be provided at the operational level with alternatives provided to give a degree of flexibility within a unified framework of approach.

Pre-land distribution. The key activities during the pre-land distribution phase are as follows:

(1) The conduct of community studies emphasizing on the obtaining the indepth knowledge of a community's power structure;

(2) The implementation of an all out publicity campaign;

(3) The creation of people's participation through formal and informal channels. This rests on certain pre-conditions such as:

(3.1) The cooperation of the Ministry of Interior in allocating to the Tambon Council, the joint responsibility within the IRAs.

(3.2) The improvements of existing organizations with definite distinctions as to their functions. Such organizations will be divided into two broad types:

(3.2.1) The organization to function in the selective process (Top-down).

(3.2.2) The organizations to function in the development activities (Bottom-up)

(3.3) The preparation for the involvement of NGOs in land reform implementation, particularly during the pre-land distribution phase, in the conduct of community studies.

(4) Planning. Planning will become a basic element of land reform implementation since the land reform will be administered in the form of project. Content of the plan will include the details of budget, manpower and resource allocation together as well as the target for land distribution and the time frame for implementation. Planning for development activities in the land reform area should also stress on the social and the human elements and allow for effective participation of the people through their organizations;

(5) Training and organization of working groups for new LRAs. The former emphasis of planning in land reform implementation has been mainly focussed on the technical aspects. These working groups are a group of ALRO retrained staff to be allocated the responsibility of in depth community studies. The nature of training will vary according to the different stages in land reform implementation.

(5.1) During the pre-land distribution phase in the form of formal training;

(5.2) During the land distribution phase in the form of case studies, i.e., references as how problems were solved in other settings to be used as action guidelines.

Land-distribution phase. All the activities to be carried out during this period should be supported by :

(1) Commitment of the state. The commitment of the state is required to provide security for undertaking the necessary measures in dealing with large land owners. It is also essential for the strengthening of the Provincial Land Reform Committee as a means of giving authority to the selection and screening process;

(2) The clarity of the legal status of the farmers within the land reform area regarding their ownership status. The selection and the screening process can only be effective if forms of legal status is clear from the onset of land reform;

(3) The implementation of the crash programmes. Crash programmes will be a means of inducing the involvement of the people and laying the grounds for the expansion of the role of the people in the development activities of their communities;

(4) Training on immediate problems (case studies training type; using compilation of experiences as the reference for action)

Post-land distribution. The key activities during the post-land distribution phase will be :

(1) The reduction of the problems of indebtedness through the institutionalisation of debts :

(2) The establishment channels for the meaningful cooperation of efforts among the different government departments as well as inducing the private sector's involvement ;

(3) The development of additional infrastructures ;

(4) The assessment of the work so far accomplished and based on several indicators so as to terminate the intensive involvement in the LRAs. These indicators are :

(4.1) Development of *adequate* basic infrastructures ;

(4.2) People's organization is adequately strong and can manage community affairs with a degree of independence ;

(4.3) Repayment rate of loans at a satisfactory level ;

(4.4) The issuance of document of land ownership.

ALRO Organization

1. Office of the Secretary

1. Correspondence Section
2. Personnel Section
3. Financial Section
4. Provincial Coordination Section

2. R & P: Division of Research and Planning

1. Secretarial Section
2. P & E: Planning and Evaluation Section
3. ST & REGIS: Statistical Analysis and Land Registration Section
4. TR: Land Reform Training Section
5. PR: Public Relations Section
6. FPR: Foreign Relations Section

3. LRO: Division of Land Reform Operations

1. Secretarial Section
2. MAP: Mapping Survey Section
3. CAD: Cadastral Survey Section
4. PHO: Photogrammetry Section
5. AGR: Agricultural Development and Promotion
6. FO: Farmers Organization Promotion Section

4. **LRP: Division of Land Reform Financing**
 1. Secretarial Section
 2. FA: Funds Analysis Section
 3. A: Account Section
 4. LB: Land Bond Section
 5. LA & CO: Land Account and Credit Operation Section
 6. A & S: Auditing and Supervision Section
 7. FLP: Foreign Loans Project Office
5. **LA: Division of Legal Affairs**
 1. Secretarial Section
 2. L & R: Legal Regulations Section
 3. COMPL: Complaints and Investigation Section
 4. CONTR: Juridical Act and Contracts Section
6. **E: Division of Engineering**
 1. Secretarial Section
 2. D & C: Design and Construction Section
 3. ME: Mechanical Engineering Service Section
7. **PLRO: Provincial Land Reform Office**
 1. Secretarial Section
 2. Land Reform Administration Section
 3. Financing and Land Account Section
 4. Legal Affairs Section
 5. Cadastral Survey and Mapping Section

Chart 1 Procedures of land reform implementation.

Study Component	Organization*	Activities (Time Span)
		1. PRE-LAND DISTRIBUTION PHASE
	R & P/MAP, CAD, PHO	1.1 Potential land reform area identification
A		
B	-	
C	-	
D	R & P/P & E, FA	Specification of budget (1 year)
	R & P/MAP, CAD, PHO	1.2 Land survey and selection of land reform area
A		
B		
C	-	
D	R & P/P & E, FA	Specification of the budget
	R & P/TR	1.3 Socio-economic survey

Note : * See page 54-55

Chart 1 (Continued)

Study Component	Organization	Activities (Time Span)
A	R & P, P & E	a. Formulate a zoning map for setting the zonal land value average price b. Survey land price in the past c. Collect data on production of main cash crops in that area.
B	R & P, PLRO	b.1 Technical field staff and field work team to start quantitative and qualitative community studies
C	-	
D	R & P/FA Procedural	d.1 Specification of the budget 1.4 Submit survey findings and propose to Land Reform Committee for public announcement of area as land reform area
C	-	c.1 Request for official statement on change of status of former forest areas
D	- Procedural	1.5 Enactment of official decree specifying land reform area
A	-	
B	-	
C	-	
D	-	
	TR/PR/FPR	1.6 Publicity and training
A	-	
B	TR/PR/FPR DOE/CBD/OARD/Educational institutions/NGOs	b. Selection of trainees from existing local staff and recruitment of additional staff for training (1 month) b.1 Criteria for selection. The recruits must have the following specifications

Chart 1 (Continued)

Study Component	Organization	Activities (Time Span)
C	FA ST & REGIS/L & R/COMPL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b.1.1 Good human relationship b.1.2 Commitment and identification with the work b.1.3 Flexible when situation demands and can be a compromiser b.1.4 For old recruits, they must have a satisfactory work record and adequate work experiences in rural areas b.2 Training on publicity campaign techniques, communication and development techniques basic undersatnding of the social and economic structure of rural societies, the role of leadership, social and cultural influence (3 month) c.1 Provision of information on types of legal document to be acquired/and basic understanding on the characteristics of such document as well as the change in the legal status of the beneficiaries
D	FA ST & REGIS/L & R/COMPL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d.1 Specification of the budget
A	-	1.7 Reporting land rights
B	Community leaders/ Research Division in R & P	Clarification and confirmation of claimance on the use of land for agricultural production
C	REGIS/I. & R/COMPL	Procedural land rights registration
D	R & P	Specification of the budget
A	REGIS/L & R/COMPL	1.8 Land rights cross examination

Chart 1 (Continued)

Study Component	Organization	Activities (Time Span)
B	Community leaders and ALRO field staff	Clarification and confirmation of claimance on the use of land for agricultural production
C	-	
D	-	
	MAP	1.9 Mapping for land distribution
A	-	
B	-	
C	-	
D	-	
	MAP	1.10 Mapping and staking
A	-	
B	-	
C	-	
D	-	
	D & C, ME, R & P	1.11 Preparation of basic infrastructural development plan (a month)
A	-	
B	-	
C	-	
	LRF	Specification of the budget
	ST & REGIS	2. LAND DISTRIBUTION PHASE
	L & R, CONTR	2.1 Issue ALRO 4-01 and registration
A	-	
B	PLRO/TR	b.1 Community development phase getting acquainted with the farmers
		b.2 Training the community leaders and getting the community leaders involved in
		b.2.1 the selection of beneficiaries

Chart 1 (Continued)

Study Component	Organization	Activities (Time Span)
C	ST & REGIS L & R, CONTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b.2.2 the specification of land value b.2.3 the size of holdings b.3 Selection of beneficiaries
D	LRA, FA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c.1 Negotiate with the Land Department concerning the issuance of legal documents relating to rights of cultivation
A	MAP, CAD, PHO - PLRO, Community leaders PLRO, L & R, COMPL, CONTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d.1 Specification of the budget for training programmes and the issuance of ALRO 4-01 2.2 Measurement and staking for land distribution
B	PLRO, Community leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.3 Negotiations for land distribution 2.4 Making contracts for land compensation
C	PLRO, L & R, COMPL, CONTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a.1 Negotiation for value of compensation a.2 Specification of interest rates on loan for land compensation.
D	LRF: FA, LB, AC, LA & CO A & S, FLP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b.1 Compromise and try to reach peaceful agreement between former land owners and potential owners c.1 Procedural undertakings on the making of the contracts c.2 Settle legal disputes that might emerge. d.1 Provision of budget for purpose of land compensation. d.2 Identify possible ways of using the land reform funds for the purpose of solving the beneficiaries' debt problem

Chart 1 (Continued)

Study Component	Organization	Activities (Time Span)
		3. DEVELOPMENT PHASE
	AGR, FO, D&C, ME, LRF	3.1 Extension and development of agricultural production (3 month pre-land distribution and year 2 to year 5 for implementation)
A	-	
B	FO, PLRO, Community leaders	b.1 Exchange of information of the problems related to production and marketing of agricultural commodities
	AGR, FO, PLRO, Community leaders	b.2 Formulation of production and marketing plan
C	-	
D	IRF: FA, LA & CO, A & S, FLP	d.1 Specification of budget requirement d.2 Specification of possible source of funds
	AGR, FO	3.2 Generation of employment opportunities
A	-	
B	-	
C	-	
D	-	
	FO, PLRO, Community leaders	3.3 Establishment of Land Reform Agricultural Cooperatives (Year 2 to Year 5)
A	-	
B	PLRO, Community leaders	b.1 Study and evaluate the existing social and economic group formation b.2 Specify the weakness and the strength of these formations and identify possible ways of upgrading the capacity of existing organizations for the collective benefit of the community both economically and socially.
C	-	

Chart 1 (Continued)

Study Component	Organization	Activities (Time Span)
D	LRF: FA	d.1 Specify the government commitment to the formation of land reform cooperatives financial wise.
A	LRF: LA & CO, A & S, FLP	3.4 Provision of credit inputs
B	- PLRO, Community leaders,	b.1 Assessment of the financial status of the beneficiaries and the requirement for credit for consumption and production, the nature and the degree of indebtedness of the beneficiaries
C	-	
D	LRF: AGR, FA, LA & CO, A & S, FLP	d.1 Specification of sum of loan requirement for investment on basic infrastructures to promote production and marketing
	ALL Divisions	d.2 Specification of possible source of funding 3.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

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_____. *สภาพข้อเท็จจริงและปัญหาการปฏิรูปที่ดินเพื่อเกษตรกรกรรมในเขตโครงการอำเภอชุมพวง จังหวัดนครราชสีมา สถาบันเทคโนโลยีแห่งเอเชีย, เมษายน 2524*

อดิมาศ บุญรักพันธ์ และประทีป ต่ายใหญ่เที่ยง "แนวความคิด การฝึกอบรมเกษตรกรในเขตปฏิรูปที่ดิน" *เอกสารประกอบคำบรรยายในการสัมมนาทางวิชาการ เรื่อง การนิเทศและมีฝึกอบรมในเขตปฏิรูปที่ดิน, พฤศจิกายน 2528*

โอภาสกี เข้มทอง "โครงการพัฒนาเกษตรกรรายย่อยในเขตปฏิรูปที่ดิน" *เอกสารปฏิรูปที่ดินฉบับที่ 82 รายงานสัมมนาเชิงปฏิบัติการระดับผู้บริหารโครงการพัฒนาเกษตรกรรายย่อยในเขตปฏิรูปที่ดิน ของสำนักงานปฏิรูปที่ดินเพื่อเกษตรกรกรรม กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์ สถาบันวิจัยแห่งชาติ, สำนักงาน, คณะกรรมการสาธารณรัฐประชาชนศาสตร์ ผู้นำในชนบทของประเทศไทย กรุงเทพฯ : โรงพิมพ์สำนักทำเนียบนายกรัฐมนตรี, 2514*

เอกสารวิจัย ฉบับที่ 65 *รายงานการวิจัย หักศนคติของเกษตรกรที่มีต่อหนังสืออนุญาตให้เข้าทำประโยชน์ชั่วคราว สำนักงานปฏิรูปที่ดินเพื่อเกษตรกรกรรม กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์ กรกฎาคม 2522.*

เอกสารวิจัย *เค้าโครงการศึกษาแนวทางวิจัย การจัดองค์กรในการพัฒนาการต่าง ๆ ในเขตปฏิรูปที่ดิน สำนักงานปฏิรูปที่ดินเพื่อเกษตรกรกรรม กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์*

เอกสารวิจัย *แนวทางหลักในการวิจัยการจัดตั้งองค์ กรเกษตรกรเพื่อกระจายสิทธิ ตามโครงการปฏิรูปที่ดินเพื่อเกษตรกรกรรม สำนักงานปฏิรูปที่ดินเพื่อเกษตรกรกรรม กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์.*

Patron-Client Relationships : Landless And Landowners In South Asia

Gautam N. Yadama

Rural agrarian societies have been studied by cultural anthropologists for a few decades now. Most of the studies can be differentiated into two streams. Those studies which try to understand rural society through its caste system and the other stream consists of studies which analyze a rural society from a "class differential" perspective. More studies have been done using a "caste" framework rather than a "class" perspective. One of the reasons for such a reliance on caste system was the assumption that caste of a household also decided a household's class in an agrarian society. The following paper will shift from a caste orientation to a class orientation. Ownership of land, and control of land becomes an important issue in studying the class structure of an agrarian society. Many of the powerful landowning classes do not belong to the higher castes but are somewhere in the middle in a caste framework [Beteille, 1974 : 71]. Looking at an agrarian society and the existing class differences, one can understand how ownership of and determines a household's opportunities, choicer and ultimately its place in the rural social pyramid. In India for example there is a small class of people who own and control much of the land and a large part to the rural masses are landless and near-landless farmers or agricultural laborers.

Landlessness has been on the rise in the rural areas of many of the South Asian countries. One must be cautious in interpreting the meaning of 'increase in landlessness'. By 'increase of landlessness' it is meant that, "...the proportion of landless households in the rural population is increasing - a reference to increasing inequality in the distribution of land" [Cain, 1983 : 149]. Landlessness among rural households ranges anywhere from 75% of rural households in Bangladesh to 53% of the rural households in India [Esman, 1978 : 6 ; Development, 1985 : 3]. The magnitude of the problems of landless can only be understood on examining the consequences of being in such a condition. Esman rightly points out that, "...white education, political contacts and family background are of some importance, the most significant asset in rural areas is the ownership and control of land. Land ownership conveys

both social status and economic opportunity" [1978 : 2]. Land ownership signifies status, authority and is associated with leisure in a rural agrarian society [Myrdal, 1972]. On the other hand, lack of privately owned land reduces the number of choices and opportunities a household has in a rural agrarian society.

Class structure based on land ownership has many implications for the distribution and access to many other resources in a village. Several studies have been done to examine the distribution of fuelwood and other energy sources in the villages of Bangladesh [Briscoe, 1979 ; Douglas, 1982]. Briscoe and Douglas point out that class differences based on landownership are influential in determining who gets fuelwood and how much fuelwood they get. Douglas summarizes the plight of the landless :

It is virtually an axiom... that when pressure is put on the basic necessities of life, the very large group of landless (or almost landless) and destitute people in the rural population will bear a disproportionate share of the deprivations [1982 : 676].

Understanding the patterns of ownership of land and the resulting social structure is very important. To help the landless one must understand the conditions that they live in the structures that keep the landless from acting as a group and most of all their perception of being oppressed. Hasty implementation of social welfare programs without any concern for the social structure of village has resulted in unexpected outcomes; such as the rich becoming richer and poor landless villagers having no other choice but to remain indebted to the rich landowner.

On the other hand, economists and experts from related fields have described the relationship between landowners and landless (patron-client relationships) as being shaped by market forces and supply and demand curves. In doing so they have failed to consider an important dimension that underlies a majority of patron-client relationships -- the security the landless seek and status that the landlord achieves through these patron-client relationships. Economic organizations are closely intermeshed with social institutions in a rural agrarian society [Beteille, 1974]. Unless one understands the relationships based on ownership of land and the intricate system of social welfare that emerges from these relationships, one cannot alleviate the problems of landless people. In support of a class framework, rather than a "caste framework" Beteille says :

This preoccupation with a single framework gives a particular slant to the description of social relations in the village. Castes and not individuals or groups of any other kind are taken as the units of interaction. Thus in regard to the system of produc-

tion we are told how the landowning caste is related to the caste of landless labourers rather than how the landowners... are related to the landless... A similar confusion is created with regard to the distribution of power by an incautious application of the concept of dominant caste [1974 : 41-42].

There is a growing body of literature on the analysis of agrarian relations from a land control perspective [Frykenberg, 1969 ; Breman, 1974 ; Desai et al, 1984 ; Bardhan, 1984].

Theories

These patron-client relationships can be understood from a structuralist perspective where a person is viewed as being locked into rigid social structures and really has no reason for intentional choice. However, some sociologists feel that, "...the ability of social actors, even elites and powerful agents, to shape social structures, cultural formations and patterns of social action favorable to their own interests is strictly limited" [Burns et al, 1985 : 10]. On the other hand, a rational approach like Blau's exchange theory is also useful in explaining the relationships the landless and the rich landowners enter into. However, exchange theory has its own limitations. It completely ignores the structural dimensions of an agrarian society and assumes that an individual has complete choice in determining which and what type of exchange relationship he will engage in.

It is important to understand the patron-client relationships between the rich landowners and the poor landless peasants and how this system functions for the following reasons :

- any policy or program implemented to improve the condition of the landless that fails to take into account the existing social pattern will not be effective in improving the living conditions of the landless.
- if a development program is transferring technology or introducing new technology into a village, it must understand the reciprocal relationships between the landless and the landowners. This is because some forms of technology do not help the rural poor but only increase the gap between the rich and the poor in a village. The green revolution is a good example where the introduction of hybrid variety seeds and modern technology only helped improve the life of already rich farmers and did not have any impact on the marginal farmers and the landless poor.

Landless and their reciprocal relationships with the landowners will be analyzed from a structural exchange perspective (Blau) and a conflict perspective (Dabrendorf).

Exchange Theory

Blau's exchange theory is an attempt to move away from the more narrow exchange perspective that only refers to economic transactions in its discussions of exchange reality. Blau also attempts to bridge a gap between more individualistic exchange theory and a structuralist exchange perspective. Ekeh feels that, "Blau's theory of social exchange is provocative for the important reason that it purports to stand at the cross-roads of the individualistic and collectivistic orientations of sociology..." [1974 : 167].

Blau begins with the assumption that exchange can take place only among those individuals who can convince each other that their exchange relationships will be mutually rewarding. In this paper the author would like to substitute groups for individuals. Therefore, groups enter into exchange relations with others only when rewards are expected and received. According to Turner, "Blau labels this perception social attraction and postulates that unless relationships involve such attraction, they are not relationships of exchange" [1982 : 248]. Therefore, 'reward expectation' becomes the primary motivation for relating with another group. Over a period of time, exchange relations between these groups become a social norm. Any violation of this norm can lead to disagreements between the groups and eventually conflict. Blau also introduces the principle of 'marginal utility' [Turner, 1982 : 246].

According to the principle of 'marginal utility', when a person receives more of a reward, "...the more satiated he or she is with that reward, and the less valuable further increments of the reward" [Turner, 1982 : 246]. Blau also states that in an exchange relationship when both groups are used to exchanging at a certain level of reward, then over time that level becomes a fair level. Any deviation in the level of reward is judged from that perceived fair level of reward. As a result, when any one of the groups reduces the level of reward, then there is a potential conflict in the relationship. When two groups are expecting and receiving rewards for a long period of time, a reciprocal relationship is established. When these established relationships are violated, there is a possibility for conflict. However, as an expected reward is received and more of it is received, the value of that reward diminishes. As the exchange relation is established between two groups, also a fair level of reward exchange is established. Any violation of the fairness of exchange principle among the two groups will result in conflict. From here Blau goes on to propose another aspect of his theory -- an established exchange relationship involves costs or alternative rewards that are forgone. Therefore, one established exchange relationship will jeopardize an alternative exchange relationship that groups could have been involved in.

Application

The relationship between the landowners and the landless in the rural villages of India will be analyzed using this briefly outlined exchange theory. About 80% of India's population is rural. As the population increases more and more pressure is being put on the arable land in the rural areas. The already small landholdings are divided and subdivided among each generation eventually resulting in majority of households that are headed by landless tenants. Workers or, "...marginal cultivators whose small, and often scattered holdings cannot provide subsistence for their families" [Esman, 1978 : 9]. At the same time, in these villages, there are a small but powerful group of landowners, "...who cultivate their holdings intensively and efficiently, usually with the help of tenants or hired laborers, and produce surpluses for marketing. By investing their surpluses they gradually expand the scale of their operations, dominate the rural areas economically and, in league with urban elites, politically" [Esman, 1978 : 9-10].

In applying the exchange perspective, the landowners and landless can be seen as two groups who can potentially be involved in an exchange relationship. However, due to the differences in the socio-economic status of these two groups, any exchange between these groups within the existing social structure will result in an unequal relationship. A relationship in which the landowners assume the superordinate role and the landless a subordinate role. In a rural agrarian society where there are very few options than to working on land, the landless masses have no choice but to enter into an unequal exchange relationships with landowners. Such necessity becomes custom and is supported by norms and expectations of both groups, thus becoming legitimate components of the social structure.

Blau's exchange theory presents the landless with four options :

- a. force the landowners to help the landless
- b. seek help from somewhere else
- c. do without any help
- d. reward the landowners by subordinating themselves and complying with the landowners' wishes [1977 : 141].

At present the landowners operate within the fourth option. The landless continue to serve the landowners as agricultural laborers or as tenants who cultivate the land for the landowners in return for basic subsistence needs, security and protection. These relationships have been continuing for generations and these relationships have become, "...codified into social norm of reciprocity, whose violation brings about social disapproval and other negative sanctions" [Turner, 1982 : 246]. In Blau's terminology a norm of reciprocity has emerged between the landless and the landowners. Moreover, a principle of "fair exchange" has been established between these two

groups. Where the landless, labour for the landowners in return for protection from the outside world. This brings us to Blau's principle where, "the more stabilized and balanced are some exchange relations among social units, the more likely are other exchange relations to become imbalanced and unstable" [Furner, 1982 : 247].

When the vertical relationships between the landowners and the landless are stabilized and balanced, the less stable and balanced will be the horizontal relationships among the landless themselves. This link between the vertical and horizontal relationships of the landless is explained well by Milton Esman :

... rural societies tend to be characterized by stratification in which income, status and power are determined by ownership and access to productive assets and are manifested in occupational distribution. Within these strata, however, are informal solidarity structures, usually based on kinship or neighbourhood relationships, which provide mutual assistance, sharing, and protection and thus help to maintain life at least at the subsistence level. Crosscutting these horizontal class strata are varieties of vertical solidarity networks based on kinship, caste, ethnicity, tribe and patron-client relationships. These vertical networks are often focused on access to land and employment and embody both economic and social relationships. They incorporate mutual obligations, assurance of protection, services, and assistance which help to insure the minimum basic needs of participants, even though relationships within these structures may be highly unequal [1978 : 4].

These vertical relationships undermine the horizontal group organization of clients more so than that of the patrons [Eitenstadt and Roniger, 1984 : 49].

The above description presents a very integrated picture of two groups -- one with access to resources and another without any access to resources -- that have established normal exchange relationships. Within these existing structural relationships, rural development programs are being implemented. Since the vertical exchange relationships are stronger than the horizontal relationships among the landless, the rural development programs are going to be exploited by villagers who are better off and well-to-do rather than the landless poor the intended target. To maintain the status quo, it is in the interest of the dominant group to take advantage of the rural development programs and further strengthen their position in their community. This pattern of domination by the landowners has been observed in community forestry programs, where the people who participate in the programs are the ones who have enough fuelwood resources but they continue to take advantage of community forestry programs and thus depriving the landless of the benefits of a community forestry program [Cernea, 1984].

How can these entrenched exchange relations between the landless and the landowners be changed so that the landless can be the beneficiaries of social welfare programs and policies? Does Blau's structural exchange theory explain how change can be brought about in such a society? Blau proposes an elaborate process where conflict is introduced into the established exchange relationships between two groups. This process emerges from the theory that has been outlined earlier. When the norms of reciprocity and fair exchange are violated by the dominant group, the more imbalanced an exchange relation becomes. As a result, there is more opposition to those in power (Turner, 1982 : 255). As the group collectively experiences the imbalances in the exchange relationships the greater will be their opposition to those in power.

Such an explanation is very clear cut and gives one an idea as to how a subordinate group starts opposing a dominant group. However, there are two problems with Blau's explanation of conflict among groups and its applicability in explaining the vertical relationships between the landholders and the landless.

A. Outcome of opposition and its intensity :

Blau only talks about how the subordinate group starts opposing the dominant group but he does not leave any place in his theory for explaining the outcome of that opposition. Eventhough Blau has included conflict into the structural relationships, unlike Parsons, it is the writer's opinion that Blau does not expect opposition in unequal relationships to bring about a drastic change. From the tone of Blau's discussion of conflict, it appears that opposing the dominant group will only result in an adjustment or redefinition of the norms of reciprocity and fair exchange. These readjustments take place within the existing structural relationships. They do not alter existing relationships.

Since the structure of a society is not favorable to the landless group, then the intensity of their opposition will also be at a level that people at all levels are willing to bear. This means that the intensity of opposition will not be very high. When the intensity of opposition is not high, the landowners will only make minimal incremental concessions to that proximate point that the landless are placated. Ineffect the landless accept the continuation of only slightly less unequal exchange relationships. For example, in a community forestry program the landowners can reap the benefits of the program and at the same time distribute some of the benefits to the landless. The landless will be content with such an act of charity because that in their perception is a fair exchange given the nature of the vertical relationships with the landowners. Blau's conflict approach is severely limited by the existing structural relationships between groups. Blau's conflict process apparently accounts best for change in groups where the participants are more nearly equal in power and resources.

B. Landless are entrenched in a very unequal relationship :

For Blau conflict apparently takes place only within the boundaries of existing relationships. The exchange relations between the landless and the landowners are highly unequal. When norms of reciprocity and fair exchange are violated and the external socio-economic conditions are harsh, instead of opposing the landowners, the landless will enter into a more heavily bonded relationship with their benefactors. This is because in an agrarian economy, lack of any arable land, eliminates all of the choices a family or a person has [Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 151]. Some studies point out that when the traditional relationships between the landless and the landowners are violated, it is the landless poor who suffer [Douglas, 1982]. Either the landless are afraid of further oppression from landowners if they oppose or the existing structure does not allow expression of opposing interests. Esman points out that, "because of their poverty and dependency, the landless and near landless are ill equipped to make demands in their own interest. There are few formal organizations rural areas that bring together the landless or tenants to advocate or bargain for economic benefits... Since traditional organizations in rural areas so often are dominated by rural elites, they can seldom be converted into instruments that articulate the... interests of the landless and the near-landless" [1978: 28].

Blau's conflict process may be seen as socially functional because it predicts a reintegration of the exchange relationships after a brief period of opposition by subordinate groups. In other words the landless will agree to the new norms of fair exchange set forth by the landholders, even though the level of reward is much lower than it was before. This is so because the landless have no alternative societal structures or institutional structures that they can depend on. While Blau explains how structures with superordinates and subordinates emerge, Dahrendorf offers a theory that explains how subordinates in an existing societal structure may move beyond being a quasigroup and challenge the existing structural relationships instead of merely negotiating for a slightly better position within that structure.

Based on the above discussion of Blau's exchange theory the following hypothesis can be derived:

Scope Condition: Given a rural agrarian society where opportunities outside of agriculture are limited

Hypothesis: The stronger the vertical dependence relationships between the landowners and the landless, the less stable and balanced will be the horizontal relationships among the landless.

Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory

Dahrendorf takes for granted the presence of opposing groups in any society or its substructures. Dahrendorf begins where Blau stops--at the point where there are two groups with opposing interests. Dahrendorf lays out a causal process which

assumes that, "in every imperatively coordinated group, the carriers of positive and negative dominance roles determine two quasi groups with opposite latent interests" [Dahrendorf, 1964 : 107]. In the initial stages the people assuming negative dominance roles have not organized themselves yet. Also these quasi groups may have expectations that differ from the dominant group but they have not taken the form of concrete opposing interests and therefore the usage of the phrase "latent interests."

These quasigroups with opposite latent interests, under certain "conditions of organization" will evolve into groups with manifest interests. These groups, one bearing a positive and another a negative dominance role, "...are in constant conflict over the preservation or change of the status quo" [Dahrendorf, 1964 : 107]. The nature and intensity of that conflict are determined by what Dahrendorf calls the "conditions of conflict." Finally this conflict given certain conditions of structural change will lead to a change, "...in the structure of their social relations, through change in their dominance relations" [Dahrendorf, 1964 : 107]. It is important to point out that the outcome of conflict in Dahrendorf's theory is a change in the structure of social relations between two groups unlike Blau's theory where only a cosmetic renegotiation of rewards and benefits are undergone, leaving the structure and nature of their relationship unchanged.

Application:

Landholders and the landless initially are seen as being in a quasi group stage. The landholders have a positive dominance role and the landless a negative dominance role. The landowners have an interest in the preservation of the status quo, whereas the landless have an (unrecognized) interest in bringing about change in this status quo. Both these groups have latent interests -- the landowners would like to control more of the scarce resources so that they can maintain their dominant position, whereas the landless would like to have more access to basic necessities so they would not have to remain so dependent upon their bonded relationships with landowners. Dahrendorf's theory is successful in explaining why the landless have not been able to break away from these vertical bonded relationships with landowners. Dahrendorf outlines three types of intervening empirical conditions. They are: A. Conditions of Organization, B. Conditions of conflict and C. Conditions of structural change. For the landless to be organized into a group and express their opposition to the landowners, the necessary conditions of conflict, conditions of structural change and most of all the necessary conditions of organization must be present.

There are three Conditions of Organization: A) Social Conditions :- conditions must be favorable for interaction among the landless and a way of recruiting the landless to form groups [Dahrendorf, 1964.] B) Political Conditions :- if landless are to organize, a certain freedom to form coalition is important [Dahrendorf, 1964].

C) Technical Conditions :- just forming an organization of landless who have no material means will not accomplish anything. Therefore it is important that for any organization to survive and thrive, it must have the material means, a leader and an ideology [Dahrendorf, 1964 : 108]. When these conditions of organization are present, then the landless can emerge as a group.

How is this possible? As long as the landless remain in their strong vertical relationships with landowners they will not be able to form a coalition. What the landless need is a structure and resources that will allow them to organize. Under the present situation the requisite conditions of organization will not be allowed by the landholders. More importantly, the landless will not organize themselves for fear of possible sanctions from the landowners which will jeopardize them and their families. The landowners will not allow any political freedom for the landless to form conflict groups. Finally, in response to any threat of organized landless groups, the landowners will threaten to withhold the few basic necessities that they now are providing to the landless. Thus they will seek to block the development of the proper technical conditions for mobilization of the landless.

Rural development programs that are implemented by voluntary organizations can provide temporary alternative structures for the landless. These structures can provide the basic necessities so that the landless instead of relying exclusively on the landowners, can participate directly in the rural development projects. At the same time, these programs can create necessary conditions for the landless to communicate, form coalitions, and provide the material means and leadership to permanently break away from the traditional patron-client relationships. These coalitions can be created by the landless without any fear of sanctions from the landowners because they will be earning their basic essentials from the rural development program. If a community forestry program were to provide temporary alternative structure, the landless will be employed for wages to plant trees in truly community land and in areas where there has been forest degradation. In addition to the wages, the landless will receive certain quantities of fuelwood for their own consumption. Once these trees that have been planted, grow, the fuelwood from these will go to the poor of the village.

However, the conditions as proposed by Dahrendorf have not been favorable for the landless to participate in the existing rural social welfare programs. As a result of which, rich landowners are participating in the programs, instead of the landless being the ones to participate, make decisions regarding the implementation of the program and distribution of benefits. As long as the landowners have favorable conditions of organization they will continue to participate in rural development programs at the expense of the landless villagers.

Overall, Dahrendorf's theory describes the present situation much better than the structural exchange theory. Dahrendorf's conflict theory has done disservice to itself by not attempting to explain how conflict groups arise. Exchange theory, on the other hand, explains the emergence of opposing groups very well, but it does not provide a theory where the opposing groups can really bring about major structural changes. Exchange theory is very good at explaining how the existing relationships between the landless and the landowners operate. Conflict theory, on the other hand, provides an alternative where the oppressed can break away from the existing bonded relationships. To create the necessary conditions for the landless to become independent and self-reliant, it is necessary to understand the nature of the patron-client relationships.

Reciprocity and Exchange

In India and other South Asian countries, with the imposition of land ceiling legislation and other land reform measures, there has been a decline in patron-client relationships. Despite this, one can safely conclude that a majority of the rural villages are still governed by a complex web of patron-client interactions. "The interaction on which these relations are based is characterised by the simultaneous exchange of different types of resources—above all, instrumental and economic as well as political ones (support, loyalty, votes, protection) on the one hand, and promises of reciprocity, solidarity and loyalty on the other" [Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 48]. Patron-client relationships, according to the author, cannot be explained fully by Exchange or Conflict theory, because of the paradoxical nature of these relationships. On the one hand there is a great amount of inequality and asymmetry in power and at the same time there are strong personal ties and self-imposed obligations among the two groups (landowners and landless).

James C. Scott describes the essence of a rural class relationship as :

...some pattern of reciprocity, some pattern of rights, which peasants claim as the duty of those who control scarce resources... The justification of any hierarchy of status and power thus implies the creation of role obligations that carry moral weight [1976: 181].

The three primary types of exchange are: A. Marketing B. Redistribution and C. Reciprocity [Gamst, 1974: 29]. The author will briefly explain redistribution and reciprocity. The Redistribution and reciprocity are the two major types of exchange in the rural villages of India. Market exchange is excluded because much of the exchange takes place outside the market.

Reciprocity :

Reciprocal relationships between the well-to-do (landowners) and the poor (landless) is based on a system of obligations and moral claims as mentioned earlier. The Jajmani system in India is a type of reciprocal exchange relationship. Different caste groups render services to each other in return for the same. These reciprocal relationships can be hereditary and impose certain obligations on each caste group [Gamst, 1974 : 36; Wisner, 1936]. This system is on the decline. Similar reciprocal relationships based on ownership of land also exist.

Reciprocal relationships imply equal exchange. How is equal exchange possible between the landless and the landowners? If one defines equal exchange as exchange of goods with similar value then equal exchange does not exist between landowners and the poor peasants. However, from a poor landless laborer's perspective, exchange of personal loyalty, agricultural labor and other miscellaneous services are worth the security, protection and food that his household receives from a landlord. To the landless peasant that is a "fair value" and the exchange is a fair exchange. As per Scott, "...it is critical to understand that the obligation of reciprocity is a moral principle par excellence and that it applies as strongly to relationships between unequals as between equals" [1976 : 168]. These reciprocal exchange relationships are based on some norm and are entrenched in a rural society. "The normative model for the conduct of these relationships may be seen in the social pressures within the village, which operate to require the relatively well-off to use their resources in ways that benefit the poorer members of the community" [Scott, 1976 : 170]. Any deviation from this norm will be frowned upon, irrespective of the social class the person belongs to.

Redistribution :

Distribution unlike exchange implies transfer of goods and services. As mentioned above reciprocal relationships are socially determined and can be enforced. Before understanding the distribution and transfer systems in a village one must understand the changing nature of the reciprocal patron-client relationships. Due to rapid population growth, penetration of urban values into rural areas and commercialization of agriculture, the old reciprocal relationships are breaking down. Landowners are attracted to market economics. "The erosion of traditional vertical solidarity networks exacerbates the poverty of the landless and near-landless, leaving them without effective protective structures..." [Esman, 1978 : 4].

When such reciprocal obligations break down and there is no way of enforcing them, then a reciprocal exchange may turn into a transfer [Pryor, 1977 : 33]. Pryor differentiates all transfers into Centric and Non-centric transfers. Non-centric transfers are predominant in a rural agrarian society where there is no central body

that regulates distribution of goods. Non-centric transfers can either be positive transfers or negative transfers [Pryor, 1977 : 250]. Since the elite in the villages prefer to operate in a cash economy and purchase the services they need, many poor peasant families are left without the security of the old reciprocal relationships. While the rich have more choices, the poor are faced with fewer alternatives and opportunities. In such situations the poor will enter into a relationship with a rich landowner who violates all the norms of reciprocity. A negative transfer from the poor to the rich is predominant in such situations. Pryor notes that, "...regressive transfer occurs in the redistributive transfers...in Indian villages where people of each occupation share in the production of other occupations and the final distribution of income is, in many cases, more unequal than what would have occurred in an alternative system" [1977 : 255]. Pryor also says that Non-centric transfers of goods are more prevalent in societies with more socio-economic inequality [1971 : 261]. The erosion of traditional reciprocal relationships (however exploitative they may seem) has resulted in a transfer system that is negative and further jeopardizes the survival of a poor landless or near landless peasant.

In the above discussion of the different reciprocal relationships and distribution patterns, it is evident that patron-client relationships in an agrarian society do not follow the same rules as that of an urban industrial society. The relationships are not purely economic but are intertwined with social and cultural obligations. This complicated system of social, cultural and economic exchange relationships cannot be adequately explained by a rational Exchange theory or a Conflict theory. The peasants, as long as the norms of reciprocity and their subsistence claims are not violated, might not renegotiate their relationships with landowners or revolt against them. In such a situation both Exchange and Conflict perspectives cannot explain the behavior of the landless laborer. Peasants are well aware that they are being exploited, but their drive for security and safety stops them from doing anything about their situation. In fact some scholars contend that peasant revolts might be an effort to restore the customary interclass relationships -- "violence in defense of paternalism" [Scott, 1976 : 189].

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Landowner-Labour Relationships in a District of Rural Central Thailand¹

Naruemon Bunjongjit

Introduction

The basic dynamics of Thailand's rural society resulted from Thai policy on the international rice trade during the mid-nineteenth century. The process of inevitable economic advance in that century resulted in increasing differentiation throughout the country. These processes were centred in towns but inevitably spread into the countryside. Regions such as the central plain, were affected by the establishment of market relations between town and country and within the country itself. Continuing accumulation of economic advantages and disadvantages among local people led to a polarization of farming society into rich farmers, who increasingly acquired the characteristics of capitalist entrepreneurs, and poor farmers, who lost their farms and became tenants and landless wage labourers. Some of the typical characteristics of traditional farming communities i.e., dense cultural cohesion, simple co-operation, low division of labour, etc. were slowly disappearing. A new social structure based on rice cultivation for the market came to be established in the countryside. Hence in the central region, the result of economic advance led to two events of great significance—firstly a shift in patterns of rural integration from relationships of socio-economic equality among farmers to rural differentiation. Secondly, the rise of a rural proletariat. Both contributed to persisting economic underdevelopment in the country.

This general picture of the dynamics of rural Thai society was of one developing from a subsistence economy to production for the market under political direction. Such development took place during the mid-nineteenth century under the

¹ This paper is based on field work in Ban Na district of Nakhon Nayok province during 1979–1981. The purpose of this paper is to show that the development of class relations consequent on the growth of capitalist production has led to rural socio-economic differentiation and to the development of a polarized class structure of rich farmers and an agricultural proletariat. By "class structure" here refers to a man's economic position which is, in turn, associated with his place in the system of production.

of King Rama IV. The rural policies of all rulers of the Thai state ever since King Rama IV, until the present ruler were to encourage farmers to produce rice for the market in order that the government could increase-revenue from rice exports. The political future was that farmers, as a rural mass living at the discretion of the ruling authority, would break down into rural classes typical of capitalist society (i.e., capitalist farmers, wage labourers, etc.) which would become increasingly self-aware and develop tendencies to political action in support of their own interests.

The evidence from various surveys of the growth of landless labourers in rural Thailand was found in the latter half of the nineteenth century due to the extension of rice cultivation. According to Ingram, between 1903-7 and 1948-50 the area in rice increased by about six times.¹ Van der Heide noted that farmers were willing to pay high rents for fertile in the Centre, especially in the Rungsit area although free land was available for the taking.² Zimmerman's 1930 survey found that the percentage of landless farmers in Thailand ranged from as high as 36 per cent in the Central Plain to 27 in the North, 18 per cent in the Northeast, and 14 per cent in the South.³ Because of the foreign demand for Thai rice after the Bowring Treaty, the volume of Thai agricultural production increased rapidly during the following decades of the Treaty. Almost all rice exports came from the Central Plain and only 2 per cent from the largely came from the Central Plain and only 2 per cent from the largely subsistence agriculture of the Northeast and North.⁴

Patterns of Land Tenure in Pakha

Land tenure is the indicator of social differentiation in Pakha. The dramatic expansion of rice cultivation that took place in the country at the end of the nineteenth century had important results which deeply affected the pattern of land tenure of the central plain and indeed of Pakha. Increasingly large areas in Ban Na district were cleared to grow rice. This was certainly a response by farmers to both domestic and international demands.

Distribution of land in Pakha

SIZE OF PROPERTY	NUMBER OF LANDOWNERS	%
Small: less than 10 <i>rai</i>	109	72
Medium: between 10 and 50 <i>rai</i>	21	21
Large: over 50 <i>rai</i>	11	7
Total	151	100

Source: a survey of all households

Seventy-two per cent of resident landowners do not have 10 *rai* of any kind of land and thus depend on other sources of incomes such as tenancies, wage labourers, salaries and crafts. Also there are 30 poor families with no land at all (even a small plot of a house site). Out of a total population in Pakha of 843, there are 127 labourers, either permanent or occasional. Most labourers either own no land at all or own small plots less than 1 *rai* for housing. Some plots between 1 and 5 *rai* are owned by storekeepers, but these are few and of no significance for the present purpose.

Twenty-three resident families fell into the category of tenant. Most of them own between 1 to 10 *rai* of land.

Social relations of production

Land in Pakha is operated by four main types of farmers according to their mode of farming :

(1) landowning farmers, those who own large plots of land that they do not cultivate themselves or which they only cultivate in part, renting out the rest;

(2) landowning farmers who have a small plot of land of their own that they cultivate themselves and they also live by hiring themselves as agricultural workers;

(3) farmers who have no land of their own or have so little that they can only live by renting land;

(4) landless labourers who neither own nor rent land, but they can only live by hiring themselves out.

Tenancy

Tenancy is the renting out of land in return for a payment fixed in advance in money or in kind. The tenants are generally referred to as *luk na* (literally: children of the rice fields). The landowner, for reasons of old age, absenteeism, or having too large a plot of land, rents out some, or all of his land to other farmers. The owner pays the land tax and receives the rent, while the tenant provides the farming equipment, running expenses, seed, fertilizer and all the work on the land. If the owner advances money, this forms part of a special contract and is paid for in supplementary rent. The tenant operates the farm in his own way, plants and harvests where he wishes, and carries the entire burden of a bad yield. Tenancy contracts are usually verbal, but can be by a written agreement signed by the tenant and the landowner and countersigned by the tenant's guarantors. A one year contract is a normal pattern of renting. The tenant holds the land on lease for a period against a fixed yearly rent paid after the harvest. Though in principle tenancy is fixed for a period of time, the tenant is often able to renew

his contract every year and continually maintain his position for several years and even decades. All contracts are arranged with the aim that the landowner shares only minimally in the risks of production, which are largely devolved upon the tenant.

Land is obtained by tenants in two different ways. First, there are those renting the land from affines and kin who are unable to manage their land themselves because of their old age, illness, or because their family members are employed in such jobs as teachers, or as police. Some tenants rent land from their parents though the rented plots are relatively small since the land is subleased to other children within the family. All tenants renting land from their affines or kin would hold usufruct right to land given out to them on a rental basis, with the rent paid in kind, which is one-fourth, or as little as one-sixth of the crops in the bad years. The contract is normally verbal. The second way that tenants have access to land is if they have a reputation of being honest and hard working. Also they would have to be recommended by a friend or neighbour (one whom the owner of the land could trust) as a reliable person. Commonly areas farmed by this type of tenant are those owned by absentee landowners who are Chinese merchants, or civil servants and living in Ban Na town. In some cases, the rented farm has been occupied by the same tenant family for more than two generations. This type of tenancy I shall call hereditary tenants. Hence a tenant access to land through his father-in-law who was the previous tenant on the rented land. When his father-in-law dies, he succeeds to the position as tenant on the land.

Tenancies can be found significantly in *tambon* Pakha on rice fields, particularly on land the owners of which live in Ban Na town or engage in other occupations, e.g. school teachers, traders, or contractors. In Pakha rent is either rent in kind, or rent in money, but the dominant form is rent in kind. Rent in money usually appears in cassava or maize cropland, and it is 200 *baht* per *rai* (1979). Tenancy on rice fields is nearly always paid for in produce, that is in paddy, varying according to the quality of the land. In *tambon* Tong Lung, in the low-lying zone where sowing is by broadcasting, it is 10 to 12 *tang* per *rai*. In Pakha, it is 10 to 15 *tang* per *rai*. This amount varies from a third to half of the harvest, in real value representing 15-40 per cent of the value of the land. The percentage of rent paid also varies from half to a sixth of the yields, according to the relationship between landowner and tenant. The area cultivated by a tenant varies from 5 *rai* to 60 *rai* of transplanted rice field in Pakha. In a good year a tenant's net income in the 1980s is between 3,000 *baht* and 8,000 *baht*.

In 1974 the legislation of Land Rent Control was issued by the Sanya government.⁵ The legislation on "protected" tenancy provided for the compulsory level of rent payment with regulated rents, determined by a formula based on the amount

of land or the volume of agricultural output. Also it provided for security of tenure.* From the end of the Sanya government till 1980 the tenants in Pakha seemed not to have benefitted from the legislation. After the low yields of 1979 some landowners decided to work all their land themselves in order to increase productivity to subsidise the loss on rice in the previous year. Some tenants were forced to leave the land and become landless labourers. As a result of the land shortage many tenants still have to pay a higher rent than the Act permits and often they are reluctant to submit their complaints to the Tambon Tenancy Committee. In one case I know of, the tenant concerned, instead of keeping quiet and accepting a rent of 50 per cent of his produce, imposed by the landlord, brought his grievance to the committee. The landlord was offended, and ordered the tenant to leave. Even though this order was illegal, the tenant could do nothing and had to leave the land. He was regarded with pity by his neighbours, but he was also the subject of some mockery for what was regarded as unnecessary litigation. After this incident the landlord had no difficulty finding a replacement tenant.

Tenants are frequently responsible for the cost of hiring tractors for the crop season. This can be expensive because of the unavailability of draft animals on Pakha at present. The cost of hiring two-wheel tractors is 150-200 *baht* per *rai*, comparing to the cost of renting a pair of buffaloes which is 400 *baht* for a season. In the tenancy contract, the owner generally provides only land. For his part, the tenant is responsible for all costs, and his cost is more than the owner who has no further expense apart from land tax. It does happen that almost all tenants in Pakha are caught in annual debt to the landowner. The owner usually advances money at the rate 30-40 per cent interest. The money is often needed to buy consumer goods to feed the family of the tenant. At the harvest the owner is first paid; rent for his land, and his loan. Therefore, most of a tenant's income is taken away immediately after harvest by the creditor.

In Pakha there are twenty-nine tenants and more than 70 per cent (twenty-one out of twenty-nine) own no rice land. Though most of them own land for fruit growing and a garden plot which is under fruit cultivation i.e., lemons, bananas, and oranges, these are mainly grown for household consumption rather than commercial sale. I shall call those tenants who own no rice land "landless tenants". There is a division between tenants who own rice land (landed tenants) and the landless tenants, since the financial position of the former are better than the latter. Large-scale tenancy is, however, an important indicator of the degree of development of commercial production in Pakha. The traditional form of farming used mutual aid at times of hard work and reciprocal provision of days of labour. At the present day in Pakha, the employment of day wage labourers is widespread and is the dominant form of rice farming. Tenants nearly always hire day wage

labourers outside the family for reaping during the harvest. Day labourers, recruited among poor people in Pakha itself or in neighbouring villages, are landless labourers, small proprietors, and landless tenants who have finished their task after working with their families. However, one should distinguish the day labourers from year-round labourers. Year-round labourers are landless labourers who are employed to perform all tasks in the rice fields as well as domestic tasks. They are paid after the harvest. These labourers are taken on for transplanting and harvesting, that is about four months, from July to August and October to November. Outside the rice fields, they are employed digging sand on the canal. In other words, landless labourers are permanent labourers who work and receive cash in return for their labour throughout the year.

Average agricultural day wages in 1980 were 25 *baht* per day for the reaping, but in 1981 the condition of payment was changed to 80 *baht* per *rai*. General hands in the transplanting season, earned 7 *baht* per 100 bundles, plus food (one meal). At the time of hiring out their hands the landless labourers often borrow a small amount of money (about 50-200 *baht*) from the landowner in advance, generally without interest.

In Pakha, two sources of labour can be found. First, labourers among people in Pakha itself who are small proprietors, landless tenants and landless labourers. Landless labourers in Pakha include also immigrants from regions of infertile soil, e.g., north-east provinces. Thus, for example, Pakha attracts agricultural labourers from Nakhon Rachasima, Khon Kaen where the land is not good to grow crops. They try to settle down in Pakha by becoming agricultural workers. Second, labourers are found among small proprietors and landless tenants who are from distant villages in *tambon* Tong Lung. After their work is completed, they come to Pakha in "gangs" to be employed by tenants, medium and large landowners in Pakha for about five to seven days' work. The tasks of rice cultivation in *tambon* Tong Lung is usually completed earlier than the work in *tambon* Pakha due to the different types of rice, soil, and techniques in sowing. The size of the gangs varies but the most common number is fifteen to twenty men and women to one group. Wages are paid at the end of the day or after the work is completed (the period of up to one week). A labourer can ask for the account at any time if he wants to; and he is then paid. The outside labourers do not stay overnight in Pakha; they come in the morning and return to their village in the evening.

The wage level of seasonal labourers varies with the region: in 1980 a wage labourer in Pakha was paid for transplanting 7 *baht* per 100 bundles which was higher comparing with outside wages that were 3 *baht* per 100 bundles.

Wage-labourers in Pakha, however, are mainly recruited from distant villages. Two reasons are behind this. First, there is a labour shortage during the peak season in Pakha owing to most tenants and small proprietors who would hire

themselves out being very busy with their own work. Although there are a number of landless labourers in Pakha, most of them are not asked to perform the tasks. They are often condemned as unreliable labourers. There are common allegations by landowners that the landless labourers are apt to ask for money in advance before the work was done and also that they did not come to work in order to clear their debts if they got to know of better paid job elsewhere. Some landowners still employed a few landless labourers in Pakha to work with them because they did not want to lose the old debts. Second, there is the availability of labourers from distant villages are their wages and cheaper than those of Pakha.

Direct family farmers :

The small and medium landowners cultivate their land themselves. However, in certain urgent tasks, e.g., reaping, they may ask for help in term of mutual provision of days of labour. A small property of one to ten *rai*, cultivated by family labour, produces hardly enough rice land for a family to live on, and in a normal year, yields a very small surplus with which to pay for small purchases and taxes. The small proprietors own land, their agricultural equipment, e.g., draught animals, but they have no working capital, i.e., expenses for fertilizer and labour. In general, they can only get this from medium and large landowners who are money lenders and also traders in the village. Obligated to sell their paddy at the start of the season to the trader/money lender in order to repay debts, they often lack buying consumer goods. The only way out is to borrow. The interest rate on money borrowed from the money lender varies from 40 per cent up to 120 per annum. Small proprietors often hire themselves out as day wage labourer during the agricultural season in order to supplement their income. There is a further division between small proprietors who are labourers and the small proprietors who are not labourers, since the latter do not work on their own land but rent it out. Small proprietors, who are not labourers, receive their income from rent. They usually rent their land out because the lack of members in the family to manage the land.

The medium landowners, like the small proprietors, cultivate their own land, but nearly always hire additional wage labourers from outside their family. In general, they possess the necessary means of production for their tasks, e.g., a tractor, and can rent it out to small proprietors and tenants. Medium landowners own land between 10 to 50 *rai*, which is sufficient for their living. There are three different kinds of medium landowners: first, those who do not work on their own land but rent all their land out to other. Their main income derives from other activities, e.g., trading money lending and contracting. They usually lend money to small proprietors, tenants and other medium landowners. Their income increases through this source, medium landowners who cultivate their own land and also rent some part from others. They

are always hiring wage labourers to perform almost all tasks during transplanting and harvesting. Their income from land only is sufficient for their living. Third, those who cultivate only their own land. They also hire wage labour to perform some tasks in an emergency when, for example, flooding threatens a rice field before the harvest. In general their income from agricultural land is enough only from year to year. Most of them have to borrow money from money lenders every year. During bad years, they are obliged to sell their land, but not to the lender, in order to repay their debt. The majority of medium landowners in Pakha are included in the third type.

Large landowners are divided into two types. First, those who reside in the town and who are 'absentee landowners'. Second, the large landowners live in the villages. No absentee landowner takes part in working the land, but they rent all their land out to local people. Large landowners are not numerous in Pakha. It was estimated that their number was about 7 per cent of the total number of landowners. The large landowners own sufficient agricultural equipment and working capital. Most of them take part personally in working the land. They often use wage labourers, otherwise, they rent out some of their land and are repaid in rent, or they own the commercial enterprises, or they even practice usury. However, the majority of large landowners in Pakha still receive their main source of their income from agricultural land.

Social Class in Pakha

There are four social classes in Pakha: the absentee landowners, the rich farmers, the middle farmers and the rural proletariat or landless labourers. Each of these has a different relationship to the land.

Absentee landowners:

A small section of landowner—those owning from 50 to over 1,000 rai—do not work the land themselves but are occupied with work elsewhere that constitutes only a subsidiary source of income. They live on income derived from the renting out of their land. In addition, the absentee landowners may gain supplementary income by lending money, by taking high rent from tenant labourers or from commercial undertakings. But the main source of their income is still rent. An absentee landowner very rarely employed wage labour. His mode of exploitation remains fundamentally that of renting out his land.

Absentee landowners constitute a small minority of the population in Pakha. It is estimated they number less than 10 per cent of the total number of landowners, but their influence is significant. Through their powerful economic and social position they are directly linked to the big merchants, to the compradors and to the high

officials of the administration. Politically and socially they are part of the national bourgeoisie class. Most absentee landowners, who own land in Pakha, are Chinese merchants (i.e., market owners, grocers), school-teachers and constructors living in Ban Na market town. Thus most absentee landowners are townspeople.

The absentee landowners, whom we may call landlords are the dominant class. They are big landlords and big money lenders whose tenants suffer from the burdens of rent payment. They pay the land taxes with their own money, on the understanding that they will be repaid by the tenants later through an increase in rents. Advance credits are often repaid with a high rate of interest. The landlords also establish themselves as patrons to their tenants, i.e., lending money, by virtue of their strong social and economic position. Therefore, they create for themselves vast clientele of debtors.

In terms of everyday life the landlords in Ban Na town have no contact with people in Pakha and surrounding villages. Their commercial activities and town residence set them apart from the rest of the population in the villages. From a political point of view, they are the members of the high levels of the administration, the high levels of civil service.

Rich farmers :

These, in general, are local landowners. Rich farmers in Pakha own more land than the average and may rent out some of their land while farming the rest. They are considered as wealthy farmers but do not own as much land as the absentee landowners. There are two extremes. On the one hand, the rich farmers take part personally in working the land, but nevertheless, they often employ wage labourers. On the other hand, they may rent out all their land and be repaid in rents and to this extent they can be considered as powerful landlords, which brings them close to the landlord class.

The rich farmers, in general, have fairly substantial agricultural equipment and working capital. Some of them are local traders who have acquired property in the villages through lending money and are not primarily concerned with agriculture. It is noteworthy that the rich farmers in Pakha are increasingly oriented towards the practice of usury and commercial enterprises. They play a very important role in economic revitalization but their social and political influence is still weak. Less than one-third of the total households in Pakha belong to this section of rich farmers. In the majority of cases the rich farmers belong to the class of the petty bourgeoisie, which is composed of the lower levels of the administration, the small businessmen, the school-teachers, and the police. From the political point of view, the rich farmers are not represented by political party because there is no such political organization in Pakha or in the district. Therefore, they enhance their power and prestige through occupying local leadership positions such as *kamnan* or *headman*.

Middle farmers :

A large section of the middle farmers own land of their own (from 50-100 *rai*), while some own only part of the land they farm and rent the rest. Because of this their position is ambiguous. To the extent that they own their own land, they can be considered as rich farmers, close to the class of petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, to the extent that they rent a large part of the land they farm, they are dependent on landowners or rich farmers to whom they pay their rent. Some middle farmers own nothing, but rent all the land they farm. They are well-off tenants. Therefore, the middle farmers include the landed tenants, small proprietors, well-off tenants and middle landowners.

Middle farmers own adequate agricultural equipment. In the majority of cases the middle farmers can cover their maintenance only in the best years. They cannot maintain their prosperity without seeking loans. Most of them take part personally in working the land, but nevertheless they do make use of a small amount of wage labour. The middle farmers usually hire themselves out, and very often engage in labour exchange. A certain section, notably the well-off middle farmers, i.e., medium landowners, do not hire themselves out. In their socio-economic position middle farmers fluctuate between the top rank and the bottom rank into which they are pushed by partly being exploited, whether by paying for the land they rent, or by paying interest on the loans they have had to contract. Most of the middle farmers are gradually moving down into the class of proletariat. Only a small minority has succeeded in entering the top rank and becoming part of the petty bourgeoisie, such as technicians, school teachers, the lower ranks in civil services, and the salaried workers.

Landless labourers :

The most typical representatives of the Pakha rural proletariat are both the permanent agricultural workers, and those who work by the day, month season or year. This class is the most numerous. More than half the total households belong to the class is the most numerous. More than half the total households belong to the class of proletariat. The agricultural workers neither have land nor financial means to farm. Nor do they rent land. They can subsist only by selling their labour power.

The rural proletariat is comprised of unskilled labourers, building workers and workers in shops. It can be said that they make a living working for landowning families or working in jobs outside agriculture.

Patterns of Economics Dependency

Small proprietors and tenants accumulated debts with the landowner during with the landowner during the year, and they paid off all or part of them after the harvest. Outstanding debts constituted a permanent problem for local people in Pakha. The occurrence of debts was associated with the integration of farmers into the national economy and the increasing use of money as the means of exchange. Debt mainly affected small proprietors, tenants, and landless labourers in two ways. Firstly, they wanted to improve their crop production and the money was spent for such purposes as buying fertilizers, hiring tractors, and hiring wage labourers. Secondly, there was a demand for cash for basic family requirements such as food, children's education, and medicines.

Money could be locally borrowed from two sources. The first of these was the rural formal financial institutions, i.e., the *klum thanakan* or 'bank group', *klum kasetakorn* or 'farmer group'—a branch of the Provincial Agricultural Co-Operative in Nakhon Nayok which was under the National Agricultural Co-Operative in Bangkok, and rural commercial bank. A man became a member of a co-operative bank by depositing a land title in which the value was in excess of 10,000 *baht*. A loan was in excess of 1,000 *baht* or in excess of what a man's deposit eventually became was given in the rate of 15 per cent. A member could only borrow up to 80,000 *baht*.² For any amount in excess of 10,000 *baht* a small proprietor therefore had to turn to a moneylender who was the second source of money in the village. The landowner, who was the moneylender, lent at the rate of between 25-60 per cent. Generally he lent up to the value of the borrower's land, the latter pledging his land as security. If small proprietors could not pay back the loan within the period of the agreement, existing land assets were mortgaged.

The tenants were not qualified to join *klum kasetakorn* or *klum thanakan* because of their lack of land title to be used as security for a loan, relying heavily on the landowner for money, fertilizers, rice and transport facilities. In most cases, tenants were bound in debt to the landowner that they could only repay after the harvest. They were often unable to seek supplementary sources of income because that would mean leaving their place of birth for the town or Bangkok and causing them to desert their crops. Money was lent out at various times of the year to small proprietors of moderate income, as well as to poor landless tenants. Loans of small amounts were made without a collateral or witness; loans of 3,000 *baht* or more were made with a witness who might be a trusted and respected relative. Large loans drew interest ranging from 30 per cent per year (the illegal rate) to 60 per cent, depending on the relationship between landowner/lender and tenant or small proprietor/borrower. Rates for smaller loans were higher 15 per cent per month.

Since the landless tenant had no collateral, they were never able to borrow a very large amount; landless tenants could borrow up to 3,000 *baht*, but small proprietors could borrow up to 40,000 *baht*.⁸

In some cases, the landowner was not only the moneylender. In one instance, the prosperous landowner in Pakha was also involved in buying crops mainly from small proprietors and tenants which he sold to the crop mill owners of Sara Buri province. It was in the interest of the landowner to lend money to the small proprietors and tenants particularly since they would become his permanent debtors supplying him with crops. The more in debt the tenant or proprietor was, the more the landowner would benefit (apart from gaining a high interest payment), by offering a lower price on buying crops from the tenant/debtor. Since the tenant and small proprietor were desperate for money or indebted to the landowner they had to accept his terms. They knew that they were in no position to complain. Moreover, the tenant and the small proprietor were aware that should they sell their crop to another middleman, they would have to settle their debt immediately. There was less pressure to pay if they continued to deal with their creditor.

Furthermore, interest was so high on the small amounts that the landless tenants borrowed and their net income was so little after deducting the debt payment. From this point of view, it was not unusual that most tenants and small proprietors were 'perennially in debt'.⁹ Additionally, tenants knew that they should settle their debts immediately after the harvest. Otherwise their reputation for honesty was adversely affected and economic support from the landowner/creditor in the future in a bad harvest could not be counted on. There were three or four families (not among the tenants but poor landless labourers) who were avoiding to pay their accounts and whose reputation suffered in consequence. They were deemed as *khon chacy mai dai* (distrusted people). But there were many tenants, small proprietors, and landless labourers who were unable to pay the full account, and although the outstanding debts accumulated from year to year this was no reflection on their reputation for honesty. In some cases, a landowner would not always take over a small proprietor's land immediately or bring the case to court even when the small proprietor had defaulted on his interest payments according to the terms of their agreement: he did not want to antagonize his client for that would mean the latter might defend his interest by blood revenge or such other revenges as robbery and burglary. There was no need to antagonize clients who could be used as a permanent nucleus for crop supplies.

By allowing default in the interest payment as a favour from year to year landowners were able to obtain gratitude,¹⁰ and might be eventually obtaining the land from the small proprietors.

Dependency relationships of the small proprietors, tenants and landless labourers with the land owners who are their creditors, are initiated and maintained by continuing mutual benefits. Moral obligation may vary from case to case. The acceptance of subordination does not necessarily imply special treatment. The content of the relationship between the creditor who is a trader, and the debtor who is a tenant or a small proprietor, is specific: rice supplied against credit. This is unlike the landless labourers, most of whom are not permanently employed by land owners. The reasons why a land owner gave a loan to a landless labourer was partly because the former needed labour force for crop growing and partly for his social reputation. Therefore, credit was considered as the basis and point of departure of their relations.

During life crises, the need to find a patron was likely to be frequent for people in Pakha. Pakha's patrons did not have their position ascribed; their position was achieved. Clients were those who had the capability to reciprocate for what they received from a patron, who was different from them because he had more wealth, and power, at the time when they asked for a favour. Therefore, the whole network of patronage was one of exchanged favours between people on a personal level but often brought under the institution of usury. The small proprietor, tenants or landless labourer was forced to seek the landowner or wealthy trader as his patron for social insurance against periodic subsistence crisis. This relationship of dependence was usually seen by clients as primarily collaborative but by virtue of his control over goods and services which client needed, the patron was often in a position to demand repayment in some way.

In addition to possessing land and wealth, a rich farmer, who was a trader or landowner, also acted as a patron. A small proprietor, tenant or landless labourer was dependent on rich farmers for credit. The relationship was always contractual, but there was no explicit obligation on the client to sell paddy to the patron. The contract existed but there was no point at which a client was told, 'Tomorrow you have to return your debt'. The relationship between landowner and his dependents was flexible and such a relationship could be broken at will by either party. Therefore, all tenants and landless labourers were free to break their contract at any time. A poor landless labourer might be dependent on the food and credit of a landowner for his sustenance; but if the landless labourer got to know a better paid job elsewhere, the reason for remaining to work or establishing a relationship with the previous patron disappeared.

However, the relationship between landowner and his dependents were patron-client relationships. Such relationships were expressed in the term *bun khua*, which indicated that the recipient of the favour was obligated to do something to return. Landless labourers were expected to work in the fields of the land owner to whom they were in debt, during the peak season. Also they were expected to provide

free service in the house of the land owner, i.e., they used to clear the garden or help prepare food for religious festivals and other functions. People in Pakha were bound by the value of *bun khun*. The importance of this value could be seen, for instance, when a fairly wealthy land owner in Pakha offered to lend money without interest to a small proprietor, so that the latter could pay for his daughter's cremation. The small proprietor in this case said that the land owner had made *bun khun* to him. In this way the only thing the small proprietor could offer in return was to agree to bargain for his piece of land to the land owner who had demanded a lower price. A person who lacked the capability to return a favour should not be associated with, and in any case had no 'real' friend. In many situations of patronage the client was subject to various forms of moral pressure against which he had no defence, because there was little material terms that he could offer in return for the favours he received. What was asked of him was often a conformity to what the patron regarded as convenient moral standards. The client was expected to live by these even if they often clashed with his interests. In general the dominant class of rich farmers used patronage relationships to exploit poorer farmers such as small proprietors, tenants, and landless labourers.

Moreover, reputation was an important means through which a rich land owner showed sympathy for others who had hard times. The qualities of reputation were evaluated in terms of honour and shame. Although all wealthy land owners did not live up to this ideal of reputation, their actions were judged in relation to it. People who were known to force their debtors to abandon the land, acquired a reputation for shamelessness and greed. Commonly a landowner might be rich yet lack in honour. At the same time it was possible, to a degree, to be honourable yet poor. Therefore, the land owner and labourer relationship in Pakha was associated with honour since it was a moral code according to which rich and poor were ranked: a land owner, choosing among several would be clients, picks the more honourable.

Patron and client were not equals. The basis of exchange between them both arose from, and reflected the disparity in their relative wealth, power and status.¹² Patronage was autonomous and flexible. At the same time it existed in Thai society before seriously invaded on rural communities, and was adapted to meet them as they grew in local significance.

Conclusion

The prevalence of usury in rural areas militates against the establishment of horizontal relationships between the various classes in the villages. The use-value dominates production together with technological improvements in agriculture, i.e., the use of chemical fertilizers, insecticides, etc., therefore, economic interdependences

between landlord and tenant, between landowner and landless wage-labourer tend to remain constant. More fundamentally, in rural areas such agricultural producer is not self-sufficient in terms of capital for producing rice. There are a number of instances of credit co-operatives between farmers. One of these is the Ban Na Agricultural Co-operative (BNAC) which is a branch of the Provincial Agricultural Co-operative in Nakhom Nayok. This, in turn, is responsible to the National Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operative in Bangkok. The BNAC provides credit with cheap rate of interest (15 per cent) to farmers who own the land. According to the BNAC's regulation, those who own no land are not eligible become member of the BNAC. The need for cash to grow rice has forced tenants and small proprietors to become economically dependent on money lenders who are usually large and medium landowners and some of whom engage in agricultural trading. The 'vertical' links between landowner and small proprietor, landowner and tenant have the effect of preventing tenants and small proprietors, as an exploited class, to organize themselves into what Marx calls a class 'for itself'.

In the 1960s the period of rapid growth of the industrial sector together with the development of capital intensive agriculture, small proprietors began to disappear because their economic interests were swept away by the urban section of population and the rural demands for more industrial goods, have reinforced the rural indebtedness. Such an economic development has caused the increasing number of landless wage labourers in the rural areas and undoubtedly also in Pakha and many areas of the district. In certain *tombon* of the Ban Na district there is a high rate of geographical mobility of wage labourers due to landless farmers not finding jobs in the cities and having to seek their living as agricultural labourers. From the geographical point of view such mobility is one of the factors that prevents the tensions between landowner and landless wage labourer in Pakha.

However, during the period of labour shortage, landowners occasionally behave as patron by giving a loan to wage labourers in order to secure labour for a period of full employment. In some cases, the wage labourers in Pakha did not turn up to work for a landowner who had lent them money for such a reason as they found better pay elsewhere. This created resentment on the part of the landowner. Some landowners explained that they would prefer to employ wage labourers from other regions. The class antagonisms between landowners and wage labourers, however, have emerged. But at this stage class antagonisms have not developed to the level of widespread conflict and this despite the fact that landowner's patronage cannot secure a wage labourer's loyalty. The main reason for this is that wage-labourers are casual labour and do not receive anything over and above their wages; although some had a loan from a landowner, later paid out of their wages. The relationship is purely contractual, for a period, and as a link of mutual benefit, i.e., the labourer

contributes his labour agricultural skills to the farm, and the landowner gives employment to the labourer. In this respect the relative autonomy is retained and in some cases as exercised by wage labourers proved to be an obstacle to the exploitation of which they tended to be victims.

However, the operations of patronage have provided, to a certain degree, "vertical"¹² links between landowner and small proprietors, landowner and tenant, landowner and wage labourer. The patronage itself in combination with debt relations can only help to maintain order but it cannot prevent class antagonism to show itself in widespread conflict. What is the factor to prevent class antagonism showing itself in widespread conflict? The answer to this question has to be explained in terms of political context: both in administrative framework and in the characteristics of political life in more general sense.

Inside the district and provincial administration, the urban bourgeoisie dominates. In addition, each Provincial Governor and District Officer are not elected, but appointed from the central government in Bangkok. Those who are chief headmen (*kamnan*) act as a "buffer" between the local agents of the bureaucracy and the villagers and are elected by the *tambon* council; the executive committee of the *tambon* council are elected by the villagers. Prior to 1979, all *kamnan* and headmen in *tambon* Pakha were appointed. As a consequence of this general political background, people are not used to making choices and to taking responsibility in a matter of local government, nor, for that matter, in those of central government either.

Over the last fifty years the characteristics of the administrative system and the characteristics of political life in a wider sense led to the absence of organized and sustained attempts by the rural proletariat to subvert the present order of social stratification. In addition, the general feeling of political indifference and powerlessness among different rural classes is reinforced by the division between rural and urban sections of the population. Such division is the most relevant feature of the political structure because it prevents the unionization of the rural proletariat. The existence of labour associations has only served to provide limited welfare benefits for urban workers in the urban areas. There are no associations or co-operatives in the rural areas which can contribute towards fostering the rural proletariat's awareness of their interests and rights as a class.¹³ Furthermore, the absence of political cohesion of different rural classes can be well explained in terms of the mobility of landless farmers and repressive power by the government forces. This can be seen in the Village Scout movement in Pakha which was created by the Ministry of the Interior and received the official and overt endorsement of the monarch. Membership of the organization are drawn from landless labourers, tenants, small proprietors, landowners, and small businessmen in the town. Those

who are leaders are influential landowners or rich farmers. The organization is used as the government's weapon to suppress leftist and communist movements. People who join this ideological, anticommunist organization, are from different rural classes. In those terms one can see that there is no open conflict between them in Pakha and in other areas partly because there are certainly no remark ideological and political differences¹⁴. Respect for traditional values especially the monarchy pervades the rural as well as the urban population. The institution of the monarchy is used by the ruling class as a mechanism of social control and to prevent social change. That is to say that political system has allowed the traditional system of values to remain in force, by suppressing a modern form of social organization, such as independent trade unions, the Farmer Federation of Thailand (FFT), and left wing political parties, that would necessarily come into conflict with some of the traditional values and restrict their scope of action. In Pakha this has had much effect in preventing labourers from creating political cohesion on a class basis.

Foot Note

¹ Ingram, James, 1955, p. 45.

² Van der Heide, J.H., 'General Report on Irrigational Drainage in the Lower Menan Valley' (Bangkok, 1903), p. 62.

³ Zimmerman, Carl, 1931, p. 28.

⁴ Van der Heide, J.H., 'The Economical Development of Siam During the Last Half Century', *Journal of the Siam Society*, Vol. III, 1986, pp. 74-101.

⁵ The Land Rent Control legislation was implemented by the *tambon* authorities. Conflicts over land rent that might arise were submitted to the Tambon Committee. In 1979 the committee in *Tambon Pakha* was composed of seven members - *kamnan* as the president, three landowners and three tenants who were appointed by the *kamnan*, not chosen by the tenants themselves.

⁶ Rent contracts could not be cancelled for a period of six years unless the tenant failed to pay his rent for two consecutive years. Even after six years contracts could be cancelled only for reasons specified by the Act, with the tenant notified at notified least one year in advance (Morell, David, 1981, p. 221).

⁷ Mimeographed translation : Ban Na Agricultural Co-Operative, Paper I for Credit Regulation 1981.

⁸ This amount of money borrowed from the moneylender was high in the local context.

⁹ Cf. Kaufman, H.K., 1976, p. 63.

¹⁰ Pettigrew, J.J.M., 1975, p. 40.

¹¹ Scott, James, 1977, p. 22.

¹² Cf. Pettigrew, J.J.M., 1975, p. 209.

¹³ Farmer Federation of Thailand (FFT) is the only political organization which is organized by landless farmers. The FFT emerged in 1974 but it ceased to grow and dispersed after being suppressed by the government and rightists.

¹⁴ Cf. Poulanzas 1974, pp. 269-296.

Alternative Planning Vision and Structural Changes in Rural Thailand

Prischa Piamphongsant

"Concern for man himself and his fate must always form the chief interest for all technical endeavours...never forget this in the midst of your diagrams and equations".

Albert Einstein

"You can never plan the future by the past".

Edmund Burke

"Accumulation of political and social consciousness is more important than accumulation of capital".

A maxim of Neue Politische Ökonomie

Introduction

This essay follows a multi-dimensional approach of socio-economic system theory. It seeks to emphasize alternative planning philosophy and methods in which the Thai social system can organize itself to solve the present systemic crisis. In this essay the following assumptions are made:

1. All political power belongs to the Thai people;
2. A new system of values and norms is well established. New societal goals are already articulated and formulated;
3. There exists a democratic planning institution which becomes a guardian of the collective interest and acts at the same time as a "visible hand", guiding the bargaining between various "special interest groups".

With these assumptions we try to develop a spectrum of some fundamental principles of an alternative planning model for Thailand.

Two further points are important for our analysis:

1. Our planning process shall take place in the "hostile" environment, where various special interest groups and private enterprises dominate the economic life. That means a system of planning alternative and optimal solution must emerge within this constraint.

2. In our essay we shall try to show that there is no such a thing as a unique "supersystem". In all real-world systems various principles and mechanism of social decision-making are always combined together.

That means also it is necessary to defuse the ideological issue; the dichotomy concept "capitalism-socialism" could not be used here.

In the last part of the essay we shall show some problems in the designing of alternative planning system—using the rural sector of Thailand as a case study. There we shall analyse some fundamental characteristics of rural crisis. And then we try to illustrate how alternative planning can help to transform the existing rural structure.

1. Fundamental Principles of Alternative Planning Crisis in the Thai Planning

The period 1960–1986 may be adequately described as a period of "crisis in planning" in Thailand¹. A few of the following elements are worth highlighting :

1. Thailand deserves more than any other Asian country the title of an "anti-social laboratory", it exhibited in the course of 25 years of planning a unique combination of capitalist growth and rural underdevelopment, high inequalities in income and wealth, and massive destruction of natural and social environment.

2. The Thai "indicative" planning is authoritarian with its 3 basic elements: centralization, non-participation and etatism.

3. In the history of the Thai planning no basic alteration in the institutional systems (for example property relations) was envisaged. The planning is to function within the traditional framework and in harmony with the capitalist ethics.

The most outstanding feature of the Thai planning is the total absence of a grand vision². The net result is that the Thai economy operates as almost a laissez faire economy. Thus the contradictions are evident : domination of the private sector and the alienation of the common man, the weaker population sections and the less privileged. At the same time the economic cooperation between the private sector and the state has created the social imbalance : promotion of private consumption of the minority and deterioration of the collective consumption for the masses.

The crisis in planning suggests that we now need to think out the new philosophy of planning. Thus we shall try to develop some fundamental principles of alternative planning, in the following passages.

Planning With Anti-Equilibrium

The equilibrium concept is of great importance in economics and sociology. It is seen also in the concept of planning. But we probably over-estimate the stability of the system. In reality our own society is not in equilibrium at all and thus cannot be understood by the equilibrium concept.³

In fact equilibrium is a product of our slow and limited perception. With faster and longer perception we would see—as BUDDHA says—persons growing, aging and dying—that is a constant flux of irreversible change. We can conclude that our alternative planning must see the social world as a constant flux of irreversible change. We can conclude that our alternative planning must see the social world as a disequilibrium system. The anti-equilibrium philosophy⁴ has 2 implications for the planning:

1. Crisis in planning suggests that we need now planning in a crisis. That means the alternative planning should be a response to certain shocks (for example external shocks or international price crisis) and internal discontinuities (rural poverty, or income and wealth inequalities). At the same time the planning should represent an attempt to create certain other positive discontinuities (for example the re-allocation of resources in favor of the rural sector). Alternative planning is thus planning reaction to crisis with anti-equilibrium.

2. Anti-equilibrium means also that the transition process in our planning model must be seen as a systemic change process, well-known to the general-system theorists as “morphogenesis”, i.e., structural transformation—governed by positive-feedback loops and deviations which push the system to a new structure.

In this planning concept our social world is not a steady-state, which maintains its structure over time by deviation-reducing processes.⁵

Planning and Social Change

A good example of the static planning can be found in Thailand. In the history of the Thai planning 1960–1986 we have experienced already 5 Plans. The Sixth covers the next 5 years period (1987–1991). All of them have certain common characteristics:

1. They seek to describe the economic reality, and at the same time to predict the future and the results of the state interventions in the macro-economy.

2. They are collections of the state expenditure programmes for the development of various sectors.

Such plans are useful to government planners and administrators. They allow the state managers to coordinate their projects more effectively.⁶

But they cannot help us to change the systemic environment. Therefore under a new system of societal goal formation we need a completely new kind of planning. For us, by a “plan” we mean a spectrum of strategies, mechanism and methods, collectively designed to decisively influence the whole socio-economic

structure of the country. A plan does not only control the production, resource allocation or distribution of income and wealth, Moreover, it provides us a guiding thread for the changes in the whole systemic configuration necessary to improve the human interrelationship and the conditions of life and work of the people.⁷

Planning and Anticipation Model

As we have seen, planning is undertaken for the purpose of effecting changes in the systemic environment. This implies that these "changes" should be related to the concept of "future". In this sense planning can be defined as a "future-directed" decision making process. But our planning does not mean the extension of the present; it does not make projections, predictions or forecasts. Our alternative planning has a character of "anticipation model": we must invent and construct the future; we must make planning "futures-creative", i.e., planning in such a way as to make the future conform to some theoretical vision of society. When we speak of "creating the future" we are concerned with "alternative futures" rather than with the future itself. Thus the futures-creative planning has to construct various anticipation models of possible futures.⁸

According to our anticipation model, to create alternative futures means to introduce fundamental changes in value systems. Without these changes planning is only the extension of the past. From this general postulate we now can derive 3 statements:

1. Only changes in the overall configuration of values can transform the present system.
2. Through the socialization process at the level of individuals a new world-view will emerge.
3. A new state of social consciousness will induce the system change.

Thus our alternative planning is the organisation for the development of the "future consciousness". The plan has to design alternative values and aspirations, and the ways of fulfilling these visions. The point of the plan is to change the present system to fit the image of the future-vision rather than to project the present into the future. Fig. 1 is one example of the inclusion of the "future" into planning model, it shows significant factors which could influence varieties of the future trends and counter-trends.⁹




Figure: 1 The procedure for the analysis of the profiles, and for the construction of scenarios, future history and image "utopia" (multiple scenarios analysis, see reference note no. 9)

Economic Planning and Planning for Freedom

In the light of anticipation model we consider now consider now the economic planning and the problem of freedom. Every planning has a time horizon. That means we want to view the national economy as an evolving entity. Within the framework of a short horizon, however, the planners face relative fixed production, consumption and distribution possibilities. Any operational plan should therefore be drawn up in the light of, say, 20 years perspective.¹⁰ The traditional Thai plans set normally current goals within very narrow perspective (5 years). The planning authority has failed to charts a course for the longer-run development of the whole system. It has no "future-history" at all. For our alternative planning we suggest the following points:

1. We have to plan our present state of the economy in relation to the expected remote future. That means that the planners have to consider various social interests, preferences and aspirations. At the same time they have to monitor the systemic tendencies caused by economic growth, contradictions and structural crisis. Thus the planners can reach conclusions about the trends, countertrends, their discontinuities and the possible images of the futures.

2. It is necessary to have dynamic choices among alternative paths of the systemic developments. These choices include not only "strategic choices" (for example consumption vs accumulation), but also the "system choices" (combinations of various social decision-making mechanism). The purpose here is to implement the optimal path which brings about radical changes in the actual distribution of wealth and welfare.

Under the conditions of widespread poverty and high inequalities it is quite correct for the planners to pay attention towards the decisions and choices in creating the foundations for future material welfare and radical redistribution of wealth and income for the masses. However conflicts could emerge in the planning: redistributive interventions and re-allocative strategy could limit the freedom of the individuals. Moreover, material growth alone cannot satisfy the inner world of the people. Further growth may be accompanied by an increase in domination and alienation.¹¹ Therefore we have to introduce the concept of "freedom" in our planning horizon. That means: for the alternative planners it is not sufficient to be concerned with the material planning. The planners must plan for the freedom-not only for the present but also for the next generations.




Fig. 2: Development path and freedom in human interaction

Fig. 2 shows that through the planning the free interaction between people of the future must be greater than the present state. This concept implies a radical reorientation of values priorities: free interaction (without domination) is more important than freedom of material choices.¹²

Planning, Efficiency and Balance of Power

Another basic task of the alternative planning is to permit more democratic government to function more efficiently in the economic sphere. That means, in the free enterprise system such as in Thailand the plan is designed to supplement the market mechanism and to improve its performance. Or exactly: the function of planning is to reduce the existing monopoly power and to reproduce a system of perfect competition.

But in order to increase the efficiency of the whole system we could introduce a wide spectrum of multi-dimensional coordination mechanism:¹³

1. The invisible hand: the free market can serve as the means for integrating the fragmented economy into a unified national market system.

2. The visible hand: The state-bureaucratic mechanism can satisfy some social needs and demands.

3. The indirect hand: The state economic policy intervention can give some guidances for the private sectors.

4. The information coordinator: organized information system can improve the decision-making of the private producers, consumers and working persons.

5. The non-market coordinator: collective agreement and bargaining, democratic election, consultation, arbitration and traditional exchange constitute non-market means of coordination.

Our alternative planning system should be characterized by optimal use of all five types of linkages in order to maximize the welfare of the people efficiently.

These 5 elements imply also the existence of political pluralism. They could serve a valuable function by diversifying power in the Thai society and by providing a counterweight to the power of the state, military and the capital. A comprehensive system of social decision making mechanism goes hand in hand with the reduction of power monopoly.

Market, Planning and Participation

In real-worlds completely centralized planning is impossible. Some degree of decentralization is necessary. Thus one important problem concerning the search for a realistic planning alternative is the optimum relation between market, planning and popular participation. This could be developed in the following way:¹⁴




Fig. 3: Combinations of three coordination mechanism

On this two-dimensional plane in the Fig. 3 there are 4 points :

- A is the initial situation of Thailand
- B corresponds to western industrial order
- C represents a soviet-type centralized planning
- D is the traditional "socialist" model

According to the experience in the real socialist system, Point C is very inefficient and wasteful. Point B is insensitive to social needs. Both have a low degree of participation. Point D is closer to the objective of a democratic society but involves a high degree of bureaucratic planning. In our opinion the route from Point A to Point Y is more desirable and feasible. The route puts the emphasis on 4 developments :

- *democratization of the planning process*
- *decentralization of the economy*
- *gradual removal of capitalist markets*
- *transition to planning with social market economy*

Thus our alternative planning model involves a reduction of capitalist market power, but at the same time it does not advocate a sudden change to the centralized planning (Point C) or to traditional socialist model (Point D).

Associative Planning

Planning is a matter of democracy. Thus our alternative planning must be an associative planning, that is: it is based on equality. Our new socio-economic system should be organized by planning action so that real equality is guaranteed to all members of society. In our view equality has 3 aspects:¹⁵

1. Equality in production: this implies social control of the means of production, the right to work and to manage the production process.

2. Equality in consumption: it refers to distribution according to work and needs. This implies that the distribution must result from the work collectives, and not from the elites of the organization.

3. Equality in administration: effective political democracy should be achieved in all institutions of the society.

The 3 dimensions of equality indicate that members of the society have the right to manage their own institutions and resources. The function of associative planning is thus to develop various models of "self-management" which represent an essential broadening of individual freedom. The goal of such models is the exclusive control and management of institutions and organization at all societal levels by their membership—on the basis of equality of vote.¹⁶

II. Development, Distributive Crisis and Domination in Rural Thailand.

Growth and distribution of a country are inseparably linked. Traditional planning practice in Thailand deals however almost exclusively with the growth problems. With the new planning philosophy the planners have to go beyond the growth approach and include the distribution aspects. This means that we must have a new kind of political economy in order to be able to grasp and influence the reality¹⁷. The approach characterising modern political economy is now illustrated in the II. section of the essay, using as an example the structural problems of rural Thailand.

The Poverty of Growth

For about 25 years (1960-1985) Thailand has experienced rapid growth of the economy. The rates of growth were 6-8% per annum. Even the agricultural sector enjoyed spectacular rates of 4-6% during this period. The growth of over-all per capita output was also impressive. Despite these dynamic growth performances development in Thailand has been highly uneven:¹⁸

A. Spatial disparities: Some regions (Bangkok-Metropole, some urban and progressive rural areas) have benefited considerably more than other. Thus we see wide disparities between urban and rural sectors, also disparities within the rural areas.

B. Persistent rural poverty: most rural areas and rural people lose from the process of uneven development during this period. Thus we call the "crisis of rural poverty."

C. Unequal income distribution: During 25 years of dynamic development the inequality in the distribution of rural income has been rising.

We can conclude that the agrarian crisis in Thailand is primarily a "distributive crisis". Despite the growth of overall and agricultural output we experienced this crisis. Thus we can speak of an "immiserizing growth". The present situation is becoming more critical. Since 1981 it is likely that the substantial deterioration in terms of trade and declining real farm incomes may lead to increase in rural poverty and inequalities.

The distributive crisis in the present rural Thailand is associated with certain structural factors and development paths and styles:

- unequal distribution of land ownership*
- interlinkage system of rural markets*
- commercialization and diversification of agriculture and the green revolution.*

Moreover, the "state factors" such as development policies and strategies, including the state domination (with its centralized model) often have a class bias which has accentuated the existing inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth in rural areas¹⁹.

Land Monopoly and Income Inequality

There is no doubt that the unequal distribution of rural income in Thailand is associated with the existing unequal power structure. The most important factor is the unequal distribution of land. During the last 25 years of development 3 aspects are combined simultaneously:

1. The available evidence on the income distribution is consistent with that on land distribution. The Gini-coefficients of the both kinds of distribution were high and remained stable during the last 25 years.
2. The proportion of the rural population without land is rising, particularly in the commercialized regions. This belongs to the poorest rural groups.
3. Land monopoly and the end of the land frontier have led to a rapid expansion of the tenancy. The tenants have to pay a very high rent.

All these factors suggest that the rural distribution of income remains highly unequal. In the last 25 years Thailand had not implemented a radical redistribution of land at all. The existing land reform law and rent control law remained ineffective. And there was no policy measure to solve the problems of the landlessness and the landless families.²⁰

Interlinkage and Rural Market Power

In the Thai rural system there exists the so-called "interlinked rural markets" or the interlinkage institution. Thus, when a landlord agrees to take on a tenant at a fixed rent, to provide him with credit at a certain interest rate, and to buy (or sell) his product at a certain price, he is entering into an interlinkage deal. The existence of the tripe role "landlord-lender-merchant" gives the person an extraordinary power which a mere dealer does not possess. With this interlinkage the dominant class can offer a comprehensive economic package to the peasants and thus can manipulate the prices and maximize the dominant benefits. The interlinkage is normally combined with 2 other institutions:

1. It may be combined with the traditional Thai patronage system: the landlords may pay poorly or get high land rents, but they provide the peasants with some "social insurance" (free housing, etc.).

2. In the interlinkage the landlords know the peasants' reaction function, i.e. they know the peasant choices in response to alternative offers of packages. In this process the landlords make their choices first and then the peasants choose. That means, there exists here a clear manifestation of power asymmetry.²¹

Thus the combined effect of the interlinkage-patronage and unequal rural power leads to a substantial reduction of the peasant welfare.

Expansion of Capitalistic Development

Structural defects in rural Thailand are also linked with the exogenous evolution. The following developments have in combination disrupted the traditional equilibrium in mode of life and intensified the unequal power structure:

1. The historic expansion of the Thai rice exports and the recent diversification of agricultural sector have led to the increased commercialization of the whole rural system.

2. The expansion of the capitalistic elements: agro-business, urban consumer goods, new modern farm-inputs, farm mechanization have brought new dimensions to the local market system.

Direct results of the both streams are commercialization of land, labor and capital in the rural markets and total reliance on urban capitalist sector. At the same time we can see further deteriorations in the rural structure:

- substantial increase in landlessness and rural proletariat
- widespread indebtedness
- appearance of modern absentee-landlordism and increase in tenancy.

The general result of these developments is the appearance on the village level a new type of social differentiation in wealth, income and land ownership.²² Moreover, a new "capitalistic ethic" penetrates the rural society which leads to dissolution of the traditional values and inner stability of the rural people, that means the disruption of the whole social fabric of rural life. In the streams of capitalistic modernization the majority of the rural people has no life-chance at all.

State Domination and Rural Underdevelopment

Distributive crisis must be seen as one integral part of the general rural underdevelopment which is closely connected with the state domination effects. In the Thai rural system all state machineries are completely run by authoritarian centralized command through medium of directives. The policies and administrative orders issued from the central government have to be implemented by those below in the hierarchical system. The central authority dominates not only the rural bureaucrats, but also the rural people who have to perform in accordance with the central commands. Thus from this point of view the local state machineries are dominant instruments for the repression of the rural masses. The dominant of the state power has various effects on the rural system. Two of them are very significant here.

The golden rule of the local bureaucracy is the maximization of power. To maximize power implies also to get the most for your power. Therefore the local bureaucrats have in the praxis no real interest in the development or in the distribution problems. This is one reason why the central resource allocation for rural development brings little benefits to the rural poor. The result is what we call "micro-inefficiency", that is too many wasteful projects. Each development agency tends to become self-contained empire, carrying out these projects in order to maximize its own power. Normally the local bureaucrats show some preferences for the coordination with the minority of the local population. Indeed power maximization and the satisfaction of the rural interests of the privileged groups are closely related.²³

Another high cost of the Thai centralization is the destruction of popular movement. In the Thai rural system there are various people's organizations. Most of them are the products of central administration. Thus they are not independent from state supervision. Some of them are allowed for some independence, but only within the strict confines of government policies. These organizations serve as the "transmission belt" from the state to the rural masses. They have little choice but to support the official development plans. The subjugation of the rural groups to the state implies that they cannot guarantee peasant legitimate rights. At present those forms of popular organizations outside the perimeters of the state such as autonomous peasant federation are inconceivable. Therefore there is in the rural system no mechanism to ensure the distribution of the benefits in favor of the poor peasants.²⁴

Development Strategies And Anti-Distribution

We have seen that one important cause of the immiserizing growth in the rural Thailand is the political power. Without popular movements the state will tend to serve the local power groups. We shall see now that without popular control the stated development strategies and policies will remain anti-distribution-oriented.

In the last 25 years various interest groups have controlled the instruments of the state and used them to further their own economic interests. One example is the state intervention in the rice prices which benefit the urban consumers, the rice millers and the exporters rather than the poor rice peasants.²⁶

Moreover the strategies and policies for allocating resources to the rural areas are heavily biased against the poor:²⁷

- subsidized credits, extension services and other agricultural services provided by the state tend to benefit the farmers who own land. The poor and the landless have no access to these factors.

- high yielding varieties and modern agricultural inputs are not accessible to all farmers. They are adopted only in the irrigated areas; and only big, progressive farmers are the innovators of the green revolution, subsidized by the state.

- investment in irrigation favours only some commercialized growth regions, where multiple-cropping of progressive farmers is extended.

Thus we can conclude that the state development strategies for the rural areas in Thailand is growth-oriented. They tend to favour the minority of areas and some progressive large farms. These policies must account for the present distributive crisis in rural Thailand.

The agricultural strategies are reinforced by other components of the overall development strategy which is biased against the rural sector and the rural poor. They are:²⁸

- The state development expenditure and investment allocation for the rural sector is relative very small.

- These allocations tend to concentrate in some growth poles and the investments are highly capital-intensive.

- The benefits of the regional expenditures of the total social welfare tend to accrue predominantly to the relatively high income areas.

The new strategy of rural development in the 1980s cannot solve the distribution problems at all. It deals only with the supply of social services to some poverty areas.²⁹ We can conclude that the overall development strategy is oriented against the rural welfare of the majority. The political allocation remains sensitive to the powerful interest groups.

Distributive Crisis and Growth Crisis

In the 1980s the distributive crisis has been intensified by the global growth crisis. In the recent years the Thai economy has gradually lost its momentum. The

Plan targets 1982-1986 have not been met, and the whole structure has experienced serious macro-economic imbalances.²⁹ At the same time the rural sector has shifted to a lower growth path than in the 1960s and 1970s. The slow down is mainly due to the sharp reduction in commodity prices. Fig. 4 reflects this poor performance. It shows that Thailand's terms of trade have deteriorated every year for the last 7 years. This has resulted in declining real income in some rural areas. The future outlook is highly uncertain and the protectionism remains severe. Thus the projections show no significant improvement over the 6th plan period (1987-91).

Together with the growth crisis the unemployment is becoming now a very serious problem for the planners. At present about 7 million people or over 30% of the rural labour force belong to the stock of unemployed persons. The planning strategy in the 1980s indicates the necessity for promoting employment. But most of the major programmes of public expenditure (energy, telecommunications, Eastern Seaboard and urban development) have no major direct job-creating impact for the rural labor. The existing rural employment programme has also not succeed effectively in raising the level of employment. Moreover, the activities of private small-scale enterprises in the rural areas tend to remain limited for the present and next years.

This 2 factors (growth crisis and increased unemployment) will contribute significantly to an increase in overall income inequalities.




Figure 4 Terms of Trade Index 1970-1992.
Source: World Bank, see reference-note no. 26.

Planning Crisis

In the last Thailand's agriculture has been in the process of transition towards a more intensive market-oriented system. It is expected to accelerate during the 6th plan period 1987-1991. But at the same time we see some contradictions in the traditional planning:²⁰

A. The most recent budget allocation reflects severe fiscal constraints. The following points are very important:

1. Over 70% the current expenditure is incurred on 3 elements wages and salaries of the government officials, defence and police, interest costs (foreign loans). None of these could be reduced. Thus the scope for rural development is very limited for the near future.

2. Because the bulk of spending is for recurrent obligations the capital expenditure of the public sector is only 20% (of the total expenditure). The opportunity for increased public investment for the rural sector during the next 5 years is not great. The share of the agricultural sector is likely to decline (less than 15% of the total capital expenditure.)

B. There is a growing view among the Thai planners that the state should increasing be to facilitate private investment in the agricultural sector. But there is danger that this policy could create biases in favor of the developments of certain large ventures (contract farming, vertical integration and other large agri-business). Along this line is already the main interest in the new strategy of big-business in Thailand.

C. Certain monetary policies, for example credit policies, still favor large farmer. Moreover general policies of modernization indicate that the state will continue to follow the traditional growth strategy. Thus the small and the poor peasants do not receive high priority attention.

All these factors indicate that in the near future the distributive crisis will be further intensified.

System Tendencies-Possible Future History

Under the conditions of the traditional development paths and the stability of development strategies we can predict that for the next decades the distributive crisis will be combined with the overall structural crisis; and there is a tendency for real rural income to decline further. Thus a majority of the rural population will experience absolute impoverishment during the 1990s. The following developments are possible:

1. The spatial distribution of income will become more polarized; disparities between Bangkok and the rest of the country, the margins between rural and urban wages tend to widen.

2. Within the rural society the income will become more skewed.

3. Some areas with high poverty will see little progress.

That is, the system tendencies for the next decades will remain the same as in the past because the fundamental causes of the distributive crisis still work efficiently in the rural system. The government planning is only the extension of the present crisis.

III. Strategic Planning for Rural Transformation : The Optimum Solution

The third section is devoted to the analysis of some strategic recommendations relevant for the transformation of the whole rural structure. The planning institution is seen here to have a central position in this transformation process; its effort to change is one of the basic characteristics of our alternative system. The possibilities of the implementation are strongly supported by a democratic government. Thus the planning institution in our model has no "political constraint," it can influence the economy and society in an optimal way.

Strategy Implications

Our analysis in the II. section has shown that despite the growth of output and income the majority of rural population of Thailand has experienced impoverishment and distributive crisis. This means that the benefits of the "trickle-down effects" are very limited. More growth as suggested by the traditional planners is unlikely to solve the distribution problems. Therefore we have to introduce radical strategies and measures to attack the problems directly. Our analysis of the causes of distributive crisis provides a useful suggestion for the direction, which the socio-economic appraisal of a strategy ought to take. It implies :

1. We should stress the problems and causes of human suffering and misery. An alternative planning ought to try to minimize the alienation of the rural poor rather than try to maximise the output and growth.⁸¹

2. For the Thai society the causes of distributive crisis are of institutional nature : Land monopoly, local market power and its interlinkage, capitalistic expansion, political domination and traditional growth-oriented development strategy.

All these 5 factors are interrelated and there is mutual reinforcement between them. Thus the policy parameters have to attack these main linkages directly in order to transform the existing power structure and at the same time to minimize the human suffering in the rural Thailand.




Figure 5: Implementability of rural planning.

Our analysis suggests clearly that it is necessary to implement comprehensive political reforms aiming at radical changes in rural power structure and institutions. This means that the state has to reduce the domination effects (i.e. the state domination over the rural population; the domination of the rural dominant groups over state and the poor peasants). The abolition of asymmetric power relations can lead us to an increase in the efficiency of redistributive strategy. At the same time a change in development styles and strategies will increase also the distributive effects of the implemented projects. (see Fig. 5).

In the following passages we shall stress some "strategic" points for our alternative planning, that is we shall consider only fundamental planning variables which bring about the decisive dynamic forces, which can have large influences on the whole rural system.

Taxation and Distributive Justice

The mobilization of the domestic financial resources is central to the solution of the present crisis in Thailand. Rural underdevelopment and distributive crisis can be solved by increasing spending and redistribution to the rural sector massively and continuously. Thus the primary problem is to mobilize the potential surplus of the whole economy. In our context a comprehensive tax reform is necessary. The income tax in Thailand has nominally a progressive structure. But many types of income are exempt from taxation. At the higher income level the incidence of deductions and allowances increases sharply. As a result the effective tax rate for the high income group is as low as the lower-middle groups. The World Bank said:²²

"Moreover, in view of the pattern of income distribution in Thailand it is estimated that 20% of the households receive 50% of the income-the steeply progressive schedule affects relatively few households at the very top of the income distribution. In addition, households in the top income bracket generally have a large portion of their income from interest earnings which is favorably treated".

Thus, following measures would transform the tax structure and mobilize potential surplus for our alternative development :

1. consideration is to be given to the broadening the tax base to include all income sources that are now exempt or receive favorable treatment.

2. Special reforms include the following areas :

- *interest incomes*
- *income from profits of domestic corporations and TNC*
- *profit income from wealth transfer*
- *taxation of big landlord (land tax) and income from rent.*
- *inheritances*
- *income of big commercialised farmers*
- *corporate income tax for state enterprises*
- *increasing tax for luxury goods*
- *income of capitalistic monks*

All these tax reforms are desirable on grounds of equity and efficiency. The increased revenue could be transferred to the allocation system for the development of the rural sectors and the poor population groups.

Reallocation and Redistribution : an Unbalanced Interaction Model


Unequal development implies the localized persistence of objective poverty. Thus growth strategy cannot eliminate this problem. Moreover the growth of the national economy is encouraged on the basis of resource drainage and destruction in the rural sector. The urban accumulation implies the extraction of rural surpluses to the benefits of the rural centres. The reproduction of underdevelopment and persistence of poverty can be overcome by two mechanism of adjustment : redistribution of income and reallocation of the "strategic" resources. That means, we have to overcome the existing structure through a redefined system of "political allocation". The planning will have to be switched to favour the rural sector. At the same time the following foundations must be created :

1. There exists establishment of interlinkage between rural and urban sectors. Those industries which have direct links to agriculture and rural resources should receive high priority in the planning.

2. Market mechanism and indirect interventions should contribute to an efficient integration between rural and urban markets.

3. The planning must pay particular attention to the relative commodity prices which farmers confront. This means that we have to turn the terms of trade in favor of the rural sector. Thus the incentives to improve rural productivities and to induce the innovations will be provided.

Figure 6: A model of unbalanced interaction



All these measures suggest that there is here an unbalanced interaction model: the political allocation system works in favor of the rural sector.

Rural Institutional Transformations

The basic requirement for the solution of rural distributive crisis is the establishing of socio-economic structural conditions which would open the road to human liberation. Intersectoral political allocation must be accompanied by comprehensive institutional transformations. As the very first step it is necessary to evolve new social and economic measures permitting the abolition of the land monopoly and concentration. For this purpose radical land reform is one important instrument. In our alternative system land reform means much more than a simple shift in land tenure rights. It means the revolutionary, radical changes in the structure of land title and in the status of the working peasantry. At the heart of the problems of land reform lies the question of who owns the land. Our reform would transfer all land to the tillers and also to the landless who have no work and no rented land at all.

To be most effective, land reform alone is not sufficient. Institutional transformations must be continuous. One major reform must succeed in starting a cycle that leads to future need for more reforms. Because the Thai peasants are emotionally tied to the land which they till, it is not possible to introduce a system of collective large-scale state farms. The institutional transformation should be carried out through the principle of voluntary enrollment in cooperatives. The peasantry of each village is free to organize cooperatives of different types, for example :

1. agricultural co-op group: only crop production is carried out collectively ;
2. agricultural farm with producer's co-op : crop and livestock are produced jointly and hold in cooperative property ;
3. combination of private plot and large-scale co-op : the cooperative farm is managed on the basis of collective responsibility and for their own account. At the same time a part of agricultural production remains in the sphere of household farming.

Thus it is clear that here the unified model of authoritarian socialist transformation of the rural system is completely rejected. New planning methods are to be introduced giving the co-op farms wide scope for independent decisions. Highly diversified forms of management and work organization are emerging in the co-op, with the principles of "cooperative democracy" and autonomy. In this model the state has to respect that the co-op is functioning as a democratically led community. The state has no right to give orders. The state has only one function, i.e. to give some guidances and to achieve its economic targets by influencing the

co-op farms in the framework of the national planning. The principle of the cooperative democracy³³ is here identical with the self-management model.

Planning for Social Needs ; Some Reflections

Rural planning should also provide particular answers to relevant strategic questions reflecting social needs. In rural Thailand the problems of poverty eradication, redistribution and equality are closely related. In the light of this interdependence there are some fundamental considerations :

1. In the redistribution process the weak equity axiom is significant, i.e. groups of persons who have the lowest level of total welfare should get a high share of redistributive allocation. This implies that the political allocation should give the highest priority to the least advantaged persons in the society.³⁴

2. Corresponding to this axiom a system of free medical care, educational opportunities and social security and other subsidized social services must involve use of the "needs principle" which includes all least privileged rural people.

3. In the rural system there should be a strong move in the direction of non-material incentives. The proportion of the social product could be distributed on some non-work criteria. The social profit is more important than the economic profit.

4. In the light of massive rural employment it would be desirable to include the non-wage system in the program of labour mobilization. Labour could be rewarded by the fruits of its own output after the production lag. This rural surplus manpower could be utilized without wage or budget system.

5. Rural work program must be combined with rural capital formation. In this way rural employment can increase the stock of social capital assets for the welfare of the poor households.³⁵

We can conclude that in the process of material development in rural areas efficient persons or co-op farms can become richer than others. The planning institution must exercise a proper control over these motivations in the social interests of equity and efficiency. The excess should be taxed away. The poorest should deserve special attention and support according to the needs principle. Finally in the rural areas with its surplus-labour there is only one solution : social labour must be transformed into social capital.

IV. People, Planning and Participation

In this IV. section the emphasis lies upon the interrelationship between the planning and the problem of "political democracy". At the centre of analysis is the "participatory planning approach".

Planning and Social Preference Function

Between the concept of planning and the concept of a political system there should not be a contradiction. Centralized bureaucratic planning belongs to as a rule an authoritarian regime from which political competition is completely eliminated. Participatory planning goes hand in hand with a democratic regime. In this context one important problem is the relation between planners and the people. For the plans to have a real meaning, social preferences of the people must be revealed. We define here a "social preference function" (SPF) as the output of society's political decision-making process; SPF will define various specific socio-economic goals for the society.³⁶


In the case of an authoritarian regime it is easy to develop a SPF that prescribes goals for the planning. The synthesis of individual goals into a SPF is simple because the state preferences dominate every one else's. In our participatory planning model the state is more likely to have to rely upon popular support. Consequently the state and the planners will always consult the people and leave open more channels for expression. Therefore 3 D's are necessary for this type of planning :

- *Decentralization*
- *Democratization*
- *De-etatization*

The problem is now how the *formulation of a SPF must be undertaken*. Such formulation requires the elaboration of the process by which individual members of the society may be induced to reveal their preferences and aspirations.

Special Interest Groups

The most efficient way to form social goals is to have them originate with small-group formations. Citizen whose welfares are affected by planning policies will join together to form groups. We can call them "special interest groups" or political pressure groups (labour union, peasant federations, various professional groups, women action groups, etc.) These groups will help to shape and crystallize preferences of their members and to influence planning decision making. At the same time the people can express their "individual preferences" indirect in elections, meetings conferences, referenda etc. Thus we have two-stage participatory planning process.³⁷



Democratic Political Competition

In our participatory planning model there is no single focus of sovereignty. In fact the sovereignty is shared among various groups; the decision-making process is dispersed. All these groups are operating competitively. The basic idea here is that the competing groups will be brought to resolve their conflicts in a set of bargainings and compromises. The planners are also competing in the process as a group. Thus we view planning as "democratic political competition".

At the end of the process the planners and the special interest groups will choose the specific alternative which will produce optimum advantage-satisfaction-welfare for the people. The optimum preference solution does not show only an optimally desired position but also makes clear the prices and the consequences of desiring that position. In this context it is necessary to understand the category "optimum": To our planning model only the concept of a "negotiated optimum" is adequate, i.e. an optimum attained through a process of social negotiation. In this process no one has the right to declare himself the sole legitimate interpreter of others' interests, preferences and goals.³⁸

Conflicts in the Participatory Planning

Practical evidence as well as theoretical considerations suggest that there may be significant conflicts in the participatory type of planning. The basic problem is maximizing democracy in political decision-making along with maximizing

efficiency in carrying out decisions. In poor organization solutions these two goals appear mutually contradictory. Therefore it is necessary to design an optimal organization scheme.³⁸

Another inherent conflict expresses itself in connection with the motivational conflict. Participatory processes are highly complex and fraught with danger of tensions and conflict of interests. When a new type of planners rises to power in the traditionally growth-oriented economy, it is almost impossible to impose the radical redistribution-oriented preferences on the system. In the transitional period a combination between two types of preferences would probably emerge. A strategy "Growth with Redistribution" would reflect this synthesis. Once the new planners and the new special interest groups establish control with popular and strong political support, the system will then become largely redistribution-oriented.

Humanistic Planning

A wide participatory system is politically necessary to involve people in planning decision making. Moreover it can increase the efficiency of the plan. But there is another argument for a participatory democracy. Planning is not simply concerned with the production of more material goods. It is concerned with the people and the satisfaction of the high-order human needs. In our participatory planning these needs would be recognized. Through participation the social relations between people would be reinforced. In this context we can speak of a "humanistic planning" which has the following elements:³⁹

1. We can understand our societal system better, if we introduce the element "man" and "people" in our planning model. The knowledge about man and his nature, about the people is the real foundation of the planning system.

2. Every planning is associated with certain social values and cultural norms. A pure economic and technological planning would intensify the materialistic orientation and thus stabilize the inhuman life-order.

3. The purpose of the planning must be then the mobilization of the people towards direct participation. Only this way can lead us to the goal of the abolition of the alienated and bureaucratic society.

Thus the humanistic planning means: the man and the people, not the technology and material growth, represent the ultimate value in our planning. The optimal human development—and not the maximale production is the criterion of our planning.

Conclusion

In this essay we have tried to develop the vision of an alternative path for our development in the Thai society. The vision is oriented towards freedom,

equality and solidarity and based on a radical strategy of egalitarian redistribution and re-allocation. Our purpose is to present and demonstrate the viability of the alternative planning model. In our view planning is not only an instrument of policy making but is directed at influencing social consciousness of the people.

Perhaps this essay could inspire some readiness for new voyages of further theoretical discovering. In the near future we should undertake some new operational researches concerning the development of local mode of life on the basis of alternative real buddhist philosophy (for example, based on the approach of "Dhammic Socialism" envisaged by the prominent Thai monk "BUDDHADASA BHIKKHU" of Chaiya, Surat-Thanee).⁴¹ Our democratic rural cooperative model in this essay indicates already clearly that the cooperative system is not only economic organization (business enterprise) but also a humanistic social organization involving new forms of free interaction in the local cultural environment of the life-world of rural population.

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
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41. The full development of his view is to be found in BUDDHADASA BHIKKHU, Dhammic Socialism, Bangkok 1986.



พิมพ์ที่โรงพิมพ์จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย โทร. 2163626

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General Statement on CUSRI

The Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (CUSRI) was set up as a center for social science research in 1967 as a Faculty of Political Science Project. It was formally established as an autonomous institute within the University by royal decree on April 22nd 1974. At present, CUSRI is one of five research institutes at Chulalongkorn University, the other four being the Institute of Population Studies, the Medical Science Research Institute, the Institute of Asian Studies, and the Institute of Environmental Research. The purpose of the Institute is to mobilize the resources of the University community to be responsive to, and to act on national and local regional priority areas of development through social science research broadly defined.

In the pursuit of this objective, the Institute is problem rather than discipline oriented, and is concerned with problem solving through the applications of the results of research rather than with the pursuit of purely theoretical interests. Following the same logic, the approach is interdisciplinary as dictated by the pre-requisites of problem solving in the field of development which require a concerted effort from many disciplinary vantages to come to grips with complex situations. The Institute proceeds from a social science base but draws upon other units of the University for support in the physical and natural sciences as well as the humanities when contributions by these disciplines are indicated by the nature of the problems under study. In this context, the Institute functions as a catalyst, coordinator and administrator of collaborative research.

It follows that although sectoral studies in selected fields are not excluded, the Institute is biased in favor of integrated multi-sectoral approaches to the study of developmental problems as all aspects -- socio-cultural, economic, political, agricultural, technological, etc. -- are interrelated in real life situations. Likewise, units of study tend to get defined concretely as they occur in real life in terms of specific communities or clusters of factors bearing on a problem area, rather than in highly abstract terms that give little grasp on reality.

Although no segment of the population is excluded on principle from Institute research interests, there is a bias in favor of research aimed at serving the interests of the underprivileged, especially in rural areas. Highest priority is given therefore to rural problems, the alleviation of rural poverty, and a more equitable distribution of income in rural areas.

As the Institute is committed to the performance of research in the national interest, it strives to maintain high standards of scientific objectivity, quality, and integrity. It refuses to be pressured into any ideological stance by research sponsors that goes counter to this ideal or accept funding for activity that might be prejudicial to the national interest.
